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PREFACE 
 
This work is an effort at conceptualizing the different phases through which 
relations between the United States, the world’s superpower and Saudi Arabia, a 
regional power of the Middle East, have gone through. The work assumes added 
importance in the wake of the geostrategic importance of Saudi Arabia in the region. 
The first chapter entitled “US–Saudi Relations in Historical Perspective” 
traces the origins and growth of bilateral relations between the two countries since the 
founding of the Saudi Kingdom. The historic meeting on February 14, 1945 between 
King Abdul Aziz and American President Franklin Roosevelt aboard the U.S.S. 
Quincy was the starting point for more robust US-Saudi political relationship that 
developed thereafter. By 1948 diplomatic representation between the United States 
and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was upgraded to the status of embassy. Cooperation 
between the two countries increased at all levels and in various field though the first 
period of the relations. Despite obvious cultural differences there surprisingly was a 
large common ground between the United States of American and the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia. 
The second chapter entitled “Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait and its Impact on 
US-Saudi Relations” looks at US – Saudi relations during and after the Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait. No Arab state endorsed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Jordan, Yemen, 
Libya, Algeria, Sudan and the Palestine Liberation Organization insisted that the 
problem could and must be settled by the Arab themselves. More importantly others 
led by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, thought outside help was required. The Saudi 
invitation to American troops was extraordinary since it was the main supporter of 
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Israel. Saudi Arabia that had long opposed “imperialism” and “Zionism” turned to the 
primary western military power for protection against another Arab country. 
In short, the invasion of Kuwait and the Arab reaction to it marked the end of 
period of Arab consensus and solidarity. Yet another determining factor was the 
American desire for a “New World Oder”. The need to propel Saudi Arabia as the 
regional leader was crucial in propagating this concept. Two powerful national 
symbols, the royal family and Islam, interacted to establish legitimacy for the 
kingdom in the Middle East. The attack on Iraq meant that there was no other state in 
the region in a position to act as a regional stabilizer. 
The defeat of Iraq eliminated all external challenges that Saudi Arabia’s 
leadership feared. In large measures the Gulf War which fought to prevent Iraq from 
becoming the dominant regional power. The coalition arrayed against Iraq testified to 
the undesirability of that outcome. “A greater Iraq” having fought a war first with Iran 
and then other Arab states, would truly have been in a position to influence events 
throughout the region. If the Iraqi military campaign in Kuwait were crushed it would 
leave Saudi Arabia in a dominant and unchallenged position in the region. 
The third chapter entitled “US-Saudi Relations in the Aftermath of 
9/11”discusses the far reaching consequence that the September 11 attack had on 
bilateral relations between the two countries. The involvement of several Saudi 
citizens in the September 11 attack created deep suspicion in the US with regard to 
the utility of Saudi in the worldwide fight against terrorism. The subsequence US 
invasion of Afghanistan to topple the Taliban regimes further worsened US-Saudi 
ties. For the Saudi Arabian rulers it was a choice between the benefit of good standing 
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with the world's only super power on the one hand and the increasing hatred of its 
people for American policies on the other. 
The fourth chapter entitled “American Invasion of Iraq and its Impact on 
US-Saudi Relations” analyses the relations between the two countries during the US 
was on Iraq. As the US invasion of Iraq became inevitable, the question of whether 
Saudi Arabia wanted the Baath regime replaced by a pro-Western government 
pumping oil in greater quantities than Saudi Arabia posed a dilemma for the Saudi 
government. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia worried about the possibility of an Iraqi Shite 
pro-Iranian government installed at its doorstep, following the demise of Saddam’s 
Sunni regime. Saudi Arabia’s responses to the war had to be handled carefully so that 
the US-Saudi strategic alliance did not suffer, while at the same time maintaining the 
semblance of Arab solidarity against US aggression to appease its own indigenous 
population. 
The fifth chapter entitled “US-Saudi Relations in the Aftermath of the 
American Invasion of Iraq”. Critically examines the current issues in US-Saudi 
relations vis. US-Saudi strategic partnership, US-Saudi military cooperation, the 
supply of weapons to Saudi Arabia, the modernization of Saudi National Guard by the 
US and finally economic and trade relations. 
Chapter sixth provides a summary an as well as the conclusions arrived at in 
this thesis. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
American-Saudi relations were shaped significantly by the awarding in 1933 
of an oil concession covering a large area in the Eastern part of the country to the 
California Arabian Standard Oil Company (CASOC) by the late king Abdul Aziz Ibn 
Saud. Up until 1940 American-Saudi relations remained purely commercial with oil 
being the chief of sphere of attention.  
The Second World War (1939-1945) however, changed this situation when the 
United States began to take more active role in world affairs especially after the war. 
During the war the United States decided that it needed to secure a strategic air base 
in the Middle East and after top-secret negotiations King Abdul Aziz granted an 
airbase lease to the United States. 
The historic meeting on February 14, 1945 between King Abdul Aziz and 
American President Franklin Roosevelt aboard the U.S.S. Quincy was the starting 
point for more robust U.S.-Saudi political relationship that developed thereafter. 
By 1948 diplomatic representation between the United States and the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was upgraded to the status of an embassy. Cooperation 
between the two countries increased at all levels and in various field though the first 
period of the relations. Despite obvious cultural differences there surprisingly was a 
large common ground between the United States of America and the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia. 
In the fall and winter of 1973/1974, three events took place, which focused 
international attention on Saudi Arabia oil policies. The first incident revolved around 
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OPEC and the negotiations with the oil companies over prices. For the first time 
OPEC unilaterally raised oil prices ignoring the pleas of power less companies. The 
second incident occurred during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The Saudi King Faisal 
had ominously stated that “Oil Weapon” might be use if the United States did not 
pressurize Israel to relinquish captured Arab lands. Washington paid little heed and 
when War subsequently broke out; the Saudis announced halting of oil shipments to 
the US. For the first time, the United States and Saudi Arabia found themselves on 
opposite sides of a major international crisis. Thirdly although the crisis subsided by 
the spring of 1974 oil prices had rocketed to over $11 a barrel while Saudi income 
rose to $222.6 billion that year. To the United States, it also meant that the Saudi 
Arabia could begin to spend untold amounts on domestic programs, a development 
having potentially far reaching consequences. 
Longstanding military training programs remain an important pillar of US-
Saudi relations. The United States has played an integral role in the development, 
training, and arming of the Saudi Arabian military since the 1940s, when U.S. 
military advisors first carried out a comprehensive assessment of the kingdom’s 
defense requirements. Since the 1940s, a number of subsequent U.S. defense 
assessments, joint planning activities, and training programs have established close 
and cooperative relationships between U.S. military services and Saudi counter parts. 
The Saudi Arabian government has continually sought U.S. military technology and 
training as a guarantee of its national security, and Saudi authorities have pursued 
military procurement and modernization initiative based on the recommendations of 
U.S. defense surveys. 
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The United States meanwhile devised a “Two pillar policy” after the 
withdrawal of the British from the region. This policy looked at Iran and Saudi 
Arabia, as the two regional powers that could fill the so-called power vacuum left by 
the British. This was relatively successful, at least in the context of Gulf security and 
stability, until the fall of the shah of Iran in 1979. Inspite of criticisms of an arms race 
developing between the two regional powers the policy provided an impetus for active 
military relations during the period. Yet relations worsened immediately there after, in 
large part as a result of four crises that followed: The fall of the Shah of Iran in a 
revolution led by Islamic hard liners in Iran and the eruption of hostilities between 
Marxists in South and North Yemen, both of which took place in early 1979 was 
followed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 and the Iraq-Iran war, 
which broke out in 1980. During this period, military relations centered largely 
around two arms request that came to be regarded by the Saudis as “litmus tests” of 
their friendship with the United States: the request for F-15 fighter planes in 1978 and 
the air defense “enhancement package” of 1981 that centered around the Saudi 
request for air borne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft. Although both 
arms request were granted, it was not without stiff congressional opposition that itself 
had as negative an influence on the state of the military relations as the positive 
impact that the American government’s willingness to make the sales had. 
Saudi Arabia has lunched two large-scale operations: internal economic 
development and the building of a modern army. The United States has been called 
upon to assist in both areas. The United States-Saudi Arabia joint economic and 
security commission are the agents of choice to implement cooperation in both. Saudi 
Arabia showed some uneasiness about military ties with the United States doubting its 
benefits, the economic relationship between the two was clearly recognized as more 
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beneficial to them. The development of economic and commercial relations between 
the two countries could be roughly characterized in to two periods. The first, from 
1933 to 1973, was basically a period in with Saudi Arabia evolved from poverty to 
become a major oil producer. Then following the energy crisis of 1973-1974, Saudi 
Arabia seemed suddenly to emerge as a major power. 
In the year immediately preceding the world energy crisis of 1973-1974, there 
a growing realization in the United States about Saudi Arabia’s expanding importance 
in world trade and economic affairs. 
The growing Saudi – American interdependence in trade and commerce led to 
the signing of an agreement which created the “US-Saudi Arabia Joint Commission 
on Economic Co-operation”. The Joint Commission was set up, as a government-to-
government arrangement, with the primary purpose facilitating the transfer of 
technology from the United States to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The work of the 
Joint Commission is under taken by the United States’ Treasury Department and the 
Saudi Arabian Ministry of Finance and National Economy. 
Having relied on the United States to produce the oil reserves, the Saudis have 
also turned to the same source for advice and assistance on how best to invest their 
assets, spend their money, and develop their country. 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 constitutes a major landmark in US-
Saudi relations. The Saudis had helped finance Hussein’s war against Iran, viewing 
Iraq was a bulwark against the Iranian revolution. The sudden movement against 
Kuwait, a fellow Arab state and monarchy threatened the very existence of the House 
5 
 
of Saud. With Hussein on the Kuwaiti border, virtually nothing stood in the way of 
Hussein’s occupation of the Saudi oil fields adjoining the Gulf.  
As Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait, President Bush immediately sent his secretary 
of defense, Richard Cheney, to Saudi Arabia. There, King Fahd, whether of his own 
volition or as a result of Cheney’s arm-twisting, requested that U.S. troops be 
deployed to the kingdom in the context of Article 51 of the UN charter. For King 
Fahd, the decision was traumatic. It contravened longstanding Saudi policy to keep 
U.S. forces “over the horizon” on naval platforms in the Arabian Sea. It also 
constituted stark recognition by the Saudis that, if Iraqi forces spilled over from 
Kuwait into Saudi Arabia, as Cheney warned might be imminent, the battlefield 
would be the kingdom’s Eastern Province where most of the Saudi oil fields are 
located. The Saudi royal request received Islamic validation through a Fatwa signed 
by the principle Saudi religious leader, Abd al-Aziz bin Baz. 
Announcing the Saudi monarch’s request, Bush publicly likened Saddam 
Hussein’s invasion to the action of Adolf Hitler before World War II and explained 
that U.S. military forces were being sent to defend Saudi Arabia, which was important 
to the United States because of the kingdom’s oil resources. U.S. ground and air force 
units were rapidly deployed to the potentially threatened areas of Saudi Arabia. By 
November they numbered more than 230,000 army personnel and marines and more 
than 1,500 combat aircraft of all types. A Central Command forward headquarters, 
under General Norman Schwarzkopf, was established in Saudi Arabia. On 8 
November, after consultation with King Fahd, President Bush announced plans to 
deploy up to 200,000 additional troops to insure what he termed “an adequate 
offensive option”. To allay predictable local misgivings, Bush repeatedly indicated 
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that U.S forces would leave whenever Saudi Arabia decided they were no longer 
necessary and asked for their withdrawal. 
In many ways, as the Gulf war marked a watershed in U.S. trade relations with 
Saudi Arabia, it also left a significant mark on military cooperation. With an active 
conflict enraging the region and with a rise in fundamentalist groups who resorted to 
violent methods for redress of their grievances, the U.S. defense of the House of Saud 
was no longer about preserving oil supplies to the United States but was more about 
protecting an emerging market for arms systems and big engineering projects. In the 
time span of three years, U.S. arms suppliers had sold Saudi Arabia almost $ 11 
billion worth of equipments. Contracts for the biggest oil field projects during that 
time like the Shaybah structure also went mainly to American Companies. 
The looming threat of an Iraq, which was wounded badly, but not finished, 
pushed Saudi Arabia into increased military cooperation with the United States. The 
presence of over 5000 American military personnel in the kingdom confirmed a 
newfound understanding. Most of these personal were involved in enforcing no fly 
zones over various parts of Iraq. This agreement to a large deployment of U.S. 
personnel, during and after the Gulf war, represented a major shift in Saudi foreign 
policy. Saudi Arabia also emerged as one of the largest arms purchaser in the third 
world. During the period from 1988 through to 1995 the Saudis bought $ 67.1 billion 
worth of military equipment accounting for nearly 30% of all Third World arms 
agreements during the above eight-year period. It also gave away contacts worth $ 
17.9 billion since the beginning of 1991 through to 1995. 19% of the value of U.S. – 
Saudi arms contracts was for lethal equipment; the largest portion (29%) went for 
support services (repairs, rehabilitation, supply operations and training). Another 
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major component was for the construction of military bases and facilities, accounting 
for the largest share (31%) through 1990 and the second largest share (24%) for the 
entire period. The military cooperation between the two caused many concerns to the 
Jewish lobby in the United States, which was seriously threatened by the enhanced 
coordination between U.S. and the Saudis. 
The Gulf War and the active threat of radical groups led to enhanced security 
cooperation between the United States and Saudi Arabia. These factors played a 
largely influential role in removing  the ambiguity that had existed in the earlier years 
of relations so much so that the decade after the gulf war witnessed military and trade 
cooperation emerge as an alternative to the oil weapon as the foundation on which the 
relationship moved ahead from the un certainties of earlier decades. 
The threat that international terrorism posed to foreign and domestic security 
was highlighted by the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on selected targets in the 
United State. It dramatically re-energized the American focus and resolve on 
terrorism. 
The events of 11 September raised two immediate questions in the minds of 
President George W. Bush and the members of his national security team. First, who 
was responsible for the attacks? And second, how should the United States respond. 
        Over the ensuing days, evidence emerged implicating al-Qaeda, a 
transnational terrorist organization based in Afghanistan under the leadership of 
Osama Bin Laden and harbored by the ultraorthodox Islamic regime of the Taliban. 
The evidence suggested that Bin Laden had planned and orchestrated the attacks from 
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Afghanistan where he trained and dispatched the hijacker responsible for carrying out 
the operation on 9/11. 
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Lebanon, the four 
countries whose citizens were named as suspects for the September 11 attacks were 
particularly in a delicate situation because many of their citizens took the view that 
Washington itself was to blame for the terrorist assaults 
The West Asian country with the most to lose by cooperating with Bush in his 
"crusade" against terrorism was Saudi Arabia. Washington`s prime suspect, Osama 
bin Laden, was born in the Kingdom and was popular with ordinary Saudis because of 
his defiance of the United States. Bin Laden had been stripped of his Saudi passport in 
1994 and anyone overtly supporting him risked the confiscation of his assets. But the 
permanent presence of thousands of American troops on Saudi soil, since the 1991 
Gulf War and Washington`s unstinting support for Israel had angered and alienated 
many Saudis and created strong Anti-American feelings. Concerned with the prospect 
of a violent backlash, the Saudi authorities had insisted on handling investigations 
into the bomb attacks against American targets in the country and prosecuting those 
responsible in its territory rather than extraditing them to the United States. 
Saudi Arabia was one of three states to have had diplomatic relations with the 
Taliban regime in Kabul, which was in the American hit list for granting sanctuary to 
Osama bin Laden. Riyadh had close ideological, political and economic ties with the 
Taliban that was inspired by the Saudi Wahhabi movement which had swept Abdel 
Aziz Ibn Saud, the founder of the ruling dynasty, to power in the 1920s. Many saw 
the Taliban as a stepson of Wahhabi Arabia. The movement enjoyed considerable 
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support amongst ultra conservative clerics and wealthy citizens who financed its rise 
to power. 
The solid five decade partnership was severely challenged by the 11 
September terrorist attacks. The relations came under considerable strain, for the first 
time, since the oil crisis of 1973. Even though various reports from the Arab Kingdom 
condemned the atrocious terror attacks and sympathized with the United States, Saudi 
Arabia, at first, refused to allow the United State to use its airfields for the strike on 
Afghanistan. It was only after considerable pressure from Washington that made it to 
announce immediately its wholehearted support to stand against the perpetrators of 
the attack. Such ambiguity was only met with scepticism in the United States. 
Some members in the U.S. Congress and several American news organizations 
publicly criticized the lack of Saudi support in the war against terror. Their criticism 
focused on the involvement of Saudi citizens in the terrorist attacks and on allegations 
that Saudi private money had been funneled to terrorist organizations. 
For the Saudi Arabian rulers it was a choice between the benefit of good 
standing with the world's only super power on the one hand and the increasing hatred 
of its people for American policies on the other. 
The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 was perhaps the most difficult challenge 
facing the Saudi government since the Gulf War of 1990-1991. The invasion was 
unprecedented, unprovoked, and lacking in wide Arab and international support and 
in the name of threats, specially, weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and links to 
Al-Qaeda that proved to have little credibility. Official Saudi Arabia wished to see 
Saddam Hussein and the Baath regime go, but feared the aftermath. It opted for an 
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indecisive position, hiding behind a confused rhetoric of open objections to the war in 
regional Arab meetings and forums and implicit approval, even secret cooperation in 
allowing U.S. military command centers to conduct the war from its own territory. 
The Iraq War was to oust Saddam Hussein himself. This made the Saudis 
uncomfortable as the charges trumped up against Saddam Hussein was the possession 
of illegal weapons of mass destructions (WMDS) and he close relationship the Iraqi 
dictator allegedly enjoyed with the Al Qaeda terror network. 
The Iraq War saw Saudi Arabia placed in a dilemma. After refusing to 
participate outright at first, it agreed to provide minimum cooperation by way of 
refuelling and a base later, to appease frayed American nerves.The Iraq War saw anti-
American feelings Saudi Arabia reach a crescendo, as the United States was perceived 
as imperialist and anti-Islamic. 
The Iraq War was a unilateral move by the United States which was opposed 
by many countries, and the United Nations. To the Saudis, the American move 
smacked of imperial designs and as a show of might. Hence it did not convince the 
Saudis to participate in the war 
Saudi-U.S. relations have grown increasingly complex as the number of policy 
challenges facing both countries has multiplied and as both countries security and 
economic interest have become more intertwined. The United States remains the 
principle external actor in the Middle East region, but by most accounts many 
regional policy makers including those is Saudi Arabia, perceive potential U.S. 
influence to be limited by current U.S. military commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
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There has been a lot of anger and antagonism between the United States and 
Saudi Arabia. Both countries have felt the need to restructure their relationship in a 
far more positive way. They have realized that the events of 9/11 cannot be forgotten, 
and there is no way to go back to the past. Simultaneously, both countries are 
identifying a few reasons that should provide the basis for a more positive and vibrant 
relations between them. Significantly, Saudi Arabia, a monarchy, is in many ways an 
antithesis of the United States, the world’s oldest democracy. Saudi Arabia also 
enjoys special importance in the international community because of its unique 
association with the Islamic religion and the abundant presence of a scare and 
precious commodity like oil in the region. 
Both the countries faced a common threat from terrorism, both in terms of 
internal and regional threats. Saudi Arabia was slow to recognize how serious this 
threat was, but after frequent terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia, it had become clear that 
it was as real for Saudi Arabia as it was for the United States. It became clear that 
dealing with terrorism required close cooperation between the two countries, that 
Saudi Arabia needed American assistance in modernizing many aspects of its internal 
security operations, and that the United States in turn needed Saudi cooperation in 
reducing the flow of money to terrorists and for their ability to manipulate Islamic 
cause. 
Saudi Arabia is still the custodian of Islam’s two most important holy places. 
It is still a symbol of Islam, as well as Arab rule, to many people outside as well as 
inside Saudi Arabia. If Saudi Arabia shifted its Islamic assistance overseas to support 
moderate and progressive Islam, it could have a major impact outside its territory. 
Meanwhile the United States was being pressurized domestically to look at more 
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effective ways to tackle terrorism. There was an outcry for evolving a strategy of 
using hearts and minds, other than force to win over terror. 
Cooperation to develop information campaigns to build understanding, rather 
than create anger and fear, between both the countries became a necessity. The cycle 
of US “Saudi bashing” by the Congress and US media, and its mirror image in the 
form of US bashing by Saudi opinion leaders and media, was becoming largely 
destructive in character. Both countries realized that constructive criticism was vital to 
creating mutual understanding on both side. 
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CHAPTER – I 
US - SAUDI RELATIONS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
1. Introduction 
 As a traditional monarchy deriving part of its legitimacy from adherence to 
fundamental Islamic tenets, Saudi Arabia during much of its brief history as an 
independent state, lived in comparative isolation from the rest of the world. While 
various ideological currents were sweeping most Arab states-nationalism, socialism 
and communism- Saudi Arabia remained attached to its own strict interpretation of 
Islam. Oil was the key to Saudi Arabia s‟ economy its future and source of many of its 
dilemmas and concerns as well. If geography has blessed it with oil, history has been 
relatively less kind. For just as Saudi Arabia came into its own as an economic power 
to be reckoned with in the Arab world it‟s surrounding environment often remained in 
turmoil . 
 Physical isolation, however, kept this country away from the dangers of 
foreign intervention, allowing the Saudi family to consolidate its power and to 
dominate its weak neighbors where possible.
1
This was in direct contrast to the early 
decades of the nineteenth century when some of the peripheral areas of the present-
day Kingdom were under the control of rival Arab leaders. Force, persuasion and 
religion went hand in hand as the Saudi family extended its sway over these Arab 
leaders and tribes. Yet many of these border issues were unresolved forcing Saudi 
Arabia to always get involved in Inter-Arab disputes. The Hashemites in Iraq and 
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Tran-Jordan were especially seen as bitter enemies and competitors for political 
leadership in the Arabian Peninsula.
2
 
 Serious external threats, though, were deflected to some extent by the western 
presence in the region. Up until the mid 1950s, this arrangement worked fairly well. 
The British played a security role in the Persian Gulf, Iraq, Jordan and Egypt. The 
Americans were visibly present in Turkey, Ethiopia, Pakistan and Iran. The Soviets 
were nowhere in sight and Saudi Arabia was politically safe and financially sound on 
the verge of financial well being, as substantial oil revenues began to flow. The 
demise of this western-dominated security system surrounding Saudi Arabia with the 
virtually simultaneous appearance of the Soviet Union in Egypt, the intensification of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict and the emergence of Arab nationalism under Gamel Abdel 
Nasser, as a powerful force became a serious threat to Saudi Arabia‟s territory. This 
coupled with Syria and Egypt forming the self styled revolutionary United Arab 
Republic, civil war in Lebanon, the Iranian revolution communization of Ethiopia, a 
bankrupt Turkey and unstable Pakistan shaky North Yemen and a South Yemen allied 
with the Soviet Union alarmed the Saudis as revolution appeared to sweep the Arab 
World. 
 Face with these sources of threat and causes for anxiety, the Saudis, limited in 
human and material resources, but possessing vast amounts of oil and money, tried to 
shape a foreign policy suited to their modest capabilities. Isolation was no answer nor 
was exclusive dependency on the United States. Arab consensus proved to be fragile 
and Islamic solidarity failed to provide a strong alternative. Confronted with an 
uncertain future and shackled with the weight of tradition and history that provided 
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few clues to cope best with new challenge, the Saudi felt a deep ambivalence toward 
the United States which became a source of both anxiety and security for them. The 
belief that their domestic developments could be seriously affected by event in the 
Middle East made them extremely attentive to the shift of power or opinion around 
them. If they believed they could shape events by drawing on their own resource, they 
went to considerable lengths to do so. When the source of danger was beyond their 
reach- for example Israel or Soviet Union- they urged the United States to act.
3
 
2. US-Saudi Relations: The Early Years  
American-Saudi relations were shaped significantly by the awarding in 1933 
of an oil concession covering a large area in the Eastern part of the country to the 
California Arabian Standard Oil Company (CASOC) by the late king Abdul Aziz ibn 
Saud. Up until 1940 American-Saudi relations remained purely commercial with oil 
being the chief of sphere of attention.  
The Second World War (1939-1945) however, changed this situation when the 
United States began to take more active role in world affairs especially after the war. 
During the war the United States decided that it needed to secure a strategic air base in 
the Middle East and after top-secret negotiations King Abdul Aziz granted an airbase 
lease to the United States.
4
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The historic meeting on February 14, 1945 between King Abdul Aziz and 
American President Franklin Roosevelt aboard the U.S.S. Quincy was the starting 
point for more robust U.S.-Saudi political relationship that developed thereafter.
5
 
By 1948 diplomatic representation between the United States and the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia was upgraded to the status of an embassy. Cooperation between the 
two countries increased at all levels and in various field though the first period of the 
relations. Despite obvious cultural differences there surprisingly was a large common 
ground between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
6
 
 Despite changing perception and conditions, the basic common interests and 
differences of their relations remained constant in the first 50 years. The need to 
examine development and significance of ties in the spheres of oil, military, 
economic-commercial and political affairs were important as events in each of these 
spheres had an influential impact on one another. Yet each sphere had sufficiently 
independent characteristics and developed sufficiently independent dynamic to 
warrant being examined separately.
7
 
3. Oil relations 
3.1 Pre Oil Era 
                Before oil was discovered and successfully exploited, Arabia was a poor 
land. The government‟s yearly receipts totaled what was then roughly equivalent to 
$500,000. Charges paid by pilgrims to Mecca constituted a main source of revenue. 
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As worldwide economic conditions improved during the 1920s, more and more 
Muslims made the pilgrimage to Mecca, and the government came to expect and 
average of about 100,000 pilgrims a year. In 1929 a record number came. Pilgrims 
commonly brought goods to sell to cover expenses, and duty paid on these became a 
mainstay of revenues. But the revenues of these goods year shrank when the onset of 
the Great Depression brought a series of lean years. The countries of the Middle East 
and Asia, from which most pilgrims came, were hard hit by falling prices of the new 
materials they produced. As a result, fewer could afford the costly journey to Mecca. 
In 1930 the number of pilgrims fell to 80,000 and in 1931 to 40,000; and the number 
continued to decline thereafter. Customs receipts fell accordingly. The government 
was hard put to it to meet the emergency. Taxes were raised and some economies 
were made.
8
 
                 Before the 1920 American companies had either been indifferent to oil 
deposits aboard or had failed to receive concessions in the Eastern hemisphere 
because of the restrictive national and colonial policies of the European powers and 
the private oil. From 1920, however, they started to take an active interest, prompted 
by worries of two kinds- the prospect of an oil shortage in the US and the threat of a 
British-Dutch monopoly over the world‟s oil resources and the fear of being debarred 
from the exploitation of cheap oil deposits. In the same year the chief American 
geological expert predicted that the country‟s oil resources would be depleted within 
eighteen years. The US navy was also worried because experts claimed that the US 
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would either have to curtail   oil consumption or import oil from overseas. The US 
companies were afraid of missing out on their share of Middle East oil.
9
 
                       During the 1920s, official U.S. interest in Middle East oil remained 
high, but the focus shifted from strategic military concerns to insuring that U.S. oil 
companies would not be frozen out of concessions in the region by the British and 
French. One cause for concern was the San Remo Agreement of April 24, 1920. In 
that agreement, Britain attempted to secure French support for British control of the 
Mosul oil concession claimed by the old British-dominated Turkish Petroleum 
Company (TPC) by granting to the French the 25% share in TPC that had formerly 
been owned by German interests. The Treaty of Severs of August 10, 1920, confirmed 
the transfer of the Mosul oil fields from Turkish sovereignty to what was to become 
the British-controlled mandate of Iraq, and TPC, renamed the Iraq Petroleum 
Company (IPC), retained the concession.  
The creation of TPC had resulted largely from efforts of an American 
entrepreneur, Calouste Gulbenkain, who in 1914 had drawn up an agreement for 50% 
ownership by British interests and 25% ownership each by Dutch and German 
interests. Gulbenkian was awarded a 5% beneficiary, nonvoting interest (2.5% from 
the Dutch and 2.5% from the British). The agreement included a clause eliminating 
competition among TPC owners in developing Middle East oil resources. This self-
denial clause, the precursor of the so-called Red Line Agreement of 1928, was 
included in order to prevent cutthroat competition among the concessionaries.  
               Taken together, the British-French-Dutch monopoly and the self-denial 
clause appeared to the U.S. state Department to be contrary to the “open-door” policy 
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for commercial access to the mandated territories that the United States was pursuing. 
The United States mounted pressure on Britain to allow U.S. oil companies full access 
to the British mandates in the Middle East, particularly Iraq, and went so far as to 
challenge the legal validity of the TPC claim. It was clear, however that the state 
Department was more interested in U.S. participation than in the legal validity of the 
claim, for the United States proposed to Britain that the claim be arbitrated, provided 
any agreement worked out would recognize the right of U.S. firms to operate in the 
mandated territories without prejudice or discrimination. 
                   In the meantime, with State Department encouragement, seven U.S. oil 
companies Standard Oil of New Jersey (now Exxon), Standard Oil of New York (now 
Mobil), Gulf Oil Corporation, the Texas Company (Texaco), Sinclair, Atlantic Oil 
Company (now part of Atlantic-Rishfield, or ARCO), and Pan American Petroleum 
(Standard Oil of Indiana) created a joint venture known as the Near East Development 
Corporation. With U.S. government backing, this group received 23.75% equity in 
IPC in July 1982. As a precondition to participation in IPC, however, the U.S. group 
agreed to abide by the self-denial clause by signing what became know as the Red 
Line Agreement. The State Department gave its blessing to these proceedings even 
though they flew in the face of the open-door principles it had been so stoutly 
defending. This reaction was an indication of the pragmatism with which the United 
States approached the entire issue. 
                     In September 1928, the chief executive offices of the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company, Royal Dutch Shell, Gulf Oil Corporation, and Standard Oil of New Jersey 
met at Achnacarry Castle in Scotland and agreed upon a formula for market 
allocations in order to prevent what was then an oil glut from causing the entire world 
oil market to collapse. The As Is Agreement, as it came to be called, limited market 
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shares, and the Red Line Agreement limited exploration activities. Together, they 
were to determine the course of international oil transactions until World War II. 
Indeed, until the 1970s, control over production rates and prices rested firmly in the 
hands of the major international oil companies.
10
 
3.2 Oil concession         
             The history of oil in the Middle East and the Arab world goes back many 
centuries. A mission of German expert visited Iraq in 1871 and reported plentiful 
supplies of oil. In 1907 another mission said Iraq was a veritable “lake of petroleum”. 
In Iran, oil was found in quantity in 1908.Oil was discovered in the major Iraqi oil 
field at Kirkuk in 1927 and began producing oil in commercial quantities; oil flowed 
abroad in 1934.In 1932 oil was discovered in Bahrain.
11
  
As early as 1930, representatives of SOCAL met the Saudi envoy in London to seek a 
permit for their geologists to visit the Eastern Province, a request that Ibn Saud 
initially refused. Since Twitchell had already visited Saudi Arabia and recommended 
seeking a concession, SOCAL then contacted Twitchell. In October 1932 the directors 
of SOCAL sent a telegram to Philby, who was then living in Jidda, asking him to 
make arrangements with the Saudi government for the preliminary prospecting for oil 
in the Eastern Province. The Saudi preferred to negotiate a concession before the 
geological work stated.  
                In early 1933 L. Hamilton, SOCAL‟s representative, arrived in Jidda. He 
was assisted in his negotiations by Twitchell who had already explored the water and 
mineral resources in Arabia. Simultaneously, Stephen Longrigg of the Iraq Petroleum 
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Company and Frank Holmes of the Eastern and General Syndicate also appeared in 
Jidda. The Saudi demanded that the future concessionaries pay £100,000 in gold on 
signature of the contract. The syndicate immediately dropped out of the game. IPC 
offered a maximum sum of £10,000, still doubting the existence of oil in Saudi 
Arabia. SOCAL finally won the concession for £50,000. 
                      The period of negotiations followed the worldwide depression of 1929-
33 and occurred in a period when the prospects for American business seemed 
gloomy. When agreement between SOCAL and Saudi Arabia had finally been reached 
on all points, the U.S. suddenly embargoed gold exports on 20 April and then 
abandoned the gold standard. SOCAL found a simple solution by buying gold 
sovereigns on the British currency market. The agreement was finally signed on 29 
May 1933 by Abdallah al-Sulaiman, the Saudi minister of finance, and Hamilton on 
behalf of SOCAL. It was ratified by Ibn Saud‟s decree of 7 July 1933 and came into 
effect one week later. In November 1933 the concession was transferred to the 
California-Arabian Standard Oil Company, a branch of SOCAL.  In January 1944 it 
changed its name to the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO). 
3.3 The Concession Agreement Granted SOCAL: 
                      „the exclusive right, for period of 60 years, to explore, prospect, drill for, 
extract, treat, manufacture, transport, deal with, carry away, and export‟ oil and oil 
products, and to create the facilities to carry out these activities. The company was 
granted an „exclusive‟ exploration area of more than 400,000 square miles 
[1,036,000sq.km], covering almost all of Eastern Saudi Arabia. The agreement also 
provided for a „preference right‟ to acquire additional concessions in the remaining 
10 
 
area of Eastern Saudi Arabia, as well as any rights that the government might acquire 
in the so-called Neutral Zone south of Kuwait. 
In return for the concessions the company agreed to meet the following condition: 
1 A loan of £30,000 gold or its equivalent, was to be payable within 15 days of the 
effective date of the agreement.  An additional loan of £20,000 gold after 18 months, 
if the agreement was still in force. Repayment of those loans was to be made by 
deductions from one-half of the anticipated royalties owing to the government. 
2   An „annual rental‟ payment of £5,000 gold, was to be payable in advance until the 
discovery of commercial quantities of oil. 
3   Upon discovery of oil in commercial quantities the company was to make an 
immediate advance royalty payment of £50,000 and another payment of the same 
amount one year later. Repayment was to be made out of anticipated royalties. 
Furthermore, the company agreed to begin relinquishment of areas it chose not to 
explore, within 90 days of the discovery of oil in commercial quantities. 
4   Once oil had been discovered the government was to receive royalty on all net 
crude produced, sold, and run from field storage: 
…after first deducting: 
(a) Water and foreign substances; and 
(b)  Oil required for the customary operations of the company‟s installation 
within Saudi Arabia; and 
(c) The oil required for manufacturing the amounts of gasoline and kerosene 
to be provided free each year to the government … 
11 
 
The rate of royalty was to be fore shilling, gold, or its equivalent per ton. In 
addition, a royalty payment was stipulated „equal to one-eighth of the proceeds 
of the sale‟ of natural gas produced, saved, and sold. 
5 The company agreed to build a refinery as soon as practicable after oil 
discovery and to supply 200,000 gallons (US) of gasoline and 100,000 gallons 
(US) of kerosene to the government without charge. 
6   The government agreed that „the company and enterprise shall be exempt 
from all direct and indirect taxes, imports, charges, fees and duties (including, 
of course, import and export duties)…12 
   Exploration was begun in the Autum of 1933 bringing to al Hasa large 
quantities of modern machinery and a number of Americans. However, oil was 
discovered in commercial quantities in 1938 in Dhahran and production began on a 
small scale the same year after a small storage and shipping terminal had been built in 
al-Khobar, making it possible to ship the oil to the refinery in Bahrain. On 1 May 
1939, the first cargo of Saudi Arabia crude oil was shipped from Ras Tannura.
13
 
3.4 The Second World War 
The Second World War convinced American officials that oil was of vital 
strategic significance. The, then, Secretary of defense James Forrestal became a 
leading proponent of this view, warning prophetically that-“within the next twenty 
five years the United States is going to be faced with very sharply declining oil 
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reserves”14. The war increased the demand for oil and oil products. The outbreak of 
the Second World War came at a bad time both for ARAMCO and for Saudi Arabia. 
While oil production was not brought to a complete halt, it was difficult to reach a 
high level of extraction given restriction on further exploration, human resources, 
drilling and shipment.
15
  
In 1939 rapid growth of revenue from oil seemed assured. From its modest 
beginning of $ 340,000 million in 1938 it grew to $3.21million in 1939 and to $4.79 
million in 1940. Then wartime conditions restricted increase of oil production and 
export. The government‟s revenues, apart from oil, dropped from the equivalent of $ 7 
million in 1938 to about $2 million by 1941. Including the moderate revenue from oil 
and advances by SOCAL total receipts during the year 1941-43 averaged only about $ 
5.5 million.
16
 The war reduced the number of pilgrims, upon whom state finances 
were still partially dependent, and the material and skilled personnel needed for 
further oil exploration and production.
17
 As early as 1943 Roosevelt instructed E. 
Stettinious, the assistant secretary of state, who directed the lend-lease program, to 
organize lend-lease aid to Saudi Arabia. According to the president, the protection of 
Saudi Arabia was vital for U.S. interest, though the kingdom was not participating in 
the war either formally or in practical terms. In 1943 the U.S. senate special 
committee for National Defense Program estimated US aid to Saudi Arabia at $99 m 
in the form of direct and indirect lend-lease and other supplies, of which only $ 27 m 
had to be repaid. According to the committee‟s report, the aid had released AROMCO 
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from meeting the budgetary requirements of Saudi Arabia and removed the danger of 
British control over all concessions and incomes.
18
 
 In 1943 owing to the increased demand for oil from the Allied armies in the 
Pacific and Mediterranean and the cessation of oil exports from Burma and Indonesia 
after these countries were invaded by Japan. ARAMCO supplied oil products to the 
US government for military purposes. Oil output in Saudi Arabia stood at 4.9 million 
barrels in 1943 and increased more than ten times in 1946.
19
  
By the end of 1945 ARAMCO had discovered four large oilfields in al-
Damman, Abu Hadiya, Abqaiq and al-Qatif. In May 1951 the largest oil deposit 
Safaniya was found on the continental shelf of the Gulf. The world‟s largest deposit 
on land Ghawar, some 240 km long and 35 km wide- was discovered in the early 
1950s. Oil explorers expected to continue finding new deposits for liquid fuel in the 
unique geological structures of Saudi Arabia. The oil terminal at Ras Tannura was 
enlarged and started operations in December 1945 with a capacity of 50,000 b/d. The 
annual capacity of the oil processing plant in Ras Tannura had risen to 15m tons by 
the mid 1960s. Two more plants were built in Jidda and Riyadh.
20
 
The war‟s ending cleared the way for a gushing flow of oil. ARAMCO could 
have access to supplies, and markets could expand rapidly.  The Tapline, 1,068 miles 
from the oil-producing eastern region of Saudi Arabia to Sidon on the Mediterranean 
Sea, was begun in 1947. Construction of the Tapline called for difficult negotiation for 
the right to cross Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. The first tanker was loaded at Sidon in 
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December 1950. Tapline saved Sued Canal dues and avoided a trip of many thousand 
of miles to European market. 
21
   
 At the behest of the US State Department ARAMCO began construction of a 
345 mile railroad from the oil part of Dammam to Reyadh Abd Al- Aziz had wanted 
such a rail line for sometime and the line was opened in 1951. The cost was $ 52.5 
million to be repaid by deductions from royalties.
22
 In December 30 1950 ARAMCO 
and Saudi Arabia had made a major change in the concession by concluding a 50-50 
profit –sharing agreement. This agreement was of great importance in as much as it 
set a precedent for similar formula in other oil producing countries of the Middle East. 
A further development was the agreement of both parties in October 1951 to apply the 
new formula before the payment of the United States taxes rather than after as had 
been done until then.
23
 Saudi Arabia played an inconsequential role in American 
strategic policies during this period, and Saudi oil was not too greatly needed by the 
United States during the 1950s and 1960s.During the 1950s even Saudi Arabia itself 
had little control over its oil, especially after it had left Saudi ports. ARAMCO was 
the primary decision maker. Even after the founding of OPEC in 1960, the oil 
producers including Saudi Arabia continued to exercise very little control over oil 
policy.
24
 
However in the 1950s United States control over Gulf oil had ensured huge 
profits for the oil companies and enabled Washington to keep its hand on the tab that 
fed the economies of the West and the Third World. In 1959 President Eisenhower 
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had restricted imports of Middle East oil to 2.5% of total US consumption. At the 
time, the US economy was virtually independent of Middle East oil though the region 
acquired increasing strategic significance in the US administration‟s anti-Soviet. By 
the 1970s however the US had become the world‟s largest importer of oil. Saudi 
Arabia‟s role increased in line with its ability to maintain or increase the volume of oil 
production.
25
 
Inspite of substantial cooperation between the two in oil trading, the urgency 
with which the United States viewed its oil interests in Saudi Arabia significantly 
diminished after the war. Although American interest did not cease completely, the 
broader political and strategic threat of communism and Soviet-supported radical 
nationalism in the region took precedence of their attention over oil interests. As a 
result, efforts to create an active American public sector role in terms of open 
transactions in Saudi Oil operations were replaced once again by a policy of indirect 
government involvement. The United States sought to maintain an overall 
environment in which the private companies could expand their Saudi and other 
Middle Eastern Operations.
26
 
3.5 OPEC 1960 
              The intricate relationship developed over the years and by the 1960s, major 
oil companies dictated oil prices and production rates, aimed primarily to prevent an 
endemic oil glut the world lead to a collapse of the international oil market. 
Continuing American and foreign discoveries perpetuated the oil glut right through 
the 1960s.The control of production and prices by the oil companies led to resentment 
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among the producing countries over their inability to determine or even regulate their 
oil revenues. This resulted in the formation of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC).
27
 
        Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) produces 25% of the 
world oil reserves. Saudi Arabia plays a pivotal role in affairs of the OPEC. The idea 
of OPEC was initiated by Arab League to develop a common policy of major 
petroleum companies operating within their boundaries including non Arab states such 
as Venezuela from Latin America. 
 The negotiation stated in 1947 in Washington to achieve a coordinated 
petroleum policies with Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The first Arab petroleum 
congress was convened in Cairo in 1959. The government of Saudi Arabia and 
Venezuela issued a declaration on 13
th
 May 1960, recommending to pursue a common 
policy in order to protect their right full interests but the countries did not take 
immediate action. Sudden decrease in petroleum prices in 1960 made them fell 
endangered and encouraged them to unite on a common front. Thus Baghdad 
Conference, (10-14, August, 1960) declared its intention to establish this organization 
finally Venezuela Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq and Kuwait were among the members. It 
came into existence in September 1960.
28
  
In 1962 Saudi Arabia created the General Petroleum and Mineral Organization 
(Petromin) the nation first national petroleum company which is empowered to 
formulate and execute projects for the development of the petroleum , petrochemical 
and mineral industries of the nation. Petromin listed five principal area of activities; 
                                                          
27
 Ibid P.20-21 
28
 Foaud Al-Farsy, N.4, PP.108-110. 
17 
 
the exploitation of gas; the diversification of industries within the field of fossil fuels 
and minerals; developing the refining of oil, including the production of benzene, 
toluene and xylene for the Kingdom‟s burgeoning petro-chemical plants; the 
marketing and transportation at home and aboard, of LPG and the speeding up of the 
production of mineral industries and of the prospecting for and development of 
precious metal resources.
29
 Petromin was designed as an independent government 
agency to administer and coordinate petroleum and mineral projects, to import mineral 
need, and to conduct studies on every aspect of petroleum and minerals operations. 
Petromin diversified approach to industrial development can be seen in the numerous 
projects which have come into being since 1962. Petromin project is the Jidda oil 
refinery, which started production in 1968, with an initial capacity of 12,000 barrels 
per day. And the $40 million Saudi Arabian Fertilizer Company (SAFCO) became 
operative in 1969.
30
  
The closure of the Suez Canal and the Trans-Arabian pipeline during the 1967 
Arab-Israeli war put a premium on Libyan crude. The Libyan ruler, Muammar 
Qadhafi instituted “conservation measures” and cut back production forcing all the 
operation companies in Libya to capitulate to Libyan demands. The implication of the 
Libyan success was the growing demands for higher prices and tax rates from all the 
oil-producing countries. The sellers market had truly developed and OPEC had begun 
to flex its muscles. In hindsight, the non-intervention of the American government to 
counter OPEC‟s challenges to the companies could have been a mistake. Even the 
willingness of the companies to deal collectively with OPEC members was itself a 
departure from the 1960s when they, from a position of strength, insisted on dealing 
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with the producing countries on an individual bilateral basis. Of course the United 
States and the companies while negotiating collectively were seeking to, in the words 
of, then Ambassador of Iran, Douglas MacArthur II “play OPEC members against one 
another”. 
At the same time that the oil-producing countries were gaining control over 
price setting, they were also gaining control over ownership of the oil resources in the 
Middle East. Some states such as Algeria, Iraq and Libya accomplished this through 
nationalization. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states preferred to follow the route of 
“participation”- a strategy, according to then Saudi minister of petroleum and mineral 
resources Ahmad Zaki Yamani, “kept companies in the game and maintained an 
incentive for them to continue to re strict production rates in order to maintain price 
stability”31 
In the fall and winter of 1973/1974, three events took place, which focused 
international attention on Saudi Arabia oil policies. The first incident revolved around 
OPEC and the negotiations with the oil companies over prices. For the first time 
OPEC unilaterally raised oil prices ignoring the pleas of power less companies.
32
The 
second incident occurred during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The Saudi King Faisal 
had ominously stated that “Oil Weapon” might be use if the United States did not 
pressurize Israel to relinquish captured Arab lands. Washington paid little heed and 
when War subsequently broke out; the Saudis announced halting of oil shipments to 
the U.S. For the first time, the United States and Saudi Arabia found themselves on 
opposite sides of a major international crisis. Thirdly although the crisis subsided by 
the spring of 1974 oil prices had rocketed to over $11 a barrel while Saudi income 
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rose to $222.6 billion that year. To the United States, it also meant that the Saudi 
Arabia could begin to spend untold amounts on domestic programs, a development 
having potentially far reaching consequences.
33
 
The embargo forced the United States for the first time to focus on the 
necessity for developing and integrated government-to-government energy relation. 
The policies adopted had to take into account domestic as well as foreign supply and 
demand factors. The realization that the United States was dependent on foreign oil to 
maintain its energy-intensive standard of living came slowly and painfully to 
Americans who had come to believe that personal mobility was their right. 
Domestically, the American government created the Federal Energy office/ 
Administration (FEA) and attempted to restrict private consumption more severely 
than industrial consumption. Development of alternative forms of energy under a 
government study called “project Independence” attempted to evaluate various energy 
strategies. The foreign energy policy was both multilateral in terms of focusing on 
major oil consumers, and bilateral in focusing on the major oil export. Saudi Arabia 
with its high production capacity  emerged as the key country for the United States. 
By the late 1970s, Saudi Arabia played an influential role in reducing the 
prices of oil by arriving at a “compromise price freeze” among the OPEC members. 
But the Iranian revolution led to dropping of Iranian oil production. The resultant 
climbing of oil prices led to “panic buying” in the market. In order to avoid another 
supply freeze, companies and countries alike began building up inventories, which 
increased the prices further. The Saudis, in the meantime limited production of oil (6.5 
m b/d in 1979) with a warning that increased prices would bring down the demand, 
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although the United States and the world at large felt the Saudis had acted in greed 
and irritation at the Americans. The world production had peaked by December 1979, 
yet the prices continued to rise. The breaking out of the Iraq-Iran War led to mayhem. 
As the Iranian and Iraqi production now shut down, Saudi Arabia increased its 
capacity. However, by August 1981, it became obvious that, unlike the Iranian crisis, 
the war had occurred on the downside of a market cycle thereby merely postponing an 
oil glut. Saudi Arabia rapidly cut down production (4.5 mb/d in offered 1983) yet the 
demand kept declining. Oil producers and companies that had stocked offered 
“discounts” and de stocked their oil. In just a decade since the production countries 
had seized control of their oil resources, and OPEC, with Saudi Arabia at the helm had 
seized control of price and production, the world had witnessed two rapid price 
escalations and two oil gluts. Despite every one‟s vociferous support for market 
stability it appeared to be as far from realization in the 1980s as in the 1970s. For the 
United States, the world‟s greatest oil consuming country, and Saudi Arabia, the 
world‟s greatest oil exporting country, oil relations would remain a crucial interest in 
the future.
34
 
4. Military Relations 
The Saudi connection is an importance ingredient in American policy planning 
for several areas and issues: the Red Sea and Suez Canal, the Persian Gulf and the 
flow of oil, the Indian Ocean and Soviet naval strategy East of Suez, the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and the alternatives of war and peace, and the actual United States military 
presence in the region.
35
 The strategic location of Saudi Arabia between the vital Red 
Sea and Persian Gulf shipping routes and across the direct air route to India and the 
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Far East were key reasons for early military relations to be initiated with the United 
States. Domestic opinion in the United States was in favor of furnishing certain direct 
assistance to Saudi Arabia in order to obtain additional privileges such as extensive air 
facilities.
36
 
Saudi Arabia‟s defense expenditures have had to respond to a massive regional 
arm buildup, and to rapidly expanding threats on all its borders. Saudi Arabia has had 
to buy advanced technology, and pay the extraordinarily high cost of creating high 
technology forces without a base of trained manpower and modern military 
infrastructure.
37
                                  
Longstanding military training programs remain an important pillar of US-
Saudi relations. The United States has played an integral role in the development, 
training, and arming of the Saudi Arabian military since the 1940s, when U.S. military 
advisors first carried out a comprehensive assessment of the kingdom‟s defense 
requirements. Since the 1940s, a number of subsequent U.S. defense assessments, 
joint planning activities, and training programs have established close and cooperative 
relationships between U.S. military services and Saudi counter parts. The Saudi 
Arabian government has continually sought U.S. military technology and training as a 
guarantee of its national security, and Saudi authorities have pursued military 
procurement and modernization initiative based on the recommendations of U.S. 
defense surveys.
38
 
In December 1943 General Roys, Commander-in-chief foe the US forces in 
the middle East , visited Saudi Arabia and made arrangements for the construction of 
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military airfields in the Dhahran and Dawaqa. The building of the air-force base in 
Dhahran began in 1944 and was complete two years later. A U.S. military mission 
arrived in Saudi Arabia to train the Saudi army together. During the US supplied arms 
and military equipment to Saudi Arabia under the lend-lease program.
39
 
The Land-Leas aid of 1943 that formally initiated military relations was 
followed by the United States sending several survey and advisory missions to 
enhance security infrastructure in Saudi Arabia. The “extensive air facilities” 
agreement (airbase at Dhahran and emergency air fields at Lauqa and Hafr al-Batin) 
was concluded in August 1945. This was an important agreement to the United States 
as it had control over the base for three years and thereby helped it control hostilities 
with Japan during the Second World War. Following the war, although the Dhahran 
air base greatly decline in importance, the advent of the Cold War, accompanied by a 
Soviet treat, and oil security, which was a major element of Saudi economic interests, 
increased the military relations between the two countries. A second agreement on 
American access to the Dhahran airfield was concluded by the June 1949. The first 
comprehensive United States plan, though, for building a modern Saudi Armed force 
was devised though O‟Keefe report made by a survey team headed by Major General 
Richard O‟Keefe. The Saudis approved the recommendations of the O‟Keefe mission 
despite deep bitterness over the United States role in the creation of Israel in 1948. 
Saudi resentment over American support of Israel was out weighed by the continuing 
perception of encircling external threats to Saudi security and the desire for an 
American commitment for protection against such threats. Over the years, evan 
though the Saudi desire for American support against encirclement persisted, 
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resentment at over weaning U.S. support of Israel created ambivalence in their 
military relations.
40
                   
 In 1948 the United States navy, entering the Persian Gulf for the first time, 
paid a courtesy visit in Dammam, and the next year the American can legation in 
Jidda was raised to the status of an embassy. In the spring of 1951 by a special 
agreement the United States made available to Saudi Arabia technical aid under the 
Point Four program. The two countries moved closer to each other by signing, in Jidda 
on June 18, 1951, a defense agreement that extended for the next five years the lease 
of the Dhahran air base, enable the Saudi Arabian government to buy military 
equipment in the United States, and provided for the military training of the Saudi 
Arabian army by American instructors.
41
 
In the broadest sense, the military relations involved a trade-off between the 
American desire for access to a forward strategic military base and the Saudi desire 
for evidence and reassurance for American commitment to protect the regime against 
foreign threats. The American did not want its military commitment to become so 
broadly constructed that it would possibly entangle itself in regional conflicts and 
place itself in a position of choosing sides on the Arab-Israel issue. The Saudis on the 
other hand remained highly sensitive to any perceived infringement of their 
sovereignty and to charges of other Arab states that they had relinquished any portion 
of their sovereignty to a foreign power by granting bases. The influence of the 
Egyptian nationalist leader Abdel Gamal Nasser on king Saud Aziz during the 1950‟s, 
the Saudi king‟s suspicions on British influences on Jordan and Iraq and his continued 
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claims for Buraymi Oasis (a dispute with Oman and the Arab Emirates) all played at 
least some part in keeping Saudi Arabia out of the American backed Baghdad pact of 
1955. 
The expiration of the Dhahran agreement and increased Arab-Israeli tensions, 
which forced Saudi Arabia to join an Arab “Defensive Alliance” in October 1955 
worsened relations. Continued Saudi arms requests, necessitated by a five-year 
military development plan (the 1380 plan) did not receive any Washington 
commitment. But the military relations stabilized quickly with the signing of a new 
Dhahran agreement and financial assistance to the tune of $ 120 million and arms 
sales worth$110 million in 1957. However the decreasing relevance of overseas bases 
to the United States and increasing criticisms on Saudi Arabia by other Arab states led 
to a formal closure of the Dhahran agreement in Mach 1961
42
 
                 Amazingly the cancellation of base rights went along way in reestablishing 
the military relations on a firmer footing. An event that helped to improve relations 
further was the crowing of King Faisal following his brother King Saud‟s abdication 
of the throne. Faysan ended the mismanagement and court intrigue that characterized 
the rule of his brother and kept continuity in national security affairs. A second 
influential event was the outbreak of the Yemeni civil war. It created a security threat 
so serious to Saudi Arabia, for the firs time, the Saudi leadership felt the need to 
develop a modern, effective military force tout weighing the internal security risks 
inherent in creating such a force.
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This was direct contrast, as the Saudis up until this time had not made any 
serious efforts to develop their military might. The rationale behind such a reluctance 
of the royal family to place much power in the hands of military men was the need 
neutralize the risk of military coup. The Saudi National Guard and the king‟s tribally 
based army were mainly responsible for security. The former had traditionally 
occupied strategic locations near Riyadh, Jeddah and Dhahran, while the latter were 
kept away from urban centers, often with out much ammunition or mobility. These 
practices though began to change in the 1970s. When Yemeni civil war ended in 1970, 
only $45 million was spent on American arms and services in a year. But by 1973, the 
figure rose to $ 1.15 billion aided by an increase in Saudi oil income. Following the 
„Yom Kippur War‟ it rose to $2billion per year and by 1979 it has shot over $6 billion. 
In addition to this, 5000 Saudis from the military and National Guard had received 
American training during the 1970s. Expanding oil reserves led to huge increases of 
arms. The contribution of American military might to the global and regional balance 
of power provided a security umbrella to Saudi Arabia.
44
  
  By 1973 virtually every major Saudi military modernization program 
involving the United States was in place. The most extensive and expensive program 
involved Saudi air defense but there were also program with the Saudi army and navy 
and wholly separate from USMTM, a program to modernize the Saudi Arabian 
National Guard, the Kingdom‟s tribally recruited paramilitary security force.45 The 
United States has agreed to provide services for Saudi Arabia in the following area: 
sale f-5 fighter jets, buildup of the navy, modernization of the National Guard 
construction management services. United States-Saudi Arabia Joint Commission on 
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Security Cooperation including the exchange of announced and unannounced visits by 
high officials of both countries for purposes ongoing coordination and consultation.
46
  
           Despite the magnitude of these efforts, Saudi Arabia entered the 1980s with out 
feeling confident of its ability to defend itself. It doubted American capabilities and 
determination to defend it and worried about circumstances in which American armed 
force might be used against rather than in support of their interests.
47
 
The United States meanwhile devised a “Two pillar policy” after the 
withdrawal of the British from the region. This policy looked at Iran and Saudi 
Arabia, as the two regional powers that could fill the so-called power vacuum left by 
the British. This was relatively successful, at least in the context of Gulf security and 
stability, until the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979. Inspite of criticisms of an arms race 
developing between the two regional powers the policy provided an impetus for active 
military relations during the period.
48
 Yet relations worsened immediately there after, 
in large part as a result of four crises that followed: The fall of the Shah of Iran in a 
revolution led by Islamic hard liners in Iran and the eruption of hostilities between 
Marxists in South and North Yemen, both of which took place in early 1979 was 
followed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 and the Iraq-Iran war, 
which broke out in 1980. During this period, military relations centered largely around 
two arms request that came to be regarded by the Saudis as “litmus tests” of their 
friendship with the United States: the request for F-15 fighter planes in 1978 and the 
air defense “enhancement package” of 1981 that centered around the Saudi request for 
air borne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft. Although both arms request 
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were granted, it was not without stiff congressional opposition that itself had as 
negative an influence on the state of the military relations as the positive impact that 
the American government‟s willingness to make the sales had.49 
Yet the two arms sales package proved to be central to an American effort in 
creating a “strategic consensus policy” of prioritizing security in the face of the Soviet 
threat in the Middle East over the Camp David process. But the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon in 1982 forced the United States to refocus policy concerns back on the 
Arab-Israeli problem. Military relations with the Saudis though quickly took 
precedence with the introduction of American troops to Saudi Arabia in the backdrop 
of the intensifying Iraq-Iran war. Thus, despite various distractions that had the 
potential for increased ambivalence the spirit of cooperation between the two 
countries remained reinforced. Inspite of having not worked out a common strategy 
with their priorities differing and their political imperative often clashing, the Saudis, 
on the one hand, recognized the importance of the United States to their security, 
while the United States, on the other hand, needed the Saudis for maintaining regional 
stability in the region. As in the past, the long tradition of cooperation continued to 
provide momentum in the military relations despite the vagaries of Middle East 
Politics.
50
 
5. Economic Relations 
Saudi Arabia has lunched two large-scale operations: internal economic 
development and the building of a modern army. The United States has been called 
upon to assist in both areas. The United States-Saudi Arabia joint economic and 
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security commission are the agents of choice to implement cooperation in both.
51
 
Saudi Arabia showed some uneasiness about military ties with the United States 
doubting its benefits, the economic relationship between the two was clearly 
recognized as more beneficial to them. The development of economic and commercial 
relations between the two countries could be roughly characterized in to two periods. 
The first, from 1933 to 1973, was basically a period in with Saudi Arabia evolved 
from poverty to become a major oil producer. Then following the energy crisis of 
1973-1974, Saudi Arabia seemed suddenly to emerge as a major power.
52
 
Americans oil companies had been responsible for the discovery, development 
and management of Saudi oil. Economic plans were designed in consultation with 
American experts. American technology flourished throughout the kingdom. The 
national airline, desalination projects, the hospitals, the National Guard and the vast 
petrochemical complexes at Jubayl and Yanbu all reflected American technology.
53
 
Saudi Arabia relies on its oil revenues to diversify its economy to build a broad 
industrial base and to educate and train its nationals. Through its economic 
diversification and manpower training programs the Kingdom hopes to transform 
itself from a semi-theocratic monarchy into a modern industrial state.
54
 
The Kingdom holds 25 percent of the world‟s oil reserves and the Kingdom, in 
its determination to develop its economy for the benefit of its citizen, needs the 
expertise of the West, there is an economic interdependence which binds the two 
countries together. Saudi Arabia oil supplies are crucial to the economies of the 
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Western world. Saudi Arabia is a major customer for the Western world‟s expertise, 
goods and services. It is in the interests of both the United States and Saudi Arabia to 
maintain and strengthen these economic ties.
55
  
The development of the Kingdom‟s oil resource, in particular, laid a firm 
foundation for co-operation between The United States and the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. The formation of the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) brought 
Saudi Arabians and Americans together in the exploitation of the vast oil reserves of 
the Kingdom.
56
 
U.S.-Saudi relations economic development had primarily involved the 
American private sector, not the government. For many years, ARAMCO probably 
played a more important role in this sphere than the American government. Economic 
relations also like military relations formally began with the extension of the 
American Land Lease aid to the kingdom in 1943.  There were two influencing cause 
responsible for the Land Lease agreement. The first one was the request for financial 
assistance by the Casco Company from the American government in 1941. The 
request materialized after the Saudi King Abdal Aziz, faced with the prospects of a 
financial collapse, had demanded an advance aid of $12 m to exploit the oil resources. 
The Second World War had brought the company‟s operation to a virtual stand still.  
The second motivating factor was the growing concern in Washington that the British 
intended to use their economic assistance to a kingdom as a wedge to increase their 
political and oil interests. 
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Following the war, mounting oil revenues ensured conclusively that the Saudi 
government would not collapse financially. Yet the rudimentary fashion in which the 
Saudi ministry of finance operated seldom distinguishing between public and private 
finance led to the task of reforms led by the United States and Britain. The Unite 
States partly on its own initiative, begun offering technical assistance in 1948. The 
Eddy-Mikesell Mission was sent to look at currency reform, while John. E. Greany 
arrived to help design an income tax under the “point four agreement” signed in 1951. 
A Financial Mission under Arthur Young was sent to reform the budgetary and 
administrative system of the Ministry of finance and to improve the tariff system. All 
these missions were the creation of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) IN 
1952 to operate as the kingdom‟s Central Bank.57 
With the ascendance of King Saud to the throne in 1953, economic and 
political relations began to suffer just as they were gaining impetus. By 1954, the 
Kingdom revoked the point four agreements on the ground that financial assistance to 
the country was too small in comparison to the assistance given to Israel. The 
outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war in 1956 and the advent of Nasser‟s “Arab 
Nationalism” wrapped in emotional and sentimental strings did not help matters much 
either. But economic relations improved when King Faisal replaced his brother and 
become the King. American government technical assistance mainly focused on the 
military field and mineral exploration. The United States geological survey (USGS) 
and ARAMCO under joint U.S.-Saudi sponsorship had published a geological map of 
the country by the mid 1960s. Saudi Arabia‟s need for western technology and 
technical assistance, their preference for American technology, American strategic 
interest in Saudi Arabia Oil and the growing purchasing power of the Kingdom all 
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contributed to insulate economic relations to great degree from the divisive Middle 
Eastern political issues of the day.
58
 
The new wealth of the 1970s increased the vulnerability of the Saudi regime. 
Saudi Arabia continued to look towards the United States to play the role of protector 
and guarantor of its security. Saudi Arabia had been enjoying a close liaison with the 
United States since after the Second World War. Partnership with the United States 
became more urgent in the aftermath of the new wealth in a country that lacked the 
human and technological resources to guarantee its own security.
59
 
In the year immediately preceding the world energy crisis of 1973-1974, there 
a growing realization in the United States about Saudi Arabia‟s expanding importance 
in world trade and economic affairs. The combination of change, opportunities and 
anxieties created by the massive accumulation of foreign exchange held by Saudi 
Arabia and other OPEC oil producers, following the energy crisis, resulted in a high 
level of ambivalence in the economic relations with Saudi Arabia. On the one hand, 
the United States welcomed investment of Petrodollar, keeping its open door 
economic philosophy in mind. Saudi Arabia was accommodated because it provided 
substantial advantages, such investment capital and strengthened relation with the 
United States. Accordingly the United States facilitated Saudi and OPEC investment 
in two ways- one was an understanding reach in early 1974 to treat Saudi investment 
in the United States confidentially and the second was an arrangement between the 
U.S. treasury department and SAMA, for SAMA purchases of American government 
securities through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. On the other hand, there 
was concern over the inadequacy of the system to monitor the growing OPEC and 
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other foreign investment in the United States. There were fears that the world financial 
system would not be able to recycle huge amounts of petro dollars amassed by Saudi 
Arabia and other oil producers, resulting thereby in a massive world wide liquidity 
crisis. More over the United States feared that Arab Petro dollars would be used to 
buy American firms; controls segments of the economy and possibly inhibit Jewish 
financial interests. Within the domestic arena, especially in the Congress, concern that 
OPEC and its Arab members would acquire a „money weapon‟ to accompany their 
near monopoly control over the supply of oil, increased. Saudi Arabia, in the mid 
1970s, came under particular scrutiny and various sub committees on Multi National 
Corporation‟s corrupt practices and on technology transfer to OPEC countries were 
constituted. The point on confidentiality and the traditional U.S. policy of welcoming 
foreign investment on a non-discriminatory basis become involved in the broader 
constitutional issue of separation of power between executive privilege and the 
Congressional investigatory responsibility.
60
 
The growing Saudi – American interdependence in trade and commerce led to 
the signing of an agreement which created the “US-Saudi Arabia Joint Commission on 
Economic Co-operation”. The Joint Commission was set up, as a government-to-
government arrangement, with the primary purpose facilitating the transfer of 
technology from the United States to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The work of the 
Joint Commission is under taken by the United States‟ Treasury Department and the 
Saudi Arabian Ministry of Finance and National Economy.
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The development plans from 1971 were worked with the help of the United 
States-Saudi Arabia Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation. The First 
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Development Plan, from 1971 to 1974, began after oil revenues reach $ 1 billion in 
1970. Budgeted for about $ 16 billion, it cost about $20billion. Major items were for 
transport and communication; port improvement and new port; agriculture and water 
resource, including more plans to desalinize sea water; and creation of industries 
based on petrochemical and minerals. The plan also included items for education, 
social development and defense.
62
 
Having relied on the United States to produce the oil reserves, the Saudis have 
also turned to the same source for advice and assistance on how best to invest their 
assets, spend their money, and develop their country. Private American consults have 
worked with Saudi on their successive five year plans, including the 1981-1985 plans 
to spend nearly $ 250 billion. American financial experts have advised the Saudis on 
how to invest their surplus revenues; by 1980 they were earning nearly $ 7 billion on 
oversea investment of $ 80 billion. When added to petroleum-related income, this 
brought total Saudi foreign exchange earning in 1980 to over $ 100 billion. 
U.S. – Saudi Arabia trade expanded in parallel with these foreign exchange 
earnings. In 1979 American companies signed nonmilitary contracts in Saudi Arabia 
worth nearly $6 billion, or about 35 percent of the total. Actual exports from the 
United States to Saudi Arabia in 1980 amounted to $5.8 billion; U.S. purchases from 
Saudi Arabia were more than double that amount
63
  
A major project was direct investment of the Saudi government in the oil 
industry. Its oil company is Petromin (General Petroleum and Mineral Organization). 
Petromin is increasingly active in many phases of oil-related enterprises and wants to 
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expand more broadly by buying substantially all ARAMCO‟s assets in Saudi Arabia. 
Purchase began with 25 percent in 1972 and later increased to 60 percent. Transfer 
was mostly completed in 1980, with total payments to ARAMCO reported to be close 
to $ 5 billion.
64
  
In the 1980s, the Saudis desire to ease the strains in the relations created by the 
1973 Arab-Israeli war and the subsequent oil embargo and the determination, with 
their new oil and financial power, to enjoy equal economic relations resulted in the 
formation of a Joint Commission with the United States in 1975. In its first decade, 
the joint commission posted a solid record of achievement. The value of the 
commission to both countries, qualitative rather than quantitatively, had been an 
incalculable boon to close economic and commercial relations. Although Saudi Arabia 
found itself in the ironic position of a negative cash flow problem in its current 
account, during the oil glut in the mid 1980s, American exports of industrial products 
exceeded $ 9 billion with another $ 500 million in agricultural products. Around the 
same time 650 U.S. firms were represented in the kingdom with some 60,000 
American employees and dependents. This had generated about 350,000 Jobs in the 
U.S. Thus it would be no exaggeration to say that the economic relations between the 
two by the late 1980s had been establish on a rock solid foundation.
65
 
6. Political Relations 
From the early 1930s through 1945, US-Saudi relations were shaped 
significantly by the awarding in 1933 of an oil exploration concession to the 
California Arabian Standard Oil Company. CASOC‟s discovery in 1938 of substantial 
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oil reserves in eastern Saudi Arabia and subsequent private and public U.S. efforts to 
mange and defend oil production operation during the war years led to a deepening of 
bilateral relations. The United States gradually replaced the United Kingdom as the 
chief external political and economic support of the Saudi government during this 
period.
66 
In February 1945 President Franklin D. Roosevelt met with King Abd al 
Aziz on the American cruiser U.S.S. Quincy anchored in the Great Bitter Lake north 
of the city of Suez. The President meeting with King Abd al Aziz symbolized the 
growing involvement of the United States in Saudi Arabia affair. And the war 
convinced American official that oil was of vital strategic significant.
67
 
After the Second World War the United States strove to replace Britain as the 
dominant power especially when oil changed from being a commercial product to a 
strategic commodity of prime importance. America‟s interest in Saudi Arabia and its 
oil should be seen as part of its concern to maintain its superpower position after the 
Second World War. The United States was beginning to be concerned with the threat 
of communism. According to the Eisenhower Doctrine the doctrine promised that 
American armed forces would be deployed to protect countries threatened by 
communism. Washing ton was convinced that the „ the Soviet Union seems to be 
determined to break down the structure which Great Britain has maintained so that 
Russian power and influence can sweep unimpeded across Turkey and through the 
Persian Gulf into the Indian Ocean‟.68 The Eisenhower Doctrine was based on the 
assumption that a vacuum had been created in the Middle East after the defeat of 
France and Britain in the Suez war in 1956. The doctrine promise that American 
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armed forces would be deployed to protect countries threatened by communism. In an 
attempt to counter the threat of Nassir and communism Saud visited Washington in 
1957. In Washington the Saud was promised military assistance and economic support 
amounting to $ 180 million and a commitment from American to supply Saudi Arabia 
with ground aircraft and naval equipment, train Saudi pilots and send technicians.
69
 In 
return Saudi promised the Americans that he would suspend all aid to Egypt and 
signed two agreements granting the United States use of the Dhahran base for an 
additional five years and providing for American the extend additional military 
assistance to strengthen the Saudi armed forces. The right to use the Dhahran air base 
was terminated in 1962. Saudi Arabia realized that a closer relationship with the 
United States offered protection against communism and Arab revolutionary trends in 
1960s. Saudi Arabia also saw the United States as the main superpower capable of 
guaranteeing the security of the kingdom against the rising influence of the Soviet 
Union in the Middle East.
70
 
From 1958 to 1963 the United States appeared to be courting President Nasser 
of Egypt, and this created new strains in U.S.-Saudi relations. American recognition of 
the Republican regime in North Yemen in 1962 came as something of a shock to the 
Saudis, for it appeared to align Washington with Nasser on an issue of great 
consequent for Riyadh.
71
 It seems that the American administration was mending 
fences with Abd al-Nasir, seeing him as a progressive non-Communist local counter 
weigh to Soviet expansions‟. In 1963 Faisal restore relations with Britain which 
promised to modernize and upgrade the Saudi Nation Guard. In June 1963 a British 
                                                          
69
 Alexei Vassiliev, N.9, pp.351-352                                            
70
 Madawi Al-Rasheed, N.15, pp. 119-120                                                                                              
71
   William B. Quandt, N.1, p.49                                                                                                    
37 
 
military mission arrived in Saudi Arabia to help train the National Guard together with 
a number of planes of the USA, its superpower ally and ultimate guarantor of its 
security. However Faisal realized that closer relationship with the United States 
offered protection against communism and Arab revolutionary trends in the 1960s. 
During the 1960s Saudi-U.S. relations were tense as Faisal rejected Kennedy‟s 
proposal to withdrawn support from the Yemeni royalists. Faisal insisted on the 
withdrawal of the Egyptian military forces as a pre condition for suspending support 
to Yemeni royalists. The relationship with the United States remained tense in 1962-
1963 although later Faisal drew closer to the United States in an effort to strengthen 
his country against the threats of Arab nationalism and socialism. As Crown Prince 
and Prime Minister Faisal also saw the United States as the main superpower capable 
of guaranteeing the security of the Kingdom against the rising influence of Soviet 
Union in the Middle East.
72
 
Americans made it crystal clear that were the main ally of Israel a state that 
threatened the security of several Arab countries. Libya Syria Iraq and South Yemen 
were generating revolutionary anti imperialist rhetoric that was directed mainly 
toward the United States. For the Muslim country with enormous oil wealth to be 
identified with American imperialism, which was sponsoring Zionist expansion at the 
expense of the Arab world. The Saudi-United States relationship invited the wrath of 
revolutionary regimes and the hatred of the Arab masses in the late 1970s. Saudi 
Arabia‟s vulnerability to the attacks of those revolutionary regimes made it even more 
necessary for the country to seek protection from the United States and buy huge 
quantities from United States. 
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CHAPTER - II 
IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT  
AND ITS IMPACT ON US – SAUDI RELATIONS 
Among the territories that the Saudis failed to overrun and add to Saudi Arabia in the 
1920‟s was Kuwait. Along the entire South-Western shore of the Persian Gulf lived 
half-wild Arab tribes, led by Semi-independent Sheiks (chiefs). The Ottoman Turk 
had never really made good their control here, though Eastern Arabia was nominally 
apart of their empire. In the late nineteenth century increasing attention was focused 
on this area, there were proposals to build a railroad all the way from Central Europe 
to Baghdad and the Persian Gulf and to contact the trade between Europe, India and 
the Far East on this eastern railhead. Under such a plan, the shores of the Persian Gulf 
would assume very great strategic importance.
73
 
 The area around Kuwait has been settled for thousands of years. Military and 
commercial activities by various Mesopotamian empires passed though Kuwait. 
Kuwait is part of the civilization created on Dilmun, in present day Bahrain. In 1650, 
drought forced Bedouin families, later know Bani Utab, to migrate from Najd in 
Central Arabia. The ruling family, Al Sabah was among the immigrants. 
 Al Sabah family settled in Kuwait in 1710. Sabah Bin Jaber elected Sheikh of 
Kuwait in 1756 and founded the Al Sabah dynasty. During that time Kuwait was a 
vassal state of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire recognized Mubarak the 
Great, sheik and ruler of Kuwait, as the provincial sub-governor of Kuwait in 1897.
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The Sheikdom of Kuwait lying directly to the Southwest of the delta of the Shatt-an 
Arab had been ruled by the descendants of the Sabah abu Abdulloh since the middle 
of the eighteenth century. In 1897, Sheikh Mubarak thought his semi-independence 
was being attacked by the Turk and asked the British government to give him 
protection. If the route through the Persian Gulf was going to become important, Great 
Britain resolved to have some share in its control. So Britain accepted the Sheikh‟s 
invitation and established a protectorate over Kuwait in 1899. At the outbreak of the 
World War I, in which Great Britain was aligned against Turkey, the wholly 
theoretical Turkish sovereignty of this area was renounced and Kuwait became a 
sovereign state under British protection. At this time Kuwait was an ill-defined areas 
its boundaries had never been agreed upon on paper or marked on the ground. In 
1922, with the rise to power of the Saudis it became necessary to clarify this matter. It 
proved difficult, however to secure agreement, and in one geographical area no 
agreement was ever reached. To the South of Kuwait is a so-called Neutral Territory, 
in which Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in default of a boundary settlement, agreed to share 
equal rights. They continue to do so even now that oil has been found there. West of 
Kuwait, a second Neutral Territory is shared by Saudi Arabia and Iraq.
75
 
1.Iraq invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War 
 At about 2 a.m. (Baghdad time) on August 2, 1990 three Iraqi Republican 
Guard Divisions invaded Kuwait. One proceeded down a coastal road to Kuwait city, 
a second seized the Island oil fields, and the third proceeded to the Saudi Arabia 
border. Kuwait A-4 aircraft and chieftain tanks fought for three days until their fuel 
and ammunition were exhausted. The small Kuwaiti Navy also made a valiant 
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showing with the last two fast attack craft escaping while firing at pursuing Iraqi 
tank.
76
 
 Iraqi forces quickly captured Kuwait city and the Emir‟s Palace while the 
Kuwaiti ruler Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmed fled to Saudi Arabia and established 
government in exile. On August 3
rd
 the remainder of Kuwait was captured and by the 
4
th
, Iraqi forces were amassed along the Kuwaiti-Saudi border for a possible invasion 
of Saudi Arabia.
77
 
 The reasons for the invasion date back to the creation of present day Kuwait. 
In 1899 Great Britain and Kuwait signed a treaty in which Britain assumed control of 
Kuwait‟s foreign affairs. This was done in order to thwart German imperialist designs 
in the region, and after World War One also led to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire 
and the creation by the European power of Iraq and a number of other countries. 
These events and decisions reflections of the European balance of power that did not 
consider the region‟s culture or politics still reverberate, and the finding of oil and 
later, in the 1970, its greatly enhanced value, aggravated trouble at times tribal, 
situations. Kuwait was an artificial creation imposed by the West, and in both denied 
Iraq a considerable amount of oil and restricted its access to the seas. This 
arrangement was never accepted, and when Kuwait received its independence on June 
15, 1961 Baghdad almost immediately claimed it, basing this on the facts that Kuwait 
had been part of the Ottoman Empire that it was an artificial British creation and it 
threatened Iraq‟s access to the sea. Threatened by invasion Kuwait appealed to the 
British, whose military reaction in July 1961 was enough to thwart Iraq. Kuwait was 
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admitted to the United Nations and the Arab League, but Iraq did not renounce its 
claims would often resurrect it, and would cite it to justify the August invasion.
78
 
 Iraq perceived that Kuwait was drawing more than its share from the common 
North-South Rumaila oil field. In addition, Kuwait had increased its oil production 
and reduced its price, damaging the economies of several Arab countries including 
Iraq and Libya. In recent years Kuwait has invested hundreds of billions of dollars in 
the U.S., Japan and Western Europe, and yet unemployment is extremely high in 
many Arab countries including Jordan, Yemen, Egypt, Algeria and Morocco. 
Interestingly enough the ruling family in Kuwait has not invested many substantial 
amount of its wealth in its Arab neighbors.
79
 
 Other grievances articulated during the case fire with Iran in August 1988 and 
the Jeddah conference before the invasion on August 2, 1990 includes the following: 
1. The over production of OPEC quotas. 
2. The Iraqi debt to Kuwait ($ 20-30 billions) 
3. The oil allegedly taken from the Rumaila field (worth $ 2.4 billions) Kuwait “war” 
on Iraq, Kuwait alleged alliance with foreign powers, to effect the economic collapse 
of Iraq. 
4. Lack of implementation of an Arab Marshall plan for Iraq. Iraq claimed it was 
entitled to expect the Gulf countries to lunch a Marshall plan to support its recovery 
from the war, just as the U.S. had done in Europe after World War II and  
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5. Kuwait‟s alleged reluctance to negotiate with Iraq. 
 These complaints were intensified two years prior to the invasion in August 
1990. There is no doubt that the Muslim nations in general and the Arab countries in 
particular have either failed to understand the validity of Iraq‟s grievances or they did 
not want to get involved in finding an acceptable solution to this problem. In both 
cases they failed to diffuse the rapidly deterioration crisis.
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 In early 1990 the Kuwaiti oil minister, Sheikh Ali Khalifar al Sabah, called for 
the system of oil production quotas to be scrapped as soon as possible. “From a 
practical standpoint the quotas are already irrelevant so all that is needed is 
recognition of the fact” he said. He had been closely associated with the policy of high 
levels of oil production to keep the word oil price low and stable. In May, he was 
shifted from the ministry of oil to that of finance mainly to assuage Iraqi suspicions of 
Kuwait over production. The oil production and pricing policy of Kuwait had by 
them, become an additional irritant in the Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations which had already 
been soured on account of Iraqi demand of cancellations of its debts to Kuwaiti 
investments in the post-war reconstruction of Iraq and right of access to Bubain.
81
 
 On 7th July, the Iraqi president Saddam Hussein claimed that the Arab states 
of the Gulf had “robbed” Iraq of $ 14 billion by depressing oil prices on the 
international market. The next day the Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz charged in a 
letter to the Arab League that Kuwait had erected military outposts on Iraqi soil and 
exploited its southern Rumaila oil field stealing oil worth $ 2.4 billions.
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Kuwait at the time had oil production quota of 1.5mbd and was producing 1.9mbd 
instead. Till the end of the Iran-Iraq war, it had also produced an additional amount 
125,000 bd and supplied the proceeds of its sale to Iraq under the “war relief” 
agreement. As the agreement was discontinued with the termination of the war, the 
Iraqi allegations in this regard were well-tied and the Kuwaiti response time-tested. It 
was widely believed that Kuwait had had offered one billion dollars to settle the 
dispute.
83
 
 Prior to a meeting of the OPEC Ministerial Council in Geneva on 25 July 
1990 Iraq had implied that it might take military action against countries which 
continued to flour their oil production quotas. It had also accused Kuwait of violating 
the Iraqi border in order to steal Iraqi oil resources worth $ 2.400 m, and suggested 
that Iraq‟s debt to Kuwait, accumulated largely during the Iran-Iraq war should be 
waived. On the eve of the OPEC meeting in Geneva, Iraq stationed two armored 
divisions (about 30,000 troops) on its border with Kuwait.
84
 
 The Iraqi threat and military mobilization led to a sharp increase in regional 
tension. Before the OPEC meeting in Geneva on 25 July 1990, president Mubarak of 
Egypt and Chedli Klibi the Secretary General of the Arab League travelled to 
Baghdad in an attempt to calm the situation. The U.S.A meanwhile alerted its naval 
forces stationed in Bahrain. At the conclusion of the OPEC meeting, however the 
threat of Iraqi military action appeared to recede: both Kuwait and the UAE agreed to 
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reduce their petroleum production, while OPEC agreed to raise its “benchmark” price 
of crude petroleum from US$18 to $ 21 per barrel.
85
  
 Direct negotiation between Iraq and Kuwait commenced in Saudi Arabia to 
the end of July 1990, with the aim of resolving dispute over territory, oil pricing and 
Iraq‟s debt to Kuwait. Kuwait was expected to accede to Iraq demands for early 
negotiations to draft a border demarcation treaty and Iraq was expected to emphasize a 
claim to the strategic islands of Bubiyan and Warbah, situated at the mouth of the Shat 
al-Arab on 1 August, however the talk collapsed, and on 2 August Iraq invaded 
Kuwait taking control of the country and establishing a (short-lived) provisional free 
government.
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 There was no evidence at all to support Iraq‟s claim that it forces had entered 
Kuwait at the invitation of insurgents who had overthrown the Kuwait government. 
The invasion appeared more likely to have been motivated by Iraq‟s financial 
difficulties in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war; by strategic interests. Iraq had long 
sought the direct access to the Persian Gulf which it gained by occupying Kuwait; and 
by Iraq pursuit of regional hegemony.
87
 
 The Gulf War, which began with Iraq‟s incursion into Kuwait on August 2, 
1990, and was quickly dubbed as the world‟s first post-cold war crisis, badly spilt the 
Arab World over the invasion. It also tested the foundation of the United States- Saudi 
relations built over the previous five decades.
88
This event, which precipitated a global 
crisis, was pivotal for several reasons. Firstly, Iraq‟s aggression was unprecedented. 
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Never before in the 20
th
 century had one Arab state occupied and subsequently 
annexed another. Secondly, the Gulf was the first regional war fought against an Arab 
state by a coalition of Western and Arab countries with Israel‟s backing. Saudi Arabia 
assertiveness even extended to the point of a public condemnation of Iraq‟s launching 
of scud missiles against Israeli cities; one Arab regime had never condemned another 
for attacking Israel. Thirdly, for the first time in the 20
th
 century, non-Muslim, 
Western military forces launched an offensive against an Arab country from Saudi 
Arabia, the land of the two most sacred shrines of Islam. Despite legitimization of the 
offensive by some Muslim religious authorities, other Muslim clergy and activists 
considered the Saudi act blasphemous. Fourthly, unlike previous wars, this war 
produced a poplar reaction that was neither uniform across the Arab world, nor 
consistent from the beginning to the end of the crisis.
89
 The Arab world was badly 
divided over providing support to the international coalition‟s war against Iraq. 
Fifthly, one of the major determinants for the United States to go to war against Iraq 
was to defend its oil supplies in the Gulf, of which the most important by far was from 
Saudi Arabia. 
 The 2nd of August 1990 was as important in the Arab history as the 2nd of 
November 1917, the date of the proclamation of the Balfour declaration providing for 
a Jewish homeland. No Arab state endorsed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Jordan, 
Yemen, Libya, Algeria, Sudan and the Palestine Liberation Organization insisted that 
the problem could and must be settled by the Arab themselves. More importantly 
others led by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, thought outside help was required. The Saudi 
invitation to American troops was extraordinary since it was the main supporter of 
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Israel. American outrage at the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was widely contrasted with 
its tranquil acceptance of Israel‟s defiance of a series of United Nations Security 
Council resolutions on Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Golan Heights and Lebanon. 
But all this was dismissed in the panic that followed Secretary of Defense; Richard 
Cheney‟s “convincing” report to the Saudis of an imminent Iraqi invasion of the Saudi 
Arabia and the rest of the Arabian Peninsula. This was another major determinant for 
the Saudi invitation to the American troops. Countries that had long opposed 
“imperialism” and “Zionism” turned to the primary western military power for 
protection against another Arab country. Countries like Jordan and Yemen which 
found the “Solution” offensive and dangerous, had to face the full wrath of the 
supporters, especially the Saudis. Some 800,000 Yemenis were expelled from Saudi 
Arabia subsequently. All subsidies from the kingdom to these countries were stopped. 
Saudi Arabia ceased delivery of oil to Jordan and stopped buying its agricultural 
produce. In short, the invasion of Kuwait and the Arab reaction to it marked the end of 
period of Arab consensus and solidarity.
90
 Yet another determining factor was the 
American desire for a “New World Oder”. The need to propel Saudi Arabia as the 
regional leader was crucial in propagating this concept. Two powerful national 
symbols, the royal family and Islam, interacted to establish legitimacy for the 
kingdom in the Middle East. The attack on Iraq meant that there was no other state in 
the region in a position to act as a regional stabilizer. Although Iran was potentially 
the most powerful country in the part of the world, it was not an Arab state. Iran was 
seen predominantly as a continental power and thus was assumed to not interact well 
with the outside world. Further, Iran was surrounded by larger countries, especially 
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the Soviet Union and had been perceived as marginalized in relation to the Middle 
East as a whole and was considered unable to play any constructive role. 
The defeat of Iraq eliminated all external challenges that Saudi Arabia‟s leadership 
feared. In large measures the Gulf War which fought to prevent Iraq from becoming 
the dominant regional power. The coalition arrayed against Iraq testified to the 
undesirability of that outcome. “A greater Iraq” having fought a war first with Iran 
and then other Arab states, would truly have been in a position to influence events 
throughout the region. If the Iraqi military campaign in Kuwait were crushed it would 
leave Saudi Arabia in a dominant and unchallenged position in the region.
91
 
2. Saudi Arabia and Operation Desert Shield / Desert Storm 
 The Iraqi invasion on 2 August 1990 evoked a quick response from the United 
States within hours two U.S. Navy carrier groups were steaming towards the Persian 
Gulf. Military planners began reviewing U.S. Central Command plans for operation in 
the Persian Gulf while other officials consulted with Saudi Arabia about defense of 
that nation. Thus began a two-phase operation to control the Iraqi moves. The first 
was Operation Desert Shield, designed to shield Gulf state. The second was Operation 
Desert Storm. 
 Military action for Desert Shield proceeded rapidly. By 7 August, elements of 
the Eighty-Second Airborne Division and U.S. Air Force fighter planes were en route 
to the Gulf. 
 Original plans envisioned a force of 200,000 to defend Saudi Arabia. Within 
less than ninety days the U.S. had 184,000 troops in the Gulf backed by thousands of 
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armored vehicle, helicopter, heavy artillery and aircraft, as well as a substantial naval 
force. 
Although sufficient for the defense of Saudi Arabia U.S. and allied forces were not 
sufficient to expel Iraq from Kuwait, which soon became the objective of the United 
Nations. The U.S. response was to order additional forces to the Gulf. In effect the 
U.S. commitment was doubled in just over two months. The result was a U.S. force of 
over 500,000 in the theater, plus substantial allied forces, by the time Desert Shield 
gave way to Desert Storm. The U.S. commitment was two army corps, two marine 
division, six navy carrier groups, two battleship and over a thousand airplanes. 
Included were substantial number of National Guard and Reserve personal. 
 The transition from Desert Shield to Desert Storm began with a spectacular air 
offensive on 17 January 1991 viewed world wide on television. Air operation 
continued until 24 February, when a massive ground offensive succeeded in driving 
Iraqi force out of Kuwait in one hundred hours. The temporary case-fire on 28 
February led to Iraqi acceptance of UN resolution on April 7. 
Iraq had one of the world largest military forces, over one million half of whom were 
in Kuwait plus 4,300 tanks. However, Iraq did not have much of a navy. Its air arm 
had 660 aircraft. 
 The five-week air offensive destroyed the Iraqi ability to use its air forces, 
neutralized air defense and command and control capabilities struck at transportation 
system and attacked war production facilities, especially those suspected of being 
related to weapons of mass destruction. The allies attacked Scud missile sites and 
49 
 
effectively isolated Iraqi forces in Kuwait. The air offensive weakened Iraqi ground 
forces for successful ground offensive.
 92
 
 The first phase was operation Desert Shield, a largely defensive operation in 
which the United States and Saudi Arabia rushed to build up the defensive forces 
necessary to protect Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf, and the United Nations 
attempted to force Iraq to leave Kuwait through the use of economic sanctions. The 
United States then led the UN effort to create a broad international coalition with the 
military forces necessary to liberate Kuwait, and persuaded the United Nations to set a 
deadline of January 15, 1991 for Iraq to leave Kuwait or face the use of force. 
 The second phase, known as Desert Storm, was the battle to liberate Kuwait 
when Iraq refused to respond to the UN deadline. The fighting began on January 16, 
1991 and ended on March 1, 1991.
93
 
 The decision by the US and allies to fight Iraq had more to do with 
discouraging a future attack on Saudi Arabia, a nation of considerable importance 
owing to its oil reserves, than with liberating Kuwait. The rapid success of the Iraqi 
army had brought it within easy striking distance of the Hama oil fields; one of Saudi 
Arabia‟s largest. Iraqi control of these fields as well as Kuwait and Iraqi reserves 
would have given it control of the majority of the world‟s reserves. The Iraqi armored 
divisions would have encountered the same difficulties that Saudi forces faced 
defending the oil fields, namely traversing large distances across inhospitable desert. 
This would have been exacerbated by intense bombing by the Saudi Air Force, by far 
the most well- equipped arm of the Saudi military. 
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 The United States Navy mobilized two naval battle groups, the aircraft 
carriers USS Dwight D. Eisenhower and USS Independence and their escorts, to the 
area, where they were ready by August 8. A total of 48 F-15s of US Air Force landed 
in Saudi Arabia and immediately commenced round the clock air patrols of the Saudi-
Kuwait-Iraq border areas to discourage further Iraqi advances. 
 The US also sent the battleship USS Missouri and USS Wisconsin to the 
region. Military buildup continued from there, eventually reaching 543,000 troops, 
twice the number used in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Much of the material was airlifted 
or carried to the staging areas via fast sealift ships, allowing a quick buildup. 
 The United States, especially former Secretary of State James Baker, 
assembled a coalition of forces to join it in opposing Iraq. Although they did not 
contribute any forces, Japan and West Germany made financial contribution totaling 
US $ 10 billion and US $ 6.6 billion respectively. US troops represented 73% of the 
coalition‟s 956,600 troops in Iraq.94 
 The United States strongly condemned the invasion, and ordered economic 
sanction against Baghdad and quickly froze both Iraqi and Kuwait assets. The 
invasion badly split the Arab world.
95A Saudi television report announced that “The 
kingdom of Saudi Arabia, while following with concern the events that had been 
taking place on the territory of sister Kuwait since dawn today, would like to clarify 
that king Fahd bin-Abd al- Aziz …began at dawn today intensive contacts with 
brothers the king and presidents of the Arab states, starting with… Saddam Hussein… 
with a view to clamming and normalizing the situation between the two fraternal 
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countries, the Republic of Iraq and the state of Kuwait in the interest of all”.96 
Following extensive telephone discussion between American President George H 
Bush and Saudi King Fahd, Saudi Arabia inspite of traditional reluctance allowed 
foreign military forces to be stationed on its soil. Although the 66,000 Saudi armed 
forces were largely American trained and Saudi Arabia had purchased billions of 
dollars of American weapons over the years, Riyadh had long resisted American 
requests for military base rights. In dispatching American ground troops and 
warplanes to the kingdom, President Bush was ordering one of the greatest American 
overseas military build – up since the Vietnam War. Although it was a gamble, most 
Western analysts argued that a greater gamble would have been to risk allowing Iraq 
to conquer or coerce the Saudis, an outcome that would give Hussein control over 
45% of the world‟s oil reserves. More importantly, this decision is one move swiftly 
swept aside decades of mistrust and suspicion that had existed in the U.S.-Saudi 
relationship, providing a thrust towards a more positive and cooperative direction.
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 Among the 29 nations constituting the international coalition force against 
Iraq, Saudi Arabia was the lynchpin of the American operations The Arabian 
Kingdom was thought to have provided the much needed political legitimacy, 
economic support and military logistics that a war of such proportions needed. 
Operation Desert Storm was largely an American-Saudi affair. The United States sent 
F-15 fighter planes, approximately 2300 paratroopers, AWACS radar planes and U.S. 
based B-52 strategic bombers to protect the Saudi mainland while  its navy took up 
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positions in the Gulf of Oman and the Red Sea to protect the Saudi coast from an Iraq 
Attack.
98
 
 A Saudi led Arab summit, in a landmark decision, voted to send troops to 
Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states to defend any attacks. Egypt, Syria and 
Morocco sent troops into Saudi Arabia to fight the invading Iraqi military, which King 
Fahd in his first public comment since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, blasted as “the 
most vile aggression known to the Arab nation in its modern History. He told his 
countrymen that the American forces” were here to help defend the kingdom… and 
would leave as the kingdom demanded.
99
 
 United Nations mediations and Saudi led Arab diplomacy began to reduce 
tensions subsequently amidst indications that Iraq was seeking to avoid a military 
confrontation with the multinational forces arrayed against it at sea and on the ground 
in Saudi Arabia. The American navy with active Saudi support had begun to block 
Iraqi commerce while warship continued to watch Iraqi tankers and cargo vessels in 
the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman and the Red Sea. Meanwhile the United States 
continued to pour men and war material into Saudi Arabia. Operation Desert Shield, 
as it was named in the first phase saw the most intense air lifting of American troops 
anywhere since the Second World War. By August 1990 there were nearly 100,000 
American troops in Saudi Arabia. The American Central Command was relocated 
temporarily to Saudi Arabia. The U.S. air force was using almost all of its 284-aircarft 
fleet of huge C – 141 and even larger C-5 transports to fly troops and supplies to the 
Persian Gulf. General Hansford. T. Johnson, the Chief of the U.S. transportation 
command to Saudi Arabia noted that-“The United States had moved amid western 
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town the size of Indiana, Fayette or Jefferson city, Missouri to the Gulf in a matter of 
two weeks.”100More than one billion pounds (500 million Kg) of arms, ammunition, 
food and other supplies had been transported by sea and air. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, 
in keeping with its proactive role in the campaign against Iraq, teamed up with 
Venezuela to forcefully promote a consensus to increase oil production quotas that 
had been agreed upon in the OPEC summit in Geneva earlier. These two countries had 
already increased their oil output and only then informed the other members that they 
would act to offset the deficit from the embargo on Iraq. Although the official 
statement from oil ministers restated to the world the OPEC stood for market stability 
and regular supply of oil to consumers, the influence of Saudi Arabia in American led 
war efforts was highly significant.
101
 More importantly Saudi cooperation shifted 
quickly from not only providing oil but also aid in the form of finance. The higher oil 
prices caused b the crisis combined with the Saudi increase in production meant that 
Saudi Arabia was now earning about $120 million more, per day, than it was before 
the Iraqi invasion. The money was excepted to go a long way towards helping the 
countries hurt by the United Nations embargo of Iraq. There was also an informal 
understanding between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia governments that the latter would 
use its huge oil revenues to help pay extra costs of the American military presence in 
the Gulf. The Saudis were already providing the bulk of the fuel, food, water and 
accommodation for the American troops. 
 This understanding became a formal commitment with U.S. officials 
indicating that they were seeking about $ 500 million a month in Saudi contributions 
to defray U.S. military costs and another $ 4 billion annually in aid to such countries 
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as Egypt, Turkey and Jordan, whose economics were facing painful adjustments due 
to the sanctions on Iraq. With Iraq unrelenting on Kuwait, most Arab leaders 
especially Saudi Arabia privately urged a massive American military strike while 
stating publicly that the multinational force assembled was there only for defensive 
purposes. Then with a war becoming a certainty, Saudi Arabia was given ultimate 
responsibility for military operations involving the defense of the Kingdom. The 
United States would assume responsibility for offensive operations outside. However, 
military operations against Iraqi troops in Kuwait would have to be mounted largely 
from Saudi territory, which in turn would require the joint authorization of Kind Fahd 
and President Bush.
102
 
 Once the war in the Persian Gulf began in the early hours of January 17, 1991, 
the role and importance of information heightened. The feudal and tribal character of 
Saudi Arabia left little room for the free flow of information. Like its counter parts in 
most Arab states, the Saudi government becomes the only source of information for 
the people. Saudi Arabia described the war for the liberation of Kuwait by the code 
name given by bush: Desert Storm and reported how the war began: “At Dawn today, 
Thursday 2
nd
 Rajab 1411, corresponding to 17
th
 January 1991, formations of the Saudi 
and Kuwait air forces, and of the friendly American, British and French air forces, 
strafed the targets: Iraqi military installations and bases, starting the implementation of 
the joint operations plan….”103 
 Since the war was predominantly an aerial affair, the number of sorties flown 
became an internal part of the briefing. While the Italian and Canadian Air forces 
joined on the third day i.e. January 19, the Arab participation came much later. 
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Together with its Arab allies, Saudi Arabia conducted about 8,200 air raids in 43 
days.
104
 
3. Impact of the War on US – Saudi Relations 
 In addition to the exiled Kuwait government, the most eager and most 
important regional allies against Saddam Hussein were the Saudis. Despite the 
enormity of Saudi oil wealth and vast expenditures on the most modern weapons 
produced by the United States, the monarchy was virtually without an army when the 
invasion occurred. The Saudis had helped finance Hussein‟s war against Iran, viewing 
Iraq was a bulwark against the Iranian revolution. The sudden movement against 
Kuwait, a fellow Arab state and monarchy threatened the very existence of the House 
of Saud. With Hussein on the Kuwaiti border, virtually nothing stood in the way of 
Hussein‟s occupation of the Saudi oil fields adjoining the Gulf. 105 
 As Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait, President Bush immediately sent his 
secretary of defense, Richard Cheney, to Saudi Arabia. There, King Fahd, whether of 
his own volition or as a result of Cheney‟s arm-twisting, requested that U.S. troops be 
deployed to the kingdom in the context of Article 51 of the UN charter. For King 
Fahd, the decision was traumatic. It contravened longstanding Saudi policy to keep 
U.S. forces “over the horizon” on naval platforms in the Arabian Sea. It also 
constituted stark recognition by the Saudis that, if Iraqi forces spilled over from 
Kuwait into Saudi Arabia, as Cheney warned might be imminent, the battlefield would 
be the kingdom‟s Eastern Province where most of the Saudi oil fields are located. The 
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Saudi royal request received Islamic validation through a Fatwa signed by the 
principle Saudi religious leader, Abd al-Aziz bin Baz. 
 Announcing the Saudi monarch‟s request, Bush publicly likened Saddam 
Hussein‟s invasion to the action of Adolf Hitler before World War II and explained 
that U.S. military forces were being sent to defend Saudi Arabia, which was important 
to the United States because of the kingdom‟s oil resources. U.S. ground and air force 
units were rapidly deployed to the potentially threatened areas of Saudi Arabia. By 
November they numbered more than 230,000 army personnel and marines and more 
than 1,500 combat aircraft of all types. A Central Command forward headquarters, 
under General Norman Schwarzkopf, was established in Saudi Arabia. On 8 
November, after consultation with King Fahd, President Bush announced plans to 
deploy up to 200,000 additional troops to insure what he termed “an adequate 
offensive option”. To allay predictable local misgivings, Bush repeatedly indicated 
that U.S forces would leave whenever Saudi Arabia decided they were no longer 
necessary and asked for their withdrawal.
106
  
 The end of the cold war made it possible for the United States to forge an 
international coalition against Saddam Hussein and win the Gulf War with negligible 
losses. However, well before the outbreak of the Gulf crisis some features of the new 
international system began to have a significant impact on Arab politics and society. 
Most notable among these were the demise of the Soviet Union as a super power, the 
resultant transformation of the role of the United States in world leadership; the 
international trend towards  economic and religious identities and the revival of 
national, ethnic and religious identities. The allies of the former Soviet Union in the 
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region could not turn to its Russian successor for protection or support and sensing 
their vulnerability many of them in the region turned to the United States. 
 The break up of the former Soviet Union into independent states and the 
demise of socialism in Eastern Europe also facilitated the expression of deep-rooted 
ethnic beliefs and religious feelings that had been suppressed for decades. For 
example, Serbs, Bosnians and Croats demonstrated their conflicting national 
aspirations in Yugoslavia, while Muslims in Azerbaijan and other Central Asian states 
sought to assert their religious identity. There was also a surge of long suppressed 
feelings of transnational group identity, such as that of the Kurds in Iraq, Iran, Turkey 
and the Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia. The revival of ethnic and religious 
aspirations led to the rise of radical political movements as an “antithesis” to the 
suppressive regimes of that time. A variety of Islamic groups with conservative, 
liberal and radical orientations emerged in the region seeking a political role. These 
groups became popular among young Muslim Arabs whose problems or basic human 
needs were neither addressed nor satisfied, by their regimes.
107
 
4. DOMESTIC COMPULSIONS IN SAUDI ARABIA 
 The Gulf War effected noticeable urge in the Saudi society. Increase in oil 
prices in the wake of the invasion of Kuwait resulted in a revenue windfall of about $ 
13 billion. Yet Saudi economic losses out weigh its gains in the war. Early in 1991, 
Saudi officials estimate their total economic losses as a result of the Gulf crisis at $ 51 
billion. After including expenses for oil spill clean up and contributions to Turkey, 
Egypt and Syria the total expenses related to the war rose to a staggering $ 64 
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billion.
108
 The clamor for political liberalization led to the king Fahd bin Abdul Aziz 
to issue three statutes that comprised the first written set of rules of government in the 
history  of Saudi Arabia. Pan-Arabism was replaced by Islamism, which sprang up in 
part from hostility toward the spread of western influence and culture. It became a 
potent ideology of popular dissent especially towards American policies in the 
region.
109
 Another effect of the Gulf War was the atomization of the Arab regional 
system, with each state placing its domestic interests ahead of regional or sub regional 
interests and thereby under mining any hope of making organizations such as the Arab 
league an effective instrument of a collective Arab policy. In the wake of the decline 
of Iraq as a power, Saudi Arabia assumed a key role of a leader in the region. The 
Saudi royal family stopped financial support to several regimes and Islamic groups 
including the PLO, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, and the Algerian FIS realizing 
that such assistance did not ensure unswerving support for the Saudi position on any 
given issue. On the contrary, it found out that during the Gulf War some of the 
principle beneficiaries of Saudi largesse stood firmly and openly against the kingdom. 
This discovery combined with the economic difficulties resulting from the conflict, 
led to the transformation in its role in the region.
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 The United States saw Saudi Arabia shift its role from a mediator between 
conflicting states and groups in the Arab region to becoming a party to regional 
conflicts. Saudi relations with Iraq turned into deep resentment and suspicions about 
each other‟s capabilities. Yemen‟s opposition of the Gulf War destroyed the long-
standing, cordial relationship it had previously enjoyed with Saudi Arabia. Relations 
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with Jordan went equally sour and all Jordanian fence mending efforts failed 
apparently because of Saudi determination to punish its “disloyal” brother. 
As a party to conflicts with three of its Arab neighbors, Saudi Arabia, in the 
post- Gulf War era, adopted a more aggressive foreign policy, losing in the process its 
long-standing role as a neutral third party in inter-Arab disputes. In addition, the 
policy of restricting economic assistance to trusted allies, subject to strict political and 
economic conditions, transformed Saudi Arabia from a major financial force though 
out the Middle East into a regional bank that lent limited assistance to a select 
clientele. At the same time Saudi Arabia became much more dependent on the United 
States for protection from external as well as internal threats.
111
 
 The Gulf War was not the only catharsis for military dimensions to become 
the central focus of the U.S.-Saudi relations in the decade after the Gulf War. 
Significantly a decline in the American dependency on oil from Saudi Arabia was 
accelerated since the U.S. led war against Iraq in 1990-91. When sanctions were 
introduced against Iraq in August 1990, American traders and refiners had lost Iraqi 
imports averaging 50,000 barrels a day. At the time Saudi Arabia and OPEC boosted 
their productive capacity and replaced the supplies from Iraq. Although the U.S. 
imports from the Gulf did reach a peak in 1991, at 27.7% of total supply, it did not last 
for long. The peak was largely the result of emergency stockpiling, precipitated by the 
conflict. Once the conflict came to an end, American buyers shifted toward purchases 
in the Atlantic basin.
112
With oil demand falling and supply continuing at such a high 
rate, an oil glut followed. It became difficult for OPEC to maintain discipline among 
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its members in limiting production to stabilize prices and tougher it became for Saudi 
Arabia to impose price stability. As the world‟s largest holder of oil reserves and with 
a large productive capacity and small domestic consumption, Saudi Arabia had long 
realized that maximizing the return on oil required maintaining stable prices and 
production at rates low enough to ensure a long-term export market. Right from the 
time OPEC was formed Saudi Arabia had acted as a “swing producer” by rising and 
lowering production to keep prices stable. Yet it became apparently difficult to 
perform the role due to the length of the oil glut period that had affected the region.
113
 
5. Emerging Arms Market  
 In many ways, as the Gulf war marked a watershed in U.S. trade relations 
with Saudi Arabia, it also left a significant mark on military cooperation. With an 
active conflict enraging the region and with a rise in fundamentalist groups who 
resorted to violent methods for redress of their grievances, the U.S. defense of the 
House of Saud was no longer about preserving oil supplies to the United States but 
was more about protecting an emerging market for arms systems and big engineering 
projects. In the time span of three years, U.S. arms suppliers had sold Saudi Arabia 
almost $ 11 billion worth of equipments. Contracts for the biggest oil field projects 
during that time like the Shaybah structure also went mainly to American 
Companies.
114
 
 The looming threat of an Iraq, which was wounded badly, but not finished, 
pushed Saudi Arabia into increased military cooperation with the United States. The 
presence of over 5000 American military personnel in the kingdom confirmed a 
                                                          
113
 David.E.Long “Stability in Saudi Arabia”, in Charles Doran and Stephen Buck, The gulf, energy and 
global security: political and economic issues,(New York, n.d) p.11-3. 
114
 Ibid, p.248 
61 
 
newfound understanding. Most of these personal were involved in enforcing no fly 
zones over various parts of Iraq. This agreement to a large deployment of U.S. 
personnel, during and after the Gulf war, represented a major shift in Saudi foreign 
policy.
115
 Saudi Arabia also emerged as one of the largest arms purchaser in the third 
world. During the period from 1988 through to 1995 the Saudis bought $ 67.1 billion 
worth of military equipment accounting for nearly 30% of all Third World arms 
agreements during the above eight-year period. It also gave away contacts worth $ 
17.9 billion since the beginning of 1991 through to 1995. 19% of the value of U.S. – 
Saudi arms contracts was for lethal equipment; the largest portion (29%) went for 
support services (repairs, rehabilitation, supply operations and training). Another 
major component was for the construction of military bases and facilities, accounting 
for the largest share (31%) through 1990 and the second largest share (24%) for the 
entire period. The military cooperation between the two caused many concerns to the 
Jewish lobby in the United States, which was seriously threatened by the enhanced 
coordination between U.S. and the Saudis.
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 The between the Saudi kingdom and US high level and unprecedented 
coordination was severely tested by the bombings of the American military facilities 
in Saudi Arabia in the mid1990s. The first, which occurred on November 13, 1995,at 
the headquarters of a U.S. training program for the Saudi National Guard in the 
capital, Riyadh, killed 7 persons (including 5 U.S. citizens) and injured 60 others 
(including 37 U.S. citizens). Three little-known fundamental groups called the “Tigers 
of the Gulf”, the “Movements of Islamic Change”, and the “Combatant Partisans of 
God” claimed responsibility. Several months later, four Saudi nationals, who 
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confessed to being influenced by Islamic fundamentalist exiles, were convicted and 
executed. 
 The second and more lethal explosion, which occurred at Khobar Towers (a 
housing facility for U.S. Air force personnel near Dhahran air base) in June 1996, 
killed 19 U.S. Air Force personnel, wounded many others and prompted the relocation 
of most American military personnel to more remote sites in Saudi Arabia to improve 
security. This bombing was reportedly carried out by exiled Saudi terrorist Osama bin 
Laden while the Saudi minister of interior prince Nayaf suggested that the bombing 
“were carried out by Saudis with the support of others”.117 
 Both the incidents led to renewed cooperation between the two countries in 
the wake of the threat that radical fundamentalist groups posed to both countries. Yet 
Saudi Arabia chose to remain silent in the wake of the American missile attack on Iraq 
in August 1996. In fact Saudi officials privately welcomed the American measures to 
constrain Iraq and the Saudis agreed to host the deployment of two batteries of U.S. 
patriot missiles, together with 150 additional U.S. military personnel to monitor Iraq. 
In September 2000, Saudi Arabia also bought three arms packages containing $ 416 
million in light armored vehicles, anti-tank missiles and advanced communications 
equipment, $ 690 million for maintenance support for its fleet of F-15 fighter aircrafts 
and $ 1.6 billion in flight simulators, repair parts and other technical services for the 
F-15 aircrafts. 
 Inspite of enhanced military cooperation necessitated by the security threats 
faced, the trade relationship between the two did not have same momentum. Yet Saudi 
Arabia was the largest U.S. trading partner in the Middle East in the decade after the 
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war. In the year 1994 alone, Saudi exports to the United States were estimated at $ 8 
billion and rose to $ 14.3 billion and at $ 5.9 billion in 2000. To a considerable extent, 
the high volume of trade was a result of American oil imports from Saudi Arabia and 
U.S. arms exports to the country. Saudi Arabia was the largest foreign supplier of oil 
to the United States until 1995 after which it took second place to Venezuela. The 
Saudis also bought significant amount of U.S. commercial equipment as well. In 
October 1995, U.S. and Saudi officials signed a $ 6 billion contract to purchase 61 
U.S. commercial aircrafts. In addition, U.S. Company AT&T won a $4.1 billion 
contract to upgrade the Saudi telecommunications system in May 1994.In April 1995 
an agreement was signed to extend the Joint Commission for economic affairs 
established in 1974 and Business council session for the two countries was also 
opened. Saudi-Arabia was removed from the U.S. Trade representative‟s priority 
watch list in 1996 in recognition of its progress in the protection of intellectual 
property rights.
118
 
 The Gulf War and the active threat of radical groups led to enhanced security 
cooperation between the United States and Saudi Arabia. These factors played a 
largely influential role in removing  the ambiguity that had existed in the earlier years 
of relations so much so that the decade after the gulf war witnessed military and trade 
cooperation emerge as an alternative to the oil weapon as the foundation on which the 
relationship moved ahead from the un certainties of earlier decades. 
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CHAPTER - III 
US – SAUDI RELATIONS IN THE AFTERMATH OF 9/11 
 The threat that international terrorism posed to foreign and domestic security 
was highlighted by the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on selected targets in the 
United State. It dramatically re-energized the American focus and resolve on 
terrorism. The "Terror Tuesday" incidents, as it was later called and the subsequent 
anthrax attacks seemed to be the conclusion of a decade of anti-American terror 
attacks. It brought terrorism to the forefront of American public concern. The 
American polices and organizational mechanisms to deal with terrorism became 
urgent issues to investigate. 
 What the September 11 attacks did was to raise a host of new issues. Terrorist 
activities supported by sophisticated planning and logistics and with possible access to 
chemical, biological or nuclear weaponry created considerable concern. As the United 
States began its hunt for the perpetrators of the crime outside, it analysed that a 
comprehensive review of terrorism policies, and domestic preparedness to respond to 
major terrorist incidents in the future was needed. The threat that radical Islamic 
fundamentalist groups posed to American interests and its allies like Israel, Jordan, 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia generated an urge for the creation of an informal "watch – 
list" of nations.
119
 
 What shook the United States on September 11, 2001 a hijacked American 
Airlines passenger jet was flown in to the World Trade Centre in New York city, a 
second hijacked aircraft was flown into the South tower, a third hijacked aircraft was 
flown into the Pentagon in Washington DC and a fourth hijacked aircraft crashed in 
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Somerset County, Pennsylvania, South of Pittsburgh.
120
 It raised speculation that a 
related mission aimed at the capitol had failed. 
 The main question that preoccupied Americans was not why this happened 
but how it could happen. The perpetrators were considered middles terrorists or 
religious fanatics who hated the United States and what it stood for decency, 
democracy, freedom etc. Rare were the voices that were prepared to say that United 
States must not seek revenge by waging war on Afghanistan or engage in activities 
that would itself amount to terrorism i.e. killing the civilians of other countries. Many, 
however, pointed out that the U.S Government actions abroad had helped create the 
breeding ground from which terrorists had emerged. Largely absent was any 
recognition by the American government of the problems caused by their foreign 
policy. The public desire for revenge was so strong that the U.S Government had to 
act. The speed with which ` long range thinking `was put into place was also 
remarkable. It became clear that the United State was looking to seize this opportunity 
to launch an attack against all sub – state armed groups, which were considered 
unacceptable to American interests.
121
 
 The United States had to rework all its notions, plans and strategies about war 
and peace, security, safety and defence, individual and society, citizenship, civil 
liberties, human rights, economy and politics. A single day`s event had touched all 
facets of American life. One of the first things the Bush government did was to give 
more power to the Central intelligence Agency (CIA). Yet very few pointed out to the 
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CIA`s role in nurturing the demons that had come to haunt America.
122
As President, 
George Bush put it – "The September 11th attacks awakened a sleeping giant"123 and 
he sought to build an "international coalition" to fight this new threat. With the United 
States realizing that any "anti-terror coalition" must have Muslim countries, Bush 
demanded that Arab countries "wrap up and prosecute terrorists on their soil". The 
Arab governments, led by Saudi Arabia, countered with a collection of their stated 
conditions for actively cooperating with the coalition. They wanted the Israelis to be 
kept out of any such coalitions, while a concrete proof of guilt had to be offered 
before they would respond positively to the United States. There would be no 
unilateral military operation by the United States and instead a concerted international 
campaign mounted under the auspices of the United Nations. The United States had to 
have prior consultations with them on any action whether military, economic political 
or diplomatic and the focus of the campaign had to only be on the Islamic groups and 
networks associated with Osama Bin Laden. In particular they rejected any attempt by 
the United States to broaden the anti-terror campaign into offensive against Iran, Iraq, 
Sudan or Libya, Washington`s traditional West Asian antagonists. Finally the Arab 
insisted that resistance groups involved in the struggle against Israel must not be 
targeted. General Ahmad Abdul Halim, an analyst with the Cairo centre for Middle 
East, explained that the Arabs had to condition their participation because the 
September 11 circumstances were very different from those in 1991 when the 
international community was dealing with Iraq`s invasion of Kuwait, "The Gulf war 
was about restoring the sovereignty of a country which had been stricken from the 
map by another .. But now, the Arabs cannot join a coalition whose goals were unclear 
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at a time Israel is trying to include Palestinian organization … a list of terrorist 
groups…Before there is any anti-terrorist coalition there must be a clear definition of 
terrorism which does not confuse terrorist groups and resistance movements."
124
 
1. The War on Afghanistan 
 The events of 11 September raised two immediate questions in the minds of 
President George W. Bush and the members of his national security team. First, who 
was responsible for the attacks? And second, how should the United States respond. 
  Over the ensuing days, evidence emerged implicating al-Qaeda, a transnational 
terrorist organization based in Afghanistan under the leadership of Osama Bin Laden 
and harbored by the ultraorthodox Islamic regime of the Taliban. The evidence 
suggested that Bin Laden had planned and orchestrated the attacks from Afghanistan 
where he trained and dispatched the hijacker responsible for carrying out the operation 
on 9/11. The United States in turn responded by building an international “coalition of 
the willing” to confront al-Qaeda and its Taliban hosts. After Taliban leader Mullah 
Muhammad Omar refused to hand Bin Laden over to Bush administration to answer 
for the attacks the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom in October 
2001. With limited logistical and combat assistance from allies such as France, 
Germany and the United kingdom, along with somewhat more substantial support 
from the opposition Afghan Northern Alliance, American forces removed the Taliban 
from power and reduced markedly Bin Laden‟s capacity to organize and direct future 
terrorist operation on the scale of the 9/11 assaults. It did so over a period of less than 
                                                          
124
 M.B. Naqvi, "The Salvation Mantra" , Foreign Panorama, Deccan Herald, November 22 2001,p.1 
68 
 
two months that was followed by nation-building operations to establish liberty and 
democratic institutions in Afghanistan.
125
 
             Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Lebanon, the four 
countries whose citizens were named as suspects for the September 11 attacks were 
particularly in a delicate situation because many of their citizens took the view that 
Washington itself was to blame for the terrorist assaults. Arab analysts argued that 
there would not have been such a devastating onslaught if the United States had 
adopted an even handed approach in the Israel – Palestine dispute, agreed to the lifting 
of the punitive sanctions regime on Iraq, pulled its forces out of the Gulf and pressed 
allied Arab leaders to reform their inefficient and corrupt administration. As the 
Afghan operations progressed rapidly, doubts were raised as to whether the United 
States was on the brink of making the same mistakes that doomed the Gulf war 
against Iraq to eventual failure. The Gulf war, in the American circles, was considered 
a failure because it did not result in the removal of Saddam Hussein. Tactical victory 
on the battlefield was considered as squandered when strategic wisdom did not follow 
in its wake. America‟s unwillingness to "finish the job" it was felt, not with massive 
weaponry, but with sensible diplomacy had led to an Iraq which threatened the Middle 
East and mankind with war, terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction. The 
strongest indication that the same scenario was developing in Afghanistan emanated 
from the exasperations expressed by leaders of the Northern Alliance which was the 
only ground force that could challenge the Taliban. It was felt that the United States 
had done nothing concrete to help there in determining whether the Taliban and their 
allies could be driven from power. There was no programme of close coordination that 
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had developed between the Northern Alliance and the American forces. What the 
Northern Alliance needed most was the application of American air power to their 
tactical requirements; that was to attack the Taliban infantry formation facing them on 
the front lines. As Major General Babajan,  a Northern Alliance commander put it "if 
there aren`t any strikes on the front line, then the bombing will be in vain". 
 As the war dragged on signs that the United States was succumbing to the 
"Gulf war syndrome" of limiting its goals to political half measures increased. It was, 
on the one hand trying to eliminate the Taliban for sheltering Osama bin Laden while 
on the other hand was averse to give the North Alliance space to go on the offensive. 
The use of air power and other assets to pave the way for a rapid Northern Alliance 
advance in Kabul was considered sceptically because it could result in a "dangerous 
political vacuum". The United States purportedly wanted the lineaments of a 
provisional government in place before committing its ground and air forces to the 
fray at the grass roots. Otherwise they feared that the Northern Alliance, consisting of 
Afghanistan`s principal ethnic minorities (Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras) will some how 
gain the political upper hand in the post Taliban period and foment an ensuing civil 
war between them and the majority Pashtuns. 
 In hindsight what the American strategy did was to prevent the only viable 
military force on the ground, the Northern Alliance, to strike when the iron was hot, 
when the Taliban was in disarray and uncertain of its ability to stem the tide of 
counterforce which was mounting against it and when a whiff of American tactical air 
power would stand the best chance of turning the tide. The propitious moment melted 
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away quickly with the Taliban forces recovering from the initial shocks of the 
American assault and hunkering down in hide away to ride the storm.
126
 
 As the war progressed, another manifestation of a cavalier conduct, which 
America had historically come to be associated with, In prime focus was 
Washington`s penchant for an awesome high tech war against an intransigent regime 
and its terrorist allies in an utterly impoverished country.
127
 In spite of blending a 
model used in the 1991 Persian Gulf war and the more restrictive approach of the 
1999 conflict in Kosovo, when bombing targets were reviewed constantly and rejected 
as too risky due to civilian casualties and its own fanfare about air-drops of food 
supplies and medicines, America`s war and the largely unspoken tragedy associated 
with it was reflected by the plight of innocent Afghan civilians. The humanitarian 
catastrophe was further blown up by the unpreparedness of the United Nation in 
coordinating its policies with those of the United States in a bid to provide the victims 
of the intensifying war with an escape route.
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 The war in Afghanistan, despite the frightful asymmetry of forces on both 
sides dragged on for much longer than expected. Although the collapse of the Taliban 
regime brought some relief, the heavy bombarding by the American military might 
and the resulting civilian casualties made the poor people of Afghanistan swing 
between hope and despair. As the Taliban`s absence and the power vacuum it had 
created was quickly filled in by the Northern alliance and various warlords in their 
respective regions, the focus of international attention in Afghanistan was shifting to 
the task of rehabilitation and in establishing a stable interim government in Kabul. 
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There were obstacles to mount in achieving both these goals. The task of rehabilitating 
the people of a country which had seen a generation of war, destruction of national 
assets and private property without the international community having a well 
constructed method to go about it was not only a long drawn out but also a tedious 
process. There were million of Afghans living as refugees in scattered all over the 
world. Nearly a third of the population living within the country was internally 
displaced. The subsistence agricultural economy was in shambles too. The industrial 
infrastructure had suffered near total destruction. There was hardly a service sector 
left in the country, which could generate employment in the immediate context. The 
public domain was no better. There was hardly any kind of government machinery 
functioning in the country with even banking institutions not existing. To add to the 
woes, various individuals had claimed their right to head the interim government. 
With the Northern Alliance occupying the areas vacated by the Taliban, Barhanuddin 
Rabbani who had been displaced by the Taliban in 1996 had formed a government at 
Kabul. There were other warlords who had their pockets of influence within the 
Northern Alliance like General Mohammad Fahim and Uzbek commander Rashid 
Dostum who had to be dealt with effectively. 
 The United States unlike what it did when Soviet forces exited from 
Afghanistan, realized the importance of not appointing Pakistan as its agent to manage 
Afghanistan. It had long-term interests in the region and hence realized the importance 
of nation building in Afghanistan. It had to build a friendly coalition, which it did 
under the interim government of President Hamid Karzai, as it would help the 
American oil and gas companies wishing to reactivate any transnational project in the 
region. But, it also realized that before it moved on to bigger things the residual mess 
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of Taliban forces and the Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden had to be cleared for 
claiming success for the purpose it had set out while attacking Afghanistan.
129
 
2. US-Saudi Relations during the Afghanistan war 
 The West Asian country with the most to lose by cooperating with Bush in his 
"crusade" against terrorism was Saudi Arabia. Washington`s prime suspect, Osama 
bin Laden, was born in the Kingdom and was popular with ordinary Saudis because of 
his defiance of the United States. Bin Laden had been stripped of his Saudi passport in 
1994 and anyone overtly supporting him risked the confiscation of his assets. But the 
permanent presence of thousands of American troops on Saudi soil, since the 1991 
Gulf War and Washington`s unstinting support for Israel had angered and alienated 
many Saudis and created strong Anti-American feelings. Concerned with the prospect 
of a violent backlash, the Saudi authorities had insisted on handling investigations into 
the bomb attacks against American targets in the country and prosecuting those 
responsible in its territory rather than extraditing them to the United States. 
 Saudi Arabia was one of three states to have had diplomatic relations with the 
Taliban regime in Kabul, which was in the American hit list for granting sanctuary to 
Osama bin Laden. Riyadh had close ideological, political and economic ties with the 
Taliban that was inspired by the Saudi Wahhabi movement which had swept Abdel 
Aziz ibn Saud, the founder of the ruling dynasty, to power in the 1920s. Many saw the 
Taliban as a stepson of Wahhabi Arabia. The movement enjoyed considerable support 
amongst ultra conservative clerics and wealthy citizens who financed its rise to power. 
Until the Sept.11 terrorist atrocities, both Riyadh and Washington considered Taliban, 
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to be the main Sunni asset in the struggle for control of strategic Afghanistan waged 
by Sunni Pakistan and Shia Iran.
130
 
  The solid five decade partnership between US & Saudi Arabia was severely 
challenged by the 11 September terrorist attacks.
131
 The relations came under 
considerable strain, for the first time, since the oil crisis of 1973. Even though various 
reports from the Arab Kingdom condemned the atrocious terror attacks and 
sympathized with the United States, Saudi Arabia, at first, refused to allow the United 
State to use its airfields for the strike on Afghanistan. It was only after considerable 
pressure from Washington that made it to announce immediately its wholehearted 
support to stand against the perpetrators of the attack. Such ambiguity was only met 
with scepticism in the United States. Where as other American allies like Germany, 
France and Singapore responded to the attacks on America with aggressive battle 
against hidden al – Qaeda cell in their territories, Saudi Arabia acted as if the 15 Saudi 
hijackers had come, literally, out of no where.
132
 The Taliban suffered an irreversible 
isolation only after Saudi Arabia decided to snap diplomatic links with it. Although 
American officials led by the President lobbied extensively around the world to build 
an international coalition under the United Nations umbrella, the absence of 
conclusive evidence to convict Osama bin Laden for the crime and his links to 
Afghanistan`s uncivilized Taliban regime genuinely mystified many countries about 
America`s plans. It was extremely difficult for the Gulf countries, particularly Saudi 
Arabia, to cooperate because of the vagueness of the proposed military response. The 
Saudi rulers met President Bush`s talk of a "crusade" with a firm disapproval while 
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the idea of a "long war on terror" in turn, preferred dictatorial stability rather than the 
necessity of explaining to their people why it was necessary to host another American 
bombing campaign.
133
 
 The September 11 attacks seriously compromised the close relationship 
between Saudi Arabia and the United States. Throughout the war on Afghanistan, the 
American administration disapproved of what they perceived as Saudi indifference. 
Saudi political vulnerability had been exposed by a relentless campaign in the western 
press, inspired by Riyadh`s alleged failure to cooperate fully by arresting possible 
accomplices, cracking down on dissident preachers and freezing book account of 
wealthy Saudi funding militant groups.
134
 
  The Saudi government had a hard time articulating its stand and responding 
to critics both in the U.S. Congress and in the media. FBI agents repeatedly expressed 
their frustration at the lack of Saudi cooperation during the investigation of the truck-
bomb attack in 1996 on the Khobar Towers housing complex in Dhahran in which 
nineteen American servicemen were killed. In the aftermath of 11 September, the 
cooperation between Riyadh and Washington has proved once again questionable. 
 Saudi Arabia and to a lesser extent the United States, was one of few countries 
in the world that initially expressed satisfaction with the Taliban‟s takeover of most 
Afghanistan in the mid-1990s. The kingdom, Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates 
were the only three countries in the world to recognize the Taliban as the legitimate 
government in Kabul. 
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Some members in the U.S. Congress and several American news organizations 
publicly criticized the lack of Saudi support in the war against terror. Their criticism 
focused on the involvement of Saudi citizens in the terrorist attacks and on allegations 
that Saudi private money had been funneled to terrorist organizations. 
 American investigators believe that several of the participants in the 11 
September attacks were recruited by al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, particularly from Abha 
the capital of Asir province in the southwestern part of the country. Individuals from 
the region have also been linked with the attack on the USS Cole in Aden Yemen in 
October 2000 in which seventeen American sailors were killed. 
 In the aftermath of the 11 September terrorist attacks, several U.S. officials 
have claimed that much of al-Qaeda‟s funding is funneled through Saudi 
organizations that provide humanitarian aid to Muslims around the world and that 
much of the money comes from wealthy Saudis and even some member of the Saudi 
royal family. But the Saudis strongly stress that they have no evidence that money 
from any Saudis-based charity went to Osama Bin Laden and his organization. 
 The Saudis had long frustrated American policy makers with their half hearted 
cooperation on security matters, regional diplomacy and intelligence sharing. The 
United States had long allowed itself to depend considerably on the secretive royal 
family for information. The Bush administration`s suspicions, after the September 11 
incidents, made it exclude the Saudi from among the allies who were informed in 
advance of the U.S moves to freeze the assets of organizations linked to terrorism. The 
Saudis had also not allowed American airplanes to use facilities in the kingdom for 
raids against Afghanistan. Several top officials top within the U.S. administration as 
well as in the congress had endorsed the Rand Corporation`s analysis, which 
76 
 
suggested, "Saudi Arabia should be treated as an enemy" .The study accused the 
kingdom of being a prime supporter of terrorism and instability in West Asia and said 
it should be issued an ultimatum to stop support for terrorism or face seizure of its oil 
fields. The concern in Washington was that Saudi Arabia could be "heading towards 
an Iran-style Islamic revolution". Although the Central Intelligence Agency concluded 
later that this was unlikely yet it remained uneasy about the lack of hard information 
about this closed society.
135
 
 Political differences between the Kingdom and Washington had been 
widening ever since Crown prince Abdullah had become the de facto ruler of Saudi 
Arabia in the mid – 1990s. Prince Abdullah, considered a pragmatic ruler, was widely 
respected in the Islamic nations for his support to the Palestine cause. He was of the 
view that the present Bush administration did not maintain neutrality in the West 
Asian conflict. Differences also persisted on the policy towards Iraq and Iran. Bush 
had labelled both the nations part of an "axis of evil" demanding a change in their 
regimes. This conflicted with the Saudi policy that wanted to mend fences with its two 
neighbours. Saudi – American ties further worsened when Prince Abdullah initiated 
the move to bring back Iraq into the Arab fold on the condition that it would 
implement all the United Nations resolutions concerning the Gulf War. The United 
States believed that "The war on terrorism" would be won only when the despotic 
culture of the West Asian countries changed. Therefore it was not only demanding 
regime changes in Iraq and Iran but also putting pressure on the Saudis to root out the 
terrorism in their midst and open up their system. It meant that the House of Saud had 
to introduce liberal Islamic values and find new political partners – something that 
was difficult for the conservative Wahhabi Saudi rulers. The Bush administration was 
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increasingly of the view that Islamic militancy could not be contained unless and until 
some of its sources were identified and neutralized in Saudi Arabia. Differences also 
persisted on the presence in the Kingdom of about 5000 American troops who had 
come to expel Iraqis from Kuwait.
136
Although champions of the U.S. – Saudi alliance 
said the Saudis were transforming themselves from financers to fighters of terrorism, 
yet they acknowledge that they had to go a long way in addressing not just the 
symptoms but also the cause of Islamic extremism. 
 The Saudi royal family, on its part, repeatedly insisted that Saudi Arabia had 
made no contributions to radical Islamic groups. When the Saudis were confronted by 
press reports that some of the substantial funds that the monarchy routinely gave to 
Islamic charities may actually have gone to Al Qaeda and other terrorist networks, 
they denied any such knowledge.
137
 Intercepts by the national Security Agency of the 
United States indicated that by 1996, Saudi money was supporting Bin Laden s Al 
Qaeda and other extremist groups in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Yemen and Central 
Asia.
138
 Saudi Arabia, because of its oil wealth and its role as the guardian of the 
Islamic holy sites in Mecca and Medina, carried tremendous prestige in the Islamic 
world. Yet it was one of the Islamic countries to severe ties with the Taliban. For 
several weeks, it vacillated over the decision to allow the American Military the use of 
bases on its soil. The American analysts believed that it was the Saudi oligarchy, 
which had helped and financed the religious schools and Moujahedeen training camps 
in Pakistan and Afghanistan. They also increasingly suspected the Saudi connection 
with Bin Laden s Al Qaeda. Therefore, it was not surprising that through its waffling, 
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Saudi Arabia provided little if any assistance to American intelligence. In the words of 
Robert Baer, a former CIA officer in the Middle East – It's a problem. Saudi Arabia is 
completely unsupportive as of today. The rank and file Saudi policemen are 
sympathetic to Bin Laden. They were not telling us who these people were on the 
planes.
139
 Vincent Cannistrato, the former chief of counter terrorism operations for the 
CIA also said that the United States received little help form the Saudi. We are getting 
zero cooperation now he said There is a whole pile of Saudi businessmen who have 
been providing regular contribution to Al Qaeda.
140
 Paul Michael Wihbe, a Middle 
East specialist and former consultant to the United States Defence Department, 
commented, The Saudi royal family is divided, and that‟s what accounts for this 
paralysis… in Saudi Arabia, Bin Laden has, no doubt, tremendous support with in the 
clergy. There is tremendous support for him in the middle class, in the professional 
class and in the armed forces
141
 The American intelligence believed that even after 
Bin Laden turned against the United States in the 1990s; he still maintained close 
contact with key Saudi figures and intelligence.
142
 
 FBI agents pursued an investigation into alleged terrorist financing in 1998 
much before the 9/11 incidents. They ran across a money trail of a Chicago firm that 
was suspected of laundering money for Hamas. Subsequently, some of the funding 
was traced to the Saudi Embassy in Washington. The same pattern emerged in the 
charity donated by the International Relief Organization.
143
 However, some officials 
appeared worried that any inquiry into the operations of the Saudis in financing terror 
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networks could jeopardize U.S. – Saudi relations. They also suspected that millions of 
dollars that were donated by the Saudi government and wealthy Saudis were diverted 
to terrorist groups. In some cases, Saudi funds were believed to have bank rolled 
specific terrorist acts, including the 1998 bombings of two American Embassies in 
Africa.
144
 
 The strain in the U.S. – Saudi relationship also efforts to engage with Iran, its 
traditional rival in the region and Riyadh's reluctance to consider Iraq a major security 
threat. There was the lack of shared strategic vision. The Saudis denied that there was 
any reason for the United States to be there to defend the kingdom against Iraq, 
explained Joseph McMillan, a former Pentagon official responsible for Saudi 
affairs.
145
 One big problem, according to several past and present American officials, 
was the anti-American sentiments in Saudi society. As C. W. Freeman Junior, a 
former U.S. ambassador to Riyadh remarked …For the first time since 1973, we 
actually have a situation in which the United States is so unpopular among the Saudi 
public that the royal family now thanks its security is best served by publicly 
distancing itself from the United States.
146
 For the United States it was a hard choice 
between exposing the suspected dubious Saudi links to terror groups and taking care 
of the sensitivity of the bilateral relationship. For the Saudi Arabian rulers it was a 
choice between the benefit of good standing with the world's only super power on the 
one hand and the increasing hatred of its people for American policies on the other.
147
 
3. Rise of Anti-American Feelings 
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It was hardly surprising that anti-American sentiments rose in the Arab world. 
especially after the September 11 attacks, Anti-American demonstrations by students 
in Egypt ending in the death of several of them, sermons by preachers instigating 
Jihad across Yemen, Syria, Qatar, Killing of two Americans in a rare incident of 
violence in Kuwait, gunning of an American diplomat In Lebanon and the murder of 
an American nurse in Jordan were some of the incidents that happened in quick 
succession after the terrorist attacks.
148
 Meanwhile in Saudi Arabia, sermon broadcasts 
on the official television station showed an impassioned cleric lambast the United 
States-“O! Allah make their plans destroy them. O! Allah support Jihad for your sake 
everywhere. O! Allah deal with them for they are within your power.”149 More than 
previous bouts of anti-Americanism in the region, the anger seemed to have 
permeated all strata of society, especially among the educated and was tinged with 
disillusionment at their own long entrenched American-backed regimes. The 
ambiguous stance of the United States toward the Palestinian cause too angered the 
Arab countries. Although most these regimes had solid relations with the United 
States, it was no secret that pro American Arab leaders rather than the common people 
promoted these relations. Arab enmity and hatred was, however, not directed against 
the American people. It was not a racist feeling against the Americans simply because 
they were Americans. It was a reaction against the American policies. The great 
historian and political scientist, P.J. Vatikotis in as many words, aptly described this 
“…Why? Because everybody hates any country that has power and used it.”150 The 
notion of an imperialist power had spread rapidly around the Arab World causing 
wide spread resentment. Yet as Barry Rubin pointed out-“Even remarkable pro-Arab 
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and pro-Muslim policies over the years has not reduced the hatred. Such animus is 
also a product of self interested manipulation by various groups within the Arab 
society and it has been used as an excuse for political, social oppression and economic 
stagnation‟.151Obviously the United States had tried to pursue a foreign policy that 
accorded with its own interest. The numerous monarchies and dictators ruling there 
could have also influenced the United States wariness toward the region. To 
Americans it seemed too many monarchies and dictators for a region. The 
psychological perception of despotism and tyranny was often linked to such regimes. 
In these societies, a revolution was often considered impending by the Americans. The 
criticism of dictators like Muammar Qadhafi (Libya),Saddam Hussein (Iraq) and 
Prince Abdullah (Saudi Arabia ) was based on stifled opposition and political disarray. 
The sanctions on Libya and Iraq, naming Lebanon as a key “safe haven” for terrorists, 
continued suspicion of Saudi financial links with terror organizations, identifying Iraq 
and Iran as “axis of evil” powers only confirmed such a consistent pattern of thinking 
in the American Administration. The growth of radical fundamentalist groups in the 
region like, Hamas in Palestine, Hizbollah in Lebanon, Society of Muslim 
brotherhood in Egypt, Popular Struggle front in Syria and the Wahhabi movement in 
Saudi Arabia targeting the United States and Israel led to growing American scrutiny 
in the region.
152
 
4. Religion as an Influencing Factor 
 An important influence for the spiraling down in U.S –Saudi relations was 
also the role of religion. The influence of religion had received comparatively little 
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attention of scholars analyzing these relations. All the Arab societies were dominated 
by one religion that was Islam, while the American society represented Christian 
values and ideals. The disparity in religious thinking reflected first, in the foreign 
policies, which were influenced by the religious views and beliefs of policy makers 
and constituents. Secondly, religion was a source of legitimacy for both supporting 
and criticizing government behavior locally and internationally. Thirdly, many local 
religious issues and phenomena, including religious conflicts, spread across borders or 
otherwise became international issues. Religion was often considered as part of 
people‟s worldviews and influenced their perception of events and their actions. 
Rodney Stark and William Bainbridge noted that sociologists of religion assumed that 
“people almost universally possess a coherent, overarching and articulated „world 
view‟, perspective‟, value orientations‟ or „meaning system‟ that was often based on 
religion”.153 Melford Spiro stated, “Every religious system consists…of a cognitive 
system.” Williams discussed fundamentalist social movements and described their 
belief systems as “frames” that are the schemata of interpretation”, which people used 
to “give meaning to events, organize experiences, and provide guides for action.”154 
Clifford Geertz deduced that not only did religion include a belief system, but most 
people also found religion necessary to interpret the world around them, especially 
when bad things happened. Weber too strongly connected religion with beliefs. 
Finally, Marx acknowledged its influence on beliefs and behavior.
155
 
 In many ways people in the Islam dominated Arab societies had their own 
tradition, values and beliefs. The attractions of the western culture with its liberal 
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attitudes created a cultural conflict in the region. The religious leaders or the Ulemas 
took advantage of this situation for their personal gains and strengthened their 
positions in the society. The political decay affected by lack of freedom to express 
views, and the strict religious laws perpetuated into a cultural decay with the invasion 
of westernization and hence a social decay in peoples lives. This led to frustrations 
and resentment against European countries and particularly the United States. The 
unequal status of woman, public executions, sectarian violence between Shia and 
Sunni Muslims created further social and cultural schisms. As Fareed  Zakaria, editor 
of news week international, put it: “you are free in the Arab world to demonstrate as 
long as what you want to demonstrate is some vast abstract cause like anti-
Americanism….you are absolutely not free to demonstrate against your rulers”.156 
Rather than pushing for equality for woman, democracy, civil society, freedom of 
speech and due process of law, which were sorely needed in the Arab world, the 
public was instead made to focus on hating the United States. A scholar explained it in 
these words –“When the average Arab citizen tries to reconcile his desire for domestic 
freedom, his feeling of frustrations at home, cautious American support for his 
government and the increasing presence of western culture in clothes, food or even 
music, he is caught in the middle. It is easier (and, in a very human way, more logical) 
to lash out at a distant America than to risk raising one‟s voice against the local 
hegemony. Popular Arab support for America will be hard to muster until Arabs are 
able to lives as they wish, with out oppression and without restrictions. Once Arabs 
are able to voice concerns about their own Government without fear of reprisals, their 
focus will turn inward…”157  
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 Anti Americanism set the stage for the vicious attacks of September 11. It also 
seemed the same anti Americanism was making the global coalition, which the United 
States sought to avenge the attacks, difficult to obtain. As Benjamin A. Gilman 
analyzed –“The United States today is facing an ideological enemy that may turn out 
to be harder to defeat than Al-Qaeda or the Taliban. It creates a culture of hatred 
directed at the United States and its allies.”158 
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CHAPTER – IV 
AMERICAN INVASION OF IRAQ AND ITS IMPACT  
ON US – SAUDI    RELATIONS 
  The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 was perhaps the most difficult challenge 
facing the Saudi government since the Gulf War of 1990-1991. The invasion was 
unprecedented, unprovoked, and lacking in wide Arab and international support and in 
the name of threats, specially, weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and links to Al-
Qaeda that proved to have little credibility. Official Saudi Arabia wished to see 
Saddam Hussein and the Baath regime go, but feared the aftermath. It opted for an 
indecisive position, hiding behind a confused rhetoric of open objections to the war in 
regional Arab meetings and forums and implicit approval, even secret cooperation in 
allowing U.S. military command centers to conduct the war from its own territory. 
The ramifications without a UN Security Council resolution have set a precedent that 
could have serious consequences for Saudi Arabia and the whole of the Middle 
East.
159
 
 The war in Afghanistan dragged on, as the United States was unable to 
pinpoint the perpetuators of the September 11 attacks. The U.S Administration had 
already trained it sights on other targets with Iraq topping the target list. The mounting 
crescendo of people in the United States favoring an attack on Iraq and Saddam 
Hussein was summed up by William Safire of the New York Times: “Strike Saddam 
while Iron‟s hot”. Americans were now being told that evil had not one, but many 
human manifestations. The Bush administration had charted the course clearly leaving 
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none in doubt that given half a chance it would like to finish the unfinished agenda in 
Iraq. President George Bush had start talking about weapon of mass destructions 
(WMDS), terrorism and Iraq some two years before. From the time that terrorists had 
targeted the US homeland, he had been saying that the war against terrorism would go 
on a cross the world. Many experts articulated even a broader vision. They said the 
war on terrorism was not just about hunting down terrorists “It is above all, to protect 
an extraordinary opportunity that has come about to recast the international system”, 
wrote Henry Kissinger. It was clear that the events highlighted the urgency of shaping 
a new world order. As to the war against terrorism, President Bush had been saying 
that it would not be constrained by time or space. The ground had been adequately 
prepared for taking the war to another front after Afghanistan. The United States duly 
notified the United Nation Security Council on October 6, 2002 through a legal 
document that counter terrorism attacks might be extended beyond Afghanistan. 
Almost everyday the Bush administration had spoken about the danger being posed by 
Saddam Hussein. President Bush kept reiterating: “Afghanistan is still just the 
beginning”.160 He made it clear that any one who harbored or funded a terrorist was a 
terrorist. “If they develop weapons of mass destruction that will be used to terrorize 
nations, they will be held accountable. As for Mr. Saddam Hussein, he need to let 
inspectors back in his country, to show us he is not developing weapons of mass 
destruction…the war against terrorism was to deny weapon getting in the hand of 
nations that will use then” Bush said.161  
 Saddam Hussein had been in the thoughts of National Security Adviser 
Condoleeza Rice also. She said “we do not need the events of September 11 to tell us 
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that this is a very dangerous man who is a threat to the region and threat to us… there 
could be only one reason that he has not wanted UN inspectors in Iraq, and that‟s so 
he can build weapons weapon of mass destruction”.162In mid-September, 2001, 
president Bush got a letter from a policy group called “project for the new American 
century” warning him against failure to promptly remove Saddam Hussein from 
power. It suggested that the state sponsors of terrorism such as Iran and Syria should 
also be punished if they refused to withdraw support from Hizbollah.
163
 Another 
group named “Defense Policy Board” recommended to President Bush that Ahmed 
Chalabi of Iraqi National Congress should be installed as the new leader in Baghdad 
backed by the deployment of American troops to secure Iraqi oil fields.
164
 
 The strategy such groups had in mind were of more support to Iraqi dissidents 
to help them organize resistance better. Their ability to channelize the anger of the 
Iraqi people and the U.S. air power, now proven in Afghanistan, could be a lethal 
combination for Saddam Hussein. These utterances were also accompanied by a series 
of media reports based on “intelligence” gathered by the United States seeking to 
implicate Saddam Hussein both in September 11 attacks and the anthrax tragedy. It 
was alleged by the Bush administration that one Al-Qaeda operative had met an Iraqi 
intelligence man in a third country some time ago. An initiative of sending a former 
CIA director to the United Kingdom to gather some “evidence” about Saddam‟s links 
with Osama bin Laden was also taken up by the Bush administration. Although the 
mission got exposed and attracted ridicule, it did not dampen the enthusiasm in the 
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Bush administration in targeting Iraq.
165
 Differences within the administration did 
persist between the Secretary of State Colin Powell led Moderates and the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowiz led hardliners. Yet it did not prevent the policy 
and operational people in the Pentagon from drawing up strategies to attack Iraq. The 
hardliners felt that links between Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein did not have 
to be proven. Timing was crucial and this was the moment to be seized for 
implementing the far right‟s security agenda. This group had always felt that the 
United States should have taken the first Gulf War to Baghdad and replaced Saddam 
Hussein a decade ago. As Richard Perle explained –“the questions of how to deal with 
Iraq has caused a remarkable division between the Clinton administration and a 
bipartisan majority of both house of Congress”.166 The group in the present 
administration did not criticize the earlier Bush Senior administration for sparing 
Saddam Hussein as it had reasoned the Gulf War had by averting his grand plans 
ensured that he would not survive the defeat. Moreover if Saddam had gone, Saudi 
Arabia might have stopped paying for its protection or hosting the American troops. It 
was also felt that to leave Iraq defenseless before neighboring Iran at the point of time 
was highly dangerous. Hence, it turned its criticism on the policies of the Clinton 
administration, which succeeded the Bush Sr. administration. The group felt that 
Clinton‟s strategy of leaving Saddam in place while claiming to have him “contained” 
was bound to be a failure. The Clinton administration‟s policy ignored the increasing 
strength of Saddam‟s position and the accelerating decline of their own.  The group 
felt that the policy depended on a continuation of ever weaker sanctions to obscure the 
decisive victory Saddam would achieve when the sanctions were eventually lifted. It 
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ignored the deterioration of the coalition once arrayed against Saddam, and the 
emergence of France, China and Russia as opponents of tough measures against 
Saddam and advocates of lifting those sanctions still in force. “It left to the next 
administration a legacy of weakness and vacillation: pin prick military strikes that 
served principally to bolster the myth of Saddam‟s invincibility; endless negotiations 
aimed at restoring United Nations on terms acceptable to Saddam and his friends on 
the security council; and a willingness to accept Saddam‟s rule in Iraq which has 
demoralized his opponents and undermined resistance in the region” explained 
Richard Perle.
167
 
 The policy failed to comprehend the fundamental nature of Saddam Hussein‟s 
regime as well as the likely consequences of his removal from power. The Defense 
Policy Board group concluded that the policy of clinging to the sanctions and hoping 
for the best was a failure and could not protect American interests in the Gulf region 
or the world. The “question of stability”, which became the central focus of American 
diplomacy in the 1990s, the “presence of Iran” and the “bay of pigs syndrome” of 
getting bogged down in another civil war were strongly influential in such an 
ambiguous policy according to the Bush administration hardliners.
168
 
 Preparations for an attack on Iraq began as early as January 2002 with the 
creation of a Terrorist Threat Integration Centre, which merged the counter terrorism 
units of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of investigation, the 
Defense Department and the Department of Homeland Security, which was led by the 
director of CIA. Colin Powell, the Secretary of state, considered a moderate, 
confirmed the impending attack when he professed that – “Ambition and hatred are 
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enough to bring Iraq and Al Qaeda together.”169 The campaign had reached such a 
crescendo that the United States went ahead with its attack on Iraq inspite of 
capturing, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the self described planner, organizer of the 
September 11 attacks and considered by American officials as the “Kingpin of Al 
Qaeda”, on March 1st  2002 in Pakistan.170 
 “The American way of war” that phrase popularized by the military historian 
Russel Weigley, spurred by dramatic advances in information technology, had 
undergone a change, from awesome destructive power that only a fully mobilized and 
highly industrialized democracy could bring to bear to a strategy seeking quick victory 
with minimal casualties on both sides. The “transformation”, which had a very high 
profile advocate in Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, of American military was 
showcased in Afghanistan in 2001.
171
 
 
First Gulf war, 1991 
 Troops 
deployed 
Casualties Duration Cost 
United states 500,000 
(estimated) 
300* 48 days $ 80 billion 
(estimated) 
Allies 160,000 65+ 48 days  
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Second gulf war, 2003 
United states 
and united 
kingdom 
250,000 
(estimated) 
129** 
31 
26 days $ 20 billion 
 
*to hostile fire + at least 84 ** of these to hostile fire.
172
 
 As shown in the above table, coalition forces in the second gulf war were less 
than half the size of those deployed in the first one. Yet they achieved a much more 
ambitious goal of occupying all of Iraq, rather than just kicking the Iraqi army out of 
Kuwait in almost half the time, with one-third the casualties, and at one-fourth the cost 
of the first war.
173Many would argue, in retrospect, that Saddam Hussein‟s forces 
were not all that formidable to begin with, yet they were capable enough when they 
fought the Iranian army in the 1980s and put down Kurdish and Shiite insurgencies in 
the 1990s. And, on paper at least, the Bath regime‟s military enjoyed a big numerical 
advantage over U.S. and British forces. Although the Iraqi army was much degraded 
from its pre-1991 heyday, it still deployed more than 450,000 troops, including 
paramilitary units, the republican guard, and the special republican, whose loyalty had 
been repeatedly demonstrated.
174
 The coalition forces by emerging victorious also 
negated the strategies taught by war colleges for sure success of an attacking force 
having a 3 to 1 advantage. As max boot explained – “that the united states and its 
allies won anyway-and won so quickly-must rank as one of the signal achievements in 
military history. Previously, the gold standard of operational excellence had been the 
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Germans managed to conquer France, the Netherlands, and Belgium in just 44 days, at 
a cost of „only‟ 27,000 dead soldiers. The United States and Britain took just 26 days 
to conquer Iraq (a country 80 percent of the size of France), at a cost of 161 dead, 
making fabled generals such as Erwin Rommel and Heinz Guderian seemed positively 
incompetent by comparison”.175 
 The war began with offensive operations combined with simultaneous air and 
ground offensive, in contrast to the 1991 campaign, which saw weeks of air attacks to 
soften Iraqi resistance. This option depended upon the continued cooperation of 
regional nations like turkey and Saudi Arabia for substantial staging area air bases and 
required months to deploy the necessary forces. There were reported 340,000 U.S. 
military personnel in the Persian Gulf region. The 3
rd
 mechanized infantry division, 
the 101
st
 airborne division, the 7
th
 cavalry regiment and the 1
st
 marine expeditionary 
force formed the bulk of the U.S. ground offensive. The air force had approximately 
15 air wings operation in the region. Strategic bombers operated from the British air 
base at Diego Garcia, and air bases in the Middle East, Europe and the United States. 
The United Kingdom also deployed over 47,000 personnel, including a naval task 
force, an armored task force, a royal marine brigade, a parachute bridge, a special air 
service regiment, and a special boat squadron. Australia deployed approximately 2000 
personnel, primarily special operations personnel, and one f/a-18 aircraft squadron 
while Poland had 200 special operations troops.
176
 
 Allied commandoes and special operations forces invading Iraq focused 
specifically on the search for weapons of mass destruction and missile launcher sites. 
                                                          
175
 Ibid, p. 44-45. 
176
 Steve bowman, “Iraq: US military operations” Congressional Research document, October 2003, 
p.1-3. 
93 
 
Fifteen hours after the start of the ground war in March 2003, the coalition began its 
full-scale air assault on Baghdad. Despite all the hype about “shock and awe”, the 
initial bombardment was very restrained. In addition to hitting the usual targets – air 
defenses and command and control facilities – allied commanders concentrated on 
bombing the Baath party head quarters and Saddam‟s palaces. They had hoped that 
the regime would collapse at the first whiff of gunpowder, leaving its infrastructure in 
fact. That overly optimistic expectation was dashed when allied ground forces ran into 
stiffer than expected resistance in southern Iraq. Coalition commanders had 
anticipated that Basra, a heavily Shiite city that had rebelled against Saddam in 1991, 
would rise up this time as well. Yet no such rebellion was forthcoming, in part 
because Basra‟s citizens did not want to risk being slaughtered by Baathist security 
forces, as they had been in 1991 and partly because Saddam had formed the 
paramilitary Fedayeen to stiffen resistance and prevent any further revolts. The 
coalition‟s response to this setback was to loosely cordon off Basra. The British 
armored division spent the next three weeks patiently chipping away at Iraqi defenses, 
all the while being careful to avoid the kind of street fighting that Saddam clearly 
hoped to trigger. Leaving the British behind, the rest of the coalition forces raced 
north towards Baghdad along two parallel axes. A section of the US Special Forces 
took to the largely empty deserts west of the Euphrates River while another segment 
advanced to its rights, along the heavily populated east bank of the Euphrates. The 
initial speed of the advance was so fast that this dash towards Baghdad left the U.S. 
lines of communication temporarily exposed to Fedayeen and other Iraqi security 
force‟s attacks.177  
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U.S. A and its ‘allies’ Military fatalities in Iraq 
(March-December 2003) 
Period US UK Other Total Days 
Dec-03 40 0 8 48 31 
Nov-03 81 1 27 109 30 
Oct-03 42 1 2 45 31 
Sept-03 31 1 1 33 30 
Aug-03 35 6 2 43 31 
June-03 46 1 0 47 31 
June-03 29 6 0 35 30 
May-03 37 4 0 41 31 
Apr-03 73 6 0 79 30 
Mar-03 65 27 0 92 12 
Total 479 53 40 572 277 
Source: Lunaville. Org/war casualties/summary.
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 As the table indicated, attacks of resistance groups, on an average, worked out 
to be a little over one per day, reaching a peak in December 2003. The resistance 
groups, on an average managed to kill two military personnel of the U.S. and its allies 
per day in Iraq. It also indicates that although Saddam Hussein might not have 
actually coordinated these attacks, his capture on December 13
th
, 2003 had a 
demoralizing effect on the resistance group. Lastly there was no indication of the 
resistance group attacks coming down in any significant way. 
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 These attacks, however, forced senior allied commanders to slow down 
temporarily the advance to allow their forces to get rest, regroup, recompiled and to 
secure rear areas. Yet, within twenty five days of offensive operations, coalition forces 
had relative control of all major Iraqi cities like Basra, Mosul, Kirkuk, Tikrit and had 
arrived at the door steps of the capital, Baghdad. Approaching it with caution amidst 
fears of risking another „Stalingrad‟, U.S. forces became progressively bolder as the 
probing attacks revealed the weakness of Iraq defenses.  Baghdad was occupied and 
the American forces felled the statue of Saddam on April 9
th
 and the occupation of the 
entire country was completed by April 14, 2003.
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 As the battle phase of the war ended, however, looting and lawlessness besieged 
Iraq. A year into the American occupation violence persists against both U.S. forces 
and Iraqis cooperating with the occupation. With the united states pledging $2.48 
billion for a special Iraq relief and reconstruction fund for the purpose of aid efforts in 
a wide range of sectors, including water and sanitation, food, electricity, education and 
rule of law, an environment of order and stability was contingent for its successful 
conduct.
180
 American diplomats are currently seeking to encourage international help 
through a United Nations Security council resolution. Yet terror, violence and 
lawlessness created a major hurdle for such reconstruction works. The bombing of the 
U.N. Head quarters in Baghdad on August 19, 2003, and the bombing of the Najaf 
mosque 10 days later indicated that resistance groups were sparing none. The 
assassination of the moderate Shiite cleric al-hakim and Sergio Vieira de Mello, a 
Brazilian diplomat and U.N. special representative shocked the world as the war on 
Iraq was producing murky and grave consequence to supporters of the war. An ethnic 
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religious war between Shias and Sunnis and the confrontations between radical clerk 
Muqtada al-Sadr and American forces has also drawn media and international 
attention to the increasing incompetence of American force to enforce order and 
stability. The continued instability has increased reconstruction costs and delayed 
implementations of further rehabilitation programs. Further, as institutions of 
commerce and security have yet to be fully reestablished ahead of the June 30, 2004 
deadline for a transitional interim government, the trust of Iraqi people in the U.S. 
leadership to bring about a democratic transformation in Iraq has been undermined, 
opening the door to political discontent and opposition.
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 A year following the invasion, a poll by the Pew Research Center for the People 
and the Press indicated that the war had softened international support for the U.-led 
war on terrorism increased anti-US sentiment in the Arab-Islamic world, and alienated 
Europeans from US leadership. Since the terrorist attacks against the United States in 
2001, the Bush administration in large part as a result of its invasion and occupation of 
Iraq has brought the United States from having unprecedented sympathy and support 
in the national community to unprecedented hostility and isolation. In the face of 
worldwide opposition to the invasion, the administration and its allies have helped 
cultivate a dramatic growth in xenophobia and national chauvinism, in relation not 
just to the Arab-Islamic world, but to Europe as well.
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1. US - Saudi Relations through the Iraq War 
                                                          
181
 Curt Tarnoff, “Iraq: recent developments in reconstruction assistance”, congressional research 
survey report, October 2, 2003, p.1-7 
182
 Stephen Zunes, The United States: Belligerent  Hegemon, The Iraq War: Causes and 
Consequences,: Viva Books Private Limited( Newdelhi:2007)p.33 
97 
 
The Saudi position vis-à-vis the war on Iraq has to be put in the context of the 
historical rivalry between the two states rooted in sectarian differences between a 
predominantly Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia majority Iraq. When Iran‟s revolutionary 
rhetoric threatened Saudi Arabia, Riyadh financed Saddam‟s war. When Saddam 
invaded Kuwait, Saudi Arabia hosted the U.S. operation Desert Strom against him, 
and in the 1990s supported international sanction against Iraq even allowing its 
territory to be used by the British and US military to monitor the no-fly zones over 
Iraq involving periodic attacks on Iraqi targets. 
 The challenge facing Saudi Arabia comes from the strains introduced into its 
long-standing strategic alliance with the United States by the attacks of 11 September 
2001. That attacks were sponsored by Osama bin Laden, a Saudi national, using 
fifteen young Saudis stimulated US suspicion of and even hostility toward the Saudi 
regime. Following the 9/11 attacks, the United States began preparing for reduction in 
its military presence in Saudi Arabia in favor of the small neighboring Gulf states. The 
U.S.-led war on Afghanistan in 2001 caught Saudi Arabia between the need to 
appease its US patron and Islamic opinion. While Saudi Arabia was more than happy 
to see the demise of the Taliban regime and the weakening of bin Laden‟s al-Qaeda 
base the government was reluctant to openly declare its full support for the onslaught 
on Afghanistan although US military bases in Saudi Arabia were used as a launching 
ground for military operations throughout autumn 2001. Bin Laden‟s Islamic rhetoric 
and actions have combined to create a volatile political climate in Saudi Arabia, where 
his opportunity was evident among some religious scholars and the youth of the 
country. 
 As the US invasion of Iraq became inevitable, the question of whether Saudi 
Arabia wanted the Baath regime replaced by a pro-Western government “pumping oil 
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in greater quantities than Saudi Arabia” posed a dilemma for the Saudi government. 
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia worried about the possibility of an Iraqi Shite pro-Iranian 
government installed at its doorstep, following the demise of Saddam‟s Sunni regime. 
Saudi Arabia‟s responses to the war had to be handled carefully so that the US-Saudi 
strategic alliance did not suffer, while at the same time maintaining the semblance of 
Arab solidarity against US aggression to appease its own indigenous population.
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 With nowhere to turn and go, crown prince Abdullah, the de facto ruler 
declared his own war on terrorism. The kingdom‟s highest religious authority too 
issued a declaration backing this war. Abdullah‟s crackdown was an increasing surge 
of violence in the form of al Qaeda attacks on three housing complexes in Riyadh 
killing 35 people including nine suicide bombers. One arrest suggested that al Qaeda 
might have penetrated the Saudi security forces. Another key al Qaeda operative in 
U.S. custody revealed an explicit deal between the al Qaeda and Saudi royals. 
Though, long ago, Osama bin laden, a Saudi by birth, had condemned the royal family 
for allowing American troops on Saudi soil, his group had refrained from violence 
within the kingdom; its reasons were clear to U.S. intelligence. A former bush 
administration official said “There were al Qaeda agents in the kingdom that urged al 
Qaeda not to strike in Saudi Arabia because they (the Saudis) might cut off the 
“spigot” of funding flowing to the group”.184 
 With the increased flurry of activities within the kingdom, American officials‟ 
scrutiny on Saudi Arabia tightened. Increased pressure from the bush administration 
and terrorist attacks like the Riyadh bombing, which according to deputy secretary of 
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state Richard Atmitage, acted as the “felling of the scales from the eyes of the 
Saudis”, forced prince Abdullah to fight a battle against what he called as “deviant 
and misguided” terrorist “with out any room neither for neutrality nor for 
hesitancy”.185 Yet such efforts largely generated mixed responses from American 
officials. An American official claims that, “now they are taking on the militant sub 
culture head on” was accepted by Armitage who stated that, “cooperation on things 
that are internal to Saudi Arabia has been magnificent”.186 Yet top administration 
counter terrorism officials shot down such assessments by saying that they had 
“significant concerns” about the levels of assistance from Riyadh. Although there was 
a sharp division in the American circles over Saudi Arabia, the Saudis did get ever 
improving marks from Washington for prohibiting Saudi charities from sending 
money abroad with out government permission and for freezing bank accounts 
suspected of having links to terrorism. Yet even though the Saudi Foreign minister 
Prince Saud Al Faisal repeatedly claimed that, “the money aspect is mow completely 
controlled, and your government knows it”.187 Robert Jordan, American ambassador 
to Riyadh, put it down as an exaggeration stating that, “it is sort of like trying to stamp 
our crabgrass. As soon as you stamp one of them out, something spring up somewhere 
else under a different name”.188 with the American political establishment increasingly 
divisive over Saudi commitment in rooting terrorism, criticizing, on the one hand, of 
“selective cooperation” and the insistence for knowing everything, while on the other 
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hand, praising the Saudis recent sweeps on Al Qaeda cells, relations had come a full 
circle from it‟s early years of inception when ambivalence was its basis.189  
 When the Iraq war started, Saudi Arabia was caught in precarious position 
between supporting a longtime ally‟s unilateral ambitions and opposing it as most of 
the Saudi public wanted it to do. The dilemma of choosing between the solid links 
established between the Saudi royal family and the Bush family and the domestic 
unrest that Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations threatened to unleash in both the 
countries, further increased the distrust and suspicions in the relations. 
2. The Dual Monarchy 
 To understand why Saudi Arabia, one of Washington‟s staunchest allies, had been 
incubating anti-Americanism, the murky depths of Saudi Arabia‟s domestic politics 
have to be analyzed. The Saudi state, by the beginning of the 21
st
 century became a 
fragmented entity, divided between the fiefdoms of the royal family. Among the four 
of five most powerful princes, two stood out: crown Prince Abdullah and his half 
brother Prince Nayef, the interior minister. 
 Relations between these two leaders were visibly tense. In the United States, 
Abdullah cut a higher profile but at home, in Saudi Arabia, Nayef, who controlled the 
secret police, cast a longer and darker shadow. Saudi Arabia was also in the throes of 
a crisis. The economy was unable to keep pace with the population growth while the 
welfare state was rapidly deteriorating and regional and sectarian resentments were 
rising to the fore. These problems have been exacerbated by an upsurge in radical 
Islamic activism. Many agreed that the Saudi political system had to evolve, but a 
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profound cultural schizophrenia prevented the elite from agreeing on the specifics of 
reform. 
 The Saudi monarchy functioned as the intermediary between two distinct 
political communities: westernized elite that looked to Europe and the United States as 
models of political development, and a Wahhabi religious establishment that held up 
its interpretation of Islam‟s golden age as a guide. Saudi Arabia‟s two most powerful 
princes took opposing sides in this debate: Abdullah tilted towards the liberal 
reformers and sought a rapprochement with the United States, where as Nayef sided 
with the clerics and took direction from an anti-American religious establishment that 
shared many goals with Al Qaeda. The two camps were divided over the question of 
whether the state should reduce the power of the religious establishment. On the right 
side of the political spectrum, the clerics and Nayef took their stand on the principle of 
“Tawhid” or “monotheism” as defined by Mohammed Ibn Abdul-wahhab. In their 
view, Christians, Jews and insufficiently devout Sunni Muslims were enemies out to 
destroy true Islam. Tawhid was closely connected to Jihad and hence it was not just an 
intolerant religious doctrine but also a political principle that legitimized the 
repressiveness of the Saudi State. In foreign policy, Tawhid translated into support for 
Jihad and so it was Nayef- not Abdullah – who presided over the Saudi fund for the 
support of fundamentalist groups. 
 If “Tawhid” was the right pole of the Saudi Political spectrum, then the 
doctrine of “Taqarub” – rapprochement between Muslims and non- Muslims – marked 
the left. Taqarub promoted the nation of peaceful coexistence with non-believers, 
downplayed the importance of Jihad and stood in opposition to the siege mentality 
fostered by “Tawhid”. Crown Prince Abdullah clearly associated himself with 
“Taqarub”. He advocated relaxing restrictions on public debate, promoted democratic 
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reform and supported a reduction in the power of clerics. Between January and May 
2003, he presided over an unusually open “national dialogue” with prominent Saudi 
liberals that included two petitions, one on a road map for Saudi democracy and 
another that included a call by the oppressed Shiite community, viscerally and vocally 
opposed by the Saudi religious establishment, for greater freedom. The first endorsed 
direct elections, the establishment of an independent Judiciary and an increased public 
role for women. The western world largely had no sympathy for hard task that the 
Crown Prince had to undertake.
190
   
 Saudi Arabia was a crucial cog for the American plans in Iraq. It was the 
launch pad for the US-led Gulf war in 1991. Washington could launch an attack on 
Iraq without using bases inside Saudi Arabia, but the air campaign would be more 
difficult for the United States by refusing to allow the use of its facilities for any 
attack against neighboring Iraq even if it was sanctioned by the United Nations. 
Foreign Minister Saud-al-Faisal, who had in the past indicated that the Americans 
could use base in Saudi Arabia for an attack on Iraq, if the UN sanctioned it, ruled out 
such a move “we will abide by the decision of the United Nations Security Council 
and we will co-operate with the Security Council. But as to entering the conflict or 
using facilities…that is something els”. He added: “our policy is that if the United 
Nations takes a decision… it is obligatory on all signatories to cooperate, but that is 
not to the extent of using facilities in the country or the military forces of the 
country”.191 His remarks were the strongest Saudi rejection to date of any assistance in 
a possible US attack on Iraq. One of the factors weighing heavily in the Saudi minds 
for rejecting active cooperation was the fear of a backlash by the Al Qaeda and a 
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determination to follow a policy of mending fences with its immediate neighbor. The 
former factor had already created ruptures in the Saudi society. Apprehensions about a 
free life for the common Saudi citizens were confirmed by the violence unleashed by 
terror groups across the kingdom. The latter factor was a continuation of the Saudi 
policy to erase the fear of a militarized Iraq and follow a policy of appeasement with 
its neighbor. By providing active cooperation to the United States in its attack on Iraq, 
Saudi Arabia did not want to antagonize the Arab world and in particular the Iraqi 
people. This was reflected in Prince Saud al-Faisal‟s statement: “you can never make 
a permanent change through occupation by foreign force”. he added that the kingdom 
wanted a political resolution to the Iraq crisis and that Baghdad had made a “very 
clear and unambiguous promise” to Arab States that it would abide by the UN 
resolution.
192
 
 Adel-al-Jubeir, spokesman for the ruling family, added- “There is no country I 
know of supporting the use of force in Iraq at this time… The rhetoric about using 
force is way ahead of the policy”.193 Saud al-Faisal explained the Saudi viewpoint in 
the following words-“The problem of Iraq and countries in the region. We have 
always opposed any attack against an Arab or Muslim country, and that also means 
Iraq”.194 Though the royal family was concerned about angering its population further 
because of its close association with the United States, its opposition to a American – 
led war had been mollified so much that the Saudi governmental officials made an 
effort to take a middle path by giving consent to the use of the Prince Sultan Air base 
and agreed for command and control, special operations and refueling missions to be 
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staged out of the country.
195
 They also agreed to keep delivering oil to maintain oil 
prices through the Iraq war. Ali Naimi, the minister of petroleum and mineral 
resources indicated that the major priority of OPEC was to maintain the stability of the 
oil market and guarantee oil supply based on fair and reasonable prices. He added that 
OPEC had signaled that it would pump more oil to make up for any disruption in 
supply caused by the war in Iraq. Saudi Arabia was believed to have as much as 50 
million barrels in storage in the country and providing more to other storage facilities. 
Accused by Washington of “feeding terrorism”, the oil-rich kingdom watched the US 
army Head Quarters in the Gulf move to Qatar. Similarly Bahrain, engaged in its own 
democratic process, had long served as the US naval Head Quarters, hosting the 5
th
 
fleet. Kuwait, invaded by Iraq in 1990, was the main launch pad for the war to oust 
Saddam Hussein and the UAE, from where much of the cash used by terrorists in the 
September 11 attacks was reportedly transferred, launched a crackdown on suspect 
money at the behest of Washington. 
 In spite of its efforts at pleasing everybody, the September 11 attacks and the 
subsequent Iraq war had greatly undermined the importance of Saudi Arabia in the 
Middle East. The issue of Iraq dominated American political discussions while 
smaller countries like Qatar, Bahrain and to a lesser extent United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) and Kuwait rose in prominence. “The changes followed the fall of the 
communist bloc in Europe at the end of the last century and were accentuated by the 
September 11, 2001 suicide attacks on the United States, in which 11 of the 19 
suspected hijackers were Saudis. The message was well understood by certain small 
countries like Qatar, Bahrain, UAE and Kuwait, on the other hand others (Saudis) 
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turned a deaf ear because of the structural paralysis that nature of their power and the 
weigh of religion and tradition” said leading Kuwaiti economic analyst Jassim al-
Saadun.
196
 
3. Similarities and dissimilarities in U.S. – Saudi relations during Gulf War I 
and II 
 First, the common goal during both the wars, for both U.S. and Saudi Arabia was 
the ouster of Iraqi troops, yet in the Gulf War-I, both countries fought together to oust 
Saddam from Kuwait after he invaded it. The Iraq War was to oust Saddam Hussein 
himself. This made the Saudis uncomfortable as the charges trumped up against 
Saddam Hussein was the possession of illegal weapons of mass destructions (WMDS) 
and he close relationship the Iraqi dictator allegedly enjoyed with the Al Qaeda terror 
network. Second, the first Gulf War was fought to protect Saudi Arabia from a 
probable Iraqi invasion, which seemed a real threat. In other words, the coalition was 
formed primarily for a defensive strategy, which turned into an offensive campaign 
later. The Iraq war, a decade later was fought by the United States for a regime 
change, not only in Iraqi, but also aimed as Saudi Arabia later. As John Lewis Gaddis, 
professor of political science in Yale University, explained," I think they have in mind 
as a long term strategy is actually a kind of domino theory in the Middle East; that if, 
in fact, you could get a functioning democracy in a place like Iraq, that truly would 
have an effect next door in Iran .. this is a strategy that`s ultimately targeted at the 
Saudis".
197
Third, the first Gulf War witnessed active participation and cooperation 
from Saudi Arabia which financed majority of the American campaign, sent troops for 
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active combat and kept up increased levels of oil supply to negate surging oil prices 
without any hesitation. The Iraq War saw Saudi Arabia placed in a dilemma. After 
refusing to participate outright at first, it agreed to provide minimum cooperation by 
way of refuelling and a base later, to appease frayed American nerves. Fourth, the first 
Gulf War was the bedrock on which the US-Saudi relations received a boost due to 
the close cooperation between the two. For the Saudi royal family, it was an easy 
decision to side with its closest ally as there were no anti- American feelings or hatred 
among the Saudi public but the Iraq War saw anti-American feelings Saudi Arabia 
reach a crescendo, as the United States was perceived as imperialist and anti-Islamic. 
Fifth, the first Gulf War was fought at a time when a popular, widely respected and 
nearly unanimously accepted ruler king Fahd was in power. He had ruled the kingdom 
for nearly a decade until then and was an American supporter. By the time the Iraq 
war took place; King Fahd had been restricted by a stroke while crown Prince 
Abdullah succeeded him. Abdullah was fighting a pitched domestic battle with his 
half brother Prince Nayef and was not seen as pro –American, unlike King Fahd. He 
was highly critical of the American support of Israel in the West Asian dispute. Sixth, 
the first Gulf War occurred at a time when the close relationship between the United 
States and Saudi Arabia was necessitated by American dependence on Saudi oil, yet 
by the time the Iraq war took place, American demand for oil had taken them to the 
Asia Pacific region and the Persian Gulf region. Hence American dependence on 
Saudi oil had visibly decreased and the United State viewed the Saudi market more for 
arms sale rather than for oil. Seventh, the first Gulf War saw the United States lead a 
coalition of countries armed with a United Nations resolution to fight Iraq. This made    
Saudi Arabia`s decision to participate in the war efforts logical to its rulers and 
people. 
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But the Iraq War was a unilateral move by the United States which was opposed by 
many countries, and the United Nations. To the Saudis, the American move smacked 
of imperial designs and as a show of might. Hence it did not convince the Saudis to 
participate in the war.
198
 Eighth the first Gulf War was fought at a time when the 
Saudi society was peaceful and fairly stable. The economy driven by oil had generated 
a higher standard of living. Hence the decision to finance and participate in the world 
could be borne. But the Iraq war took place when Al Qaeda repeatedly targeted the 
Saudi society with its terror attacks. This had a resounding effect on the economy 
which had begun to slow down. Finally the first Gulf War saw Saudi participation 
because of it fear of Iraqi military might threatening its territorial integrity but the Iraq 
war took place after Saudi Arabia had decided to be less hostile and look at ways of 
rapprochement with Iraq to bring it back into the main fold. Hence, it was hesitant in 
providing support to American designs on Iraq.
199
 
 The striking similarities, which remained the basis of the US-Saudi relations 
through both the wars, were first, the advent of a faceless enemy called terrorism, 
which had resounding impacts on both the countries. Terrorism became a major threat 
after the first Gulf war, and reached its ultimate manifestations in the form of the 
September 11 attacks, which led to the subsequent attack by the United States on Iraq 
for its alleged connections with terrorists. Secondly, the enemy for both the countries 
over the decade that separated both the wars was the same Saddam Hussein & Iraq. 
Thirdly, when the Iraq war took place, Saudi Arabia, in spite of difficult relations, 
continued to be the closest ally of the United States. According to the Americans, both 
wars took place due to security threats to the territory of Saudi Arabia. Fourthly, both 
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wars resulted in the building of a new world order. The first Gulf War was fought to 
stop Iraq emerging as a major regional threat to the Saudi dominance in the regime. 
The Iraq War was fought with the idea of taking control over Iraq, which would give 
the United States, along with Afghanistan, an opportunity to surround the other major 
threat, Iran. Fifthly, both the wars were seen as aggressive responses to events 
preceding them. The first gulf war took place as a result of the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait while the Iraq war took place as a result to the deadly September 11 attacks by 
terrorists on the United States.
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CHAPTER - V 
US – SAUDI RELATIONS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE AMERICAN 
INVASION OF IRAQ 
  Saudi-U.S. relations have grown increasingly complex as the number of policy 
challenges facing both countries has multiplied and as both countries security and 
economic interest have become more intertwined. The United States remains the 
principle external actor in the Middle East region, but by most accounts many regional 
policy makers including those is Saudi Arabia, perceive potential U.S. influence to be 
limited by current U.S. military commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 The United States and Saudi Arabia still have many common interests. The 
kingdom remains the world‟s largest reservoir and producer of oil and the United 
States is its biggest consumer. Both states want to make sure that the flow of Saudi oil 
to the international market remains uninterrupted by Iran or terrorist group; both face 
a serious threat from al Qaeda; both want to contain Iran‟s political ambitions in the 
region and thwart Tehran‟s nuclear weapon program; both look to each other to help 
resolve the current world financial crisis. The Saudi continued to support the dollar 
through thick and thin in early 2008, fending off pressures from their Arab allies in the 
Persian Gulf to delink their currency from the dollar and calculate oil payments in 
other denominations. Their faith in the dollar has been vindicated, as other countries, 
including China, have recently sought refuge from their own current economic crises 
by buying more U.S. Treasury bonds. The main Saudi interest now is to see a quick 
U.S. recovery, which would help revive a depressed world economy and stimulate 
demand for more oil.  
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Since al Qaeda began launching attacks inside Saudi Arabia in May 2003, the two 
governments have begun working closely together on counterterrorism, including 
through the exchange of real-time intelligence to track, thwart, and apprehend 
terrorists. The Saudi have also worked with the U.S. government to establish a 35,000 
member force to protect Saudi Arabia‟s oil facilities, which al Qaeda has already 
targeted twice.
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             Saudi confidence in U.S. influence and guarantees reportedly has diminished 
and the ability of the United States to simultaneously pursue a political and social 
reform agenda and a close strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia remain in question. 
Saudi Arabia has weathered economic strains and a dangerous domestic terrorism 
campaign and arguably has emerged as the most economically and politically 
powerful Arab states. 
 Over the long term, growing demand for oil in development countries, declining 
oil reserves outside of the Persian Gulf region, and expanding Saudi oil revenue are 
likely to further raise Saudi Arabia‟s international profile and influence. U.S. national 
security interests with regard to Saudi Arabia are likely to persist, while U.S. efforts to 
achieve policy goals may be complicated by these trends. At present, formal U.S.-
Saudi security and political relationship appear strong, in spite of differences in some 
areas. As noted above, the Obama Administration appears poised to promote U.S.-
Saudi cooperation in education, trade, and investment while continuing to seek Saudi 
cooperation on global counterterrorism and regional security issues.
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1. The US and Saudi Arabia Strategic Partnership 
 The practical value of the US and Saudi strategic partnership was demonstrated 
by a long series of Saudi efforts that helped the US deal during the World War. It has 
since been demonstrated in combat. Saudi Arabia played a key role in containing 
Iranian military pressure on the Southern Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war, and Saudi 
defense of its air space and waters was made possible by US sales and training 
support.
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 Unconventional threats from Iran the threat of domestic terrorism and the residual 
effects of continuing instability in Iraq, Yemen, Syria and Pakistan now constitute the 
primary threats to Saudi National Security counterterrorism, intelligence and border 
security improvements are ongoing to respond these threats and the United States is 
seeking to improve the deterrent and defensive capability of Saudi Arabia and other 
Gulf Cooperation Council (OPEC) military vis-à-vis Iran whose conventional air force 
is limited but whose unconventional warfare capabilities could threaten the kingdom. 
References to potential threats to Saudi security from Iran have persisted since the 
1979 Iranian revolution, and have moved back into focus since the overthrow of 
Saddam Hussein‟s regime in Iraq removed what Saudi and U.S. military officials 
considered after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990  the other primary conventional 
military threat to Saudi Arabia security. 
 At present, U.S. and Saudi Arabia officials cite the residual effects of 
continuing instability in the region as serious external threats to Saudi security, while 
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the threat of terrorism and the security of key energy infrastructure remain the 
principal domestic security concerns.
204
 
           While Saudi Arabia must be diplomatic about its public treatment of its 
neighbor, Iran is now the central focus of US and Saudi military cooperation. An 
ambitious and extremist Iranian regime has emerged as a threat to the entire region. It 
has built up a massive capability to conduct irregular warfare in the Gulf, it has 
created strong ties to extremist and terrorist non-state actors, it is steadily expanding 
its long range missile forces, it is seeking to create a major defense production base 
for conventional weapon, it is a declared chemical weapons state, and it is becoming a 
nuclear threshold state that has at least started arming its missile with nuclear 
warheads. 
 This is having major impact on regional stability at a time when other major 
changes are taking place in the regional military balance. The US invasion of Iraq in 
2003 destroyed most of its conventional military forces and Iraq‟s ability to act as 
counter balance to Iran. US withdrawal from Iraq will also leave Iraq without the 
conventional forces it need to deter intimidation and military pressure from 
neighboring states like Iran for at least eight to ten years. This has fundamentally 
changed the military balance in the Gulf in ways that both create major new security 
demands for Saudi Arabia, and as effective a mix of US presence, US power 
projection capability, and strong, interoperable Saudi and other GCC forces as 
possible.
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The two countries share an interest in resolving several of the Middle East‟s most 
vexing problems. Both Washington and Riyadh want to create an independent 
Palestinian state and to promote stability in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, and the 
Palestinian territories. But common concerns do not mean shared strategy. On 
Afghanistan, the Saudis will likely demur: they regard the buildup of U.S. military 
forces and Washington‟s expanded commitment to building a strong central 
government as foolhardy. In December 2008, Prince Turki al-Faisal, the former Saudi 
ambassador to Washington, advised the Obama administration to “get bin Laden, get 
Zawahiri, and get out.” The Saudis are far less concerned than the Americans about 
the prospect that the resurgent Taliban may secure a role in a newly reformulated 
Afghan central government. Saudi Arabia was one of the only three countries to 
recognize the old Taliban regime in the 1990s, and the extreme strain of Wahhabism 
prevalent in the kingdom which is intolerant of Christians, Jews, and other forms of 
Islam is very similar to the Taliban‟s puritanical brand of Islam. 
 In Pakistan, Riyadh shares Washington‟s interest in stability but cares little 
about the fate of democracy. Like Bush, Abdullah was a strong supporter of former 
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf‟s military regime. Saudi Arabia has invested 
heavily over the years in Pakistan‟s economic and financial well-being, mediated its 
internal political squabbles on more than one occasion, and helped finance 
Islamabad‟s military purchases from abroad. It is even believed to have substantially 
financed the Pakistani nuclear weapons program. With the democratically elected 
government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif facing a threat from militant Islamist 
groups, the Saudis will have to decide whether their theological affinity with the 
Pakistani Taliban is more important than their support for a stable, secular central 
government. 
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In Lebanon, both Washington and Riyadh have work in tandem to contain and weaken 
the militant Shiite group Hezbollah, which is backed by Iran and Syria. Both 
governments have consistently supported Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and 
his shaky coalition of Christian and Sunni groups. But the Saudis are also pursuing 
their own narrow interests there. They are pouring funds into fundamentalist Salafi 
groups, which are building militias to counter Hezbollah, whose forces went on a 
rampage through downtown Beirut last May and even sought to kill Saudi diplomats 
because of the kingdom‟s support for their enemies. The potential for a U.S.-Saudi 
clash over Lebanon became clear during the summer of 2007, when the Lebanese 
army struggled to quash a revolt by the Salafi group Fatah al-Islam, which was holed 
up inside a Palestinian refugee camp in northern Lebanon. While the Salafi fighters 
including many Saudis battled government forces, the United States was rushing 
weapons to the Lebanese army. The army eventually prevailed. 
 In the Palestinian territories, in contrast to the Bush administration‟s goal of 
isolating Hamas, Abdullah‟s objective has been to bring together Palestinian radicals 
and moderates. U.S. officials were dismayed when Abdullah invited feuding 
Palestinian factions to Mecca in January 2007 and pressured the moderate Fatah 
faction to accept a coalition government under Hamas‟ leadership. The so-called 
Mecca agreement undermined the Bush administration‟s efforts to promote direct 
peace talks between then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian 
Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. Since then, however, the Saudis have worked 
with the United States to bolster the embattled Palestinian Authority against Hamas, 
and they continue to support Palestinian negotiations with Israel, despite Hamas‟ 
growing popularity on the Arab street in the wake of Israel‟s failed attempt in January 
to break the group‟s hold over the Gaza Strip. The Gaza fighting led a frustrated 
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Abdullah to condemn the Fatah-Hamas rift as “more dangerous than Israeli 
aggression” and to push harder for reconciliation between the two factions, a policy 
the Obama administration has not yet adopted.
206
 
 The Obama administration should prepare itself for an unpredictable 
relationship with Saudi Arabia marked at times by willingness to pursue common 
interests and at others by sharp disagreement or even openly conflicting objectives. It 
should not expect, as past U.S. administrations have, that Saudi Arabia stands ready 
and willing to do the United States‟ bidding. 
 In its effort to breathe new life into this old relationship, the Obama 
administration must put an end to its predecessor‟s clumsy efforts to promote the 
kingdom as a keystone of a grand alliance against Iran. The Saudis flatly rejected 
Bush‟s efforts to build a coalition of so-called moderate Sunni states Egypt, Jordan, 
and the six GCC members with the conspicuous backing of the United States and 
Israel. For all its intense distrust of Iran, Saudi Arabia has made clear that it is not 
going to take part in any U.S. scheme to promote regime change in Tehran, bomb 
Iranian nuclear facilities, or promote opposition groups in Iran. Riyadh‟s fear of 
retaliation, its keen awareness of Iran‟s ability to chock shipping lanes, and its natural 
penchant for accommodation all give it reason to keep away from U.S.-designed 
strategies for outright confrontation. But Abdullah will likely support Obama‟s 
recently announced plan to seek dialogue with Iran, even if it cause anxiety among 
those Saudis who fear that it night lead to a “grand bargain” in which the United 
States would accommodate Iran‟s civilian nuclear ambitions and acknowledge its 
hegemony over the Persian Gulf. The quid pro quo would involve Iran‟s renunciation 
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of nuclear weapons and the ending of its support for terrorism. One proposal being 
discussed in Washington is for the Obama administration to extend the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella to the GCC states to reassure them of a continuing U.S. commitment to their 
security and to lessen their interest in developing independent nuclear weapons 
capabilities. The Saudis have not disclosed whether they would welcome this, which, 
if they did, would in essence mean publicly conceding their dependence on 
Washington for their security. 
 In this atmosphere of uncertainty, the Obama administration should seek 
cooperation on a piecemeal basis rather than laboring to devise a grand strategic 
alliance, a Saudi-led coalition of Arab moderates, or a new special relationship. 
Successful cooperation on any one issue, particularly a settlement of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, would go a long way toward restoring the trust and confidence 
that were lost on 9/11.207 
2. US-Saudi Military Cooperation 
 Long standing military training programs remain an important pillar of U.S.-
Saudi relations. The United States has played an integral role in the development, 
training, and arming of the Saudi Arabia military since the 1940s when U.S. military 
advisors first carried out a comprehensive assessment of the kingdom defense 
requirements. Since the 1940s, a number of subsequent U.S. defense assessments, 
joint planning activities, and training programs have established close and cooperative 
relationships between the U.S. military services and their Saud counterparts. The 
Saudi Arabia government has continually sought U.S. military technology and training 
as a guarantee of its national security, and Saudi authorities have pursued military 
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procurement and modernization initiatives based on the recommendations of U.S. 
defense surveys. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the United States Army Corps of 
Engineers completed a series of massive military infrastructure construction project 
across the Kingdom; many U.S.-built facilities remain critical to the operations of 
Saudi security forces.
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 A US-Saudi military partnership led the coalition that drove Iraq from 
Kuwait. It was demonstrated in the basing of US fighters and surface-to-air missiles in 
Saudi Arabia from 1992-2003, which played a critical role in enforcing sanctions in 
Iraq. It also was demonstrated during the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. While Saudi 
Arabia did not support the war, it helped support US air operations, and allowed over 
flights and recovery. 
 While US combat forces left Saudi Arabia in 2003, the US military Training 
Mission (USMTM), and advisory team supporting the Saudi Arabia National Guard 
(SANG), remained. Saudi Arabia has continued to play a major role in US-led 
exercises involving Britain and France. As Saudi help in blocking the shipment of 
terrorist bombs from Yemen to the US in October 2010, has shown, Saudi Arabia has 
steadily improved its intelligence cooperation with the US, and counterterrorism 
mission similar to USMTM has now been established in country.
209
  
 Although Saudi leaders are reluctant to allow an on-the-ground U.S. military 
presence in the kingdom, there is still a significant level of military cooperation. This 
includes joint exercises between the two countries‟ air forces and armies, the training 
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of Saudi officers in the United States, and $3.7 billion worth of arm deals designed to 
modernize the Saudi Arabian Nation Guard and upgrade Riyadh‟s arsenal of U.S.- 
built AWACS and F-15 warplanes.
210
 
3. Creating the Capability to Deter and Defend 
 Major changes in the US and Saudi partnership are waterway the new US arms 
sales will build on a long series of US army transfers designed to build up critical 
Saudi mission capabilities, and develop interoperable Saudi forces. While Saudi 
Arabia continues to buy arms from a variety of sources-including British aircraft and 
French ships – its army, National Guard, Air Force, and Air Defense force all rely on 
US-made systems and are highly interoperable with the US forces in the Gulf and US 
power projection forces. 
 The US systems form the backbone of Saudi capabilities for armored and air 
warfare, and are supported by a large array of US-made advanced missiles and 
precisions guided weapons, support systems, sensor and early warning systems, and 
C4I/battle management systems. They have already done much to improve Saudi 
capabilities, and Saudi interoperability with US forces. They are part of a broader 
pattern of such arms transfers that not only build up Saudi capabilities but also those 
of other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. They are steadily improving their 
capability to deter and defend against Iran in all forms of intimidation and warfare, as 
well as give Saudi Arabia and other local forces the capability to deal with any 
terrorist or low-level threats like the tribal attacks from Yemen into Saudi Arabia. 
Ideally, they will help deter and contain Iran until major changes take place in the 
character and ambitions of its regime. Deterrence, however, is ultimately dependent 
                                                          
210
 David Ottaway, N.1 p.127 
119 
 
on the capability to defend and reliance on deterrence may not be enough. Iran‟s 
future behavior is unpredictable as is the future alignment and military capabilities of 
Iraq. This make a combination of Saudi and US military capabilities a critical factor 
shaping stability in the Gulf region, and makes their interoperability and level of joint  
training critical to both stability and war fighting.  
 While the US no longer maintains combat forces in Saudi Arabia, Saudi 
Arabia‟s purchases of US munitions and spare parts, its creation of maintenance and 
support systems for US-made weapons, its potential basing capability, and its 
purchase of US C 4I and sensor systems would be of critical value in any major crisis 
where the US has to rapidly deploy and sustain forces in the Gulf region.
211
  
Following the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003, the U.S. military 
withdrew almost all of the 5000 troops that had been stationed in Saudi Arabia and 
moved its Combat Air Operations Center from Saudi Arabia to neighboring Qatar. 
Now, as before, between 200 and 300 U.S. military personal remain in Saudi Arabia at 
any given time to administer long-standing U.S. training programs in conjunction with 
U.S. civilians and local hires. Almost all U.S. training for the Saud armed forces is 
funded via Saudi government purchases through the Foreign Military Sales program. 
The existence of parallel U.S. training programs for different Saudi security forces 
reflects the relatively stove-piped nature of Saudi Arabia‟s security and defense 
establishment; anecdotal evidence suggests that different Saudi ministries and security 
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forces do not operate jointly and may serve as sources of influence and patronage for 
members of the royal family.
212
 
4. U.S. Military Training in Saudi Arabia 
        The US military training programme in Saudi Arabia (USMTM) has served as 
the focal point for U.S.-Saudi Arabia military-to-military relations since its 
establishment in 1953. Through USMTM, the U.S. Department of defense and the 
joint military services work with it counterparts from Saudi Ministry of Defense and 
Aviation (MODA) and Saudi armed forces, which are led by Crow Prince Sultan bin 
Abd al Aziz and his son Prince Khalid bin Sultan. The USMTM is a joint service 
training mission under the command of U.S Central Command (CENTOM) and work 
with the Saudi MODA “to assist and advise the Saudi Arabia Armed Forces with 
respect to the building of military equipment, plans, organization, administrative 
procedures, training methods, and the conduct of such training”.    Organized in 1953 
under the auspices of the U.S.-Saudi Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, the 
program is now administered according to the terms of a 1977 memorandum of under 
standing.
213
 
5. Saudi Arabia National Guard Modernization Program (PM-SANG) 
 The Saudi Arabian Nation Guard(SANG) which operates separately from MODA 
forces, is led by King Abdullah bin Al Aziz and his son, Prince Miteb bin Abdullah. 
The United States Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC) administers PM-
SANG, which seeks to “develop, within the Saudi Arabian National Guard, the 
capability to unilaterally initiate, sustain, and operate modern military organization 
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and systems.” According to USASA, modernization support under the PM-SANG 
mission is “open-ended and includes training, supply, maintenance, operations, 
medical, construction, equipment fielding, equipment post fielding support, and a host 
of other related activities.” The program was chartered by and operates according to 
the terms of a 1973 memorandum of understanding. The Vinnell Corporation, a 
subsidiary of the Northrop Grumman Corporation, is the primary U.S. contractor 
charged with training SANG units. In 2004, terrorists shot and killed an American 
Vinnell employee based in Reyadh. In July 2008, the Bush Administration notified 
Congress of a potential sale to Saudi Arabia of “continued assistance in the 
modernization of the Saudi Arabian National Guard as well as associated equipment 
and services… for the period 1 January 2009 through 31 December 2013.” The 
estimated potential cost is $ 1.8 billion. According to the notification, as of July 2008, 
there were 215 U.S. military personnel and 500 contractors in Saudi Arabia supporting 
PM-SANG.
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6. Arms Sales 
 The US has critical strategic interests that it shares with Saudi Arabia, and shape 
the US-Saudi worry in the field of defense. The first and for more strategic interest 
involve around energy supply. For all the talk of the energy independence over the last 
four decades, the US Department of Energy estimates that the US will be as 
strategically dependent on imported oil through 2035 as it is today ( over 40% of all 
liquid in the reference case). And, these projections do not take account of indirect 
imports of oil in the form of manufactured goods, or our dependence on the health of a 
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global economy that is dependent on stable supply and market driven prices. The 
stability of Gulf energy exports is critical to our economy and every job in the US. 
Secondly the US has finite limits to its military power, and both the US and Saudi 
Arabia face rapidly changing threats. The US needs allies that have interoperable 
forces the can fight effectively along side the US, and that can ease the burden on the 
US by defending themselves. Iran already poses a massive asymmetric naval air-
assault force threat to the Gulf States. The US invasion of Iraq has left Iraqi force a 
decade away from being any kind of counterbalance to Iran, and Saudi Arabia has the 
only meaningful regional power to work with. Al Qa‟ida in the Peninsula is based in 
Yemen, and terrorism and outside infiltration is a serious threat. As a result, creating 
strong, highly mobile Saudi force is critical to the security of Saudi energy and civil 
facilities. Helping Saudi Arabia create a combination of effective air and naval power 
not only affects the Gulf, but the security of tanker and other shipping in the Gulf of 
Oman and steadily more unstable Red Sea. 
 Third Iran already poses a missile and chemical weapons threat and may pose 
a nuclear one within the next 3-5 years. Upgrades of the Saudi Patriots have created a 
base for an integrated approach to air and missile defense. They lay the groundwork 
for follow-on sales of advanced missile defense systems system like THAAD, and an 
emphasis on defense-not Saudi purchases of missiles or nuclear systems. Coupled to 
recent US offers of “extended regional deterrence,” and the new proposed arms sales 
that can help create a Saudi Air Force that is more of a treat to Iran than Iran‟s 
conventional missiles are to Saudi Arabia, US arms transfer offer the best hope of 
both giving Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states security and stopping the spread of a 
nuclear arms race in the region. 
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Fourth the proposed arms sale package create level of interdependence which not only 
gives the current Saudi government a strong incentive to work with the US, but all 
future Saudi government for the next 15-20 years. Saudi Arabia will need continuing 
support from the US during the entire life cycle of every major system sold, and no 
future Saudi government can ignore this fact. Moreover, the sales are large in dollar 
terms, but not in terms of numbers of weapons. This will not be some kind of massive 
build-up. Saudi Arabia had an Air Force with some 417 combat aircraft in 2000, and it 
now has only 219. The Saudi F-15 buy is not a build-up. It will be take some 3-5 years 
to deliver and put fully in service, replace some 87 obsolete F-15EIIs that were in 
service in 2000, and help Saudi Arabia compensate for the serious performance limits 
on 107 aging Tornados still in service.
215
  
               In late December 2011, the Obama Administration publicly announced that 
Saudi Arabia had agreed to terms to proceed with a $ 29 billion sale of advanced F-15 
fighter aircraft to the kingdom after months of delay and speculation. On March 9, 
2012, the Pentagon announced that Boeing had been selected for an $ 11.4 billion 
contract to supply 84 new F-15 along with related systems and weaponry as part of the 
sale. Congress was notified of the proposed sale in October 2010, and Saudi Arabia 
received the formal letter of offer and approval for consideration in April 2011. 
Informed observers attributed the delay in the announcement to a combination of 
Saudi domestic and foreign policy considerations. These include the illness and 
subsequent death of long-serving Defense Minister Crown Price Sultan bin Adelaziz 
Al Saud and Saudi reevaluation of the proposal in light of the unrest in the region, the 
U.S. response, and political change un Egypt, Bahrain, and Yemen. The sale will 
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perpetuate the reliance of the Royal Saudi Air Force on material and training support 
provided by the United States military and U.S. defense contractors. 
 Progress also continues toward completion of other large outstanding sales, 
including 24 Apache helicopters value at $ 2.7 billion, and 12MD-530 aircraft and 12 
Apache and 24 Blackhawk helicopters at an approximate combined value of $ 5 
billion. The sales will guide the immediate future of the United States Military 
Training Mission (USMTM) in Saudi Arabia and the Saudi Arabian National Guard 
Modernization Program (PM-SANG) which have been active in the kingdom under 
special bilateral agreements since the 1950s and 1070s, respectively. Saudi purchases 
fund these programs. The sale, particularly the long-term F-15 program, are seen by 
decision makers on both sides as a symbolic commitment to sustained cooperation 
during a period like to include generational change in the kingdom‟s aging leadership. 
As of October 2012, no legislation or amendment seeking to block or alter the arms 
sale had been introduced in the 112
th
 Congress. Public debates occurred in Finland 
and Germany during 2011 and 2012 concerning proposed arms sale to Saudi 
Arabia.
216
  
7. Economic Relations and Trade 
  The US and Saudi Arabia may have very different political systems and cultures, 
but they are bound together by the same critical strategic interest. Saudi Arabia 
depends on the secure flow of Gulf energy exports both for its own economy and the 
stability of its neighbors. The US depends on that same flow of energy exports to keep 
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energy prices moderate, the stability and growth of a global economy, and the stability 
and growth of its own economy and foreign trade.
217
 
              Saudi Arabia remained the largest U.S. trading partner in the Middle East in 
2011. According to the U.S International Trade Administration, Saudi exports to the 
United States were $47.5 billion and U.S. exports to Saudi Arabia are estimated at 
$13.8 billion. Comparable 2011 figures for Israel, the second-largest U.S. trading 
partner in the Middle East, were more than $23 billion in exports to the United States 
and $13.9 billion in imports from the United States. To a considerable extent, the high 
value of U.S.-Saudi trade is dictated by U.S. imports of hydrocarbons from Saudi 
Arabia and U.S. exports of weapons, machinery, and vehicles to Saudi Arabia. 
Fluctuations in the volume and value of U.S.-Saudi oil trade account for declines in 
the value of Saudi exports to the Unite States in recent years.
218
 
 With the world largest proven oil reserves, Saudi Arabia produced 
approximately 8 million barrels per day of crude oil in mid-January 2009, a significant 
drop from record high production of 9.7 million bpd in mid-2008. Saudi Arabia oil 
reserves, oil exports, and excess oil production capacity make the Kingdom the focal 
point for the global oil market. Saudi Aramco is in the process of completing a multi-
year, multi-billion dollar production capacity expansion project that will raise its daily 
production capacity to 12.5 million bpd. According to the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, approximately 11.1% of U.S. oil imports and 7.2 % of total U.S. oil 
consumption came from Saudi Arabia was the second-largest supplier to United States 
based on average monthly supply. 
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           U.S. calls for Saudi Arabia to increases its daily oil production in order to bring 
down climbing global oil prices in early 2008 were met with resistance from Saudi 
Arabia oil officials. Saudi officials argued that global consumption data and oil market 
conditions suggested that high oil prices were not the result of a lack of supply on 
excess demand but rather a function of refining capacity restriction, declines in the 
value of the U.S. dollar relative to other currencies, commodity market speculation, 
and insecurity in key oil production regions. Significant declines in global demand 
and market prices for crude oil since mid-2008 have largely reversed a trend that 
delivered record oil export revenues and budget surpluses to Saudi Arabia over the 
last five years. Most estimates suggest that oil export revenue provides 90 % of the 
Saudi government‟s budget. In response Saudi Arabia led OPEC production cuts in an 
attempt to stabilize oil prices. Saudi authorities are projecting a 2009 budget deficit of 
$ 17 billion after record surplus of $ 157 billion in 2008. In September 2009, Saudi 
Oil Minister Ali al Naimi said in an interview that “We believe that around $ 75 [per 
barrel] is a fair price for the oil producer, the consumer.”  
          Saudi officials have committed to completing planned oil production capacity 
expansion to the level of 12.5 million barrels per day, while arguing that U.S. policy 
makers and elected officials are sending conflicting signals about the future of U.S. 
energy policy. Specifically Saudi officials appear concerned that U.S. efforts to reduce 
petroleum consumption in the United States will undermine demand for Saudi and 
other petroleum producer, exports, which in turn could limit the profitability of 
planned investments in production capacity and threaten the fiscal position of oil 
revenue dependent governments.
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       In March 2012, Saudi Oil Minister Ali Naimi called the recent global oil price 
spike unjustified and indicated that the kingdom would move to bring more of its 
spare production capacity online. As of late May 2012, Saudi Arabia was producing 
close to 10 mbd and exporting 7.5 mbd. According to the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, as of November 21, 2012, Saudi Arabia was the third-largest source 
of U.S. crude oil imports, about 1.18 million bpd gross U.S. crude oil imports, behind 
Canada and Venezuela.
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 Several U.S. companies are involved in existing on planed projects in Saudi 
Arabia. Saudi Arabia has shown increasing interest attracting foreign investment to 
the Kingdom. Major Saudi economic initiatives, such as plans to construct several 
massive economic cities and to lift Saudi Arabia‟s global competitiveness ranking into 
the top 10 by 2020, involve efforts to secure foreign investment and economic 
development partnerships. Saudi officials appear to be prepared to continue with 
several ambitious economic reform and infrastructure expansion initiatives. On May 
12, 2007, Saudi Aramco and the U.S. Dow Chemical Company announced the signing 
of a memorandum of understanding related to the development of large scale, jointly 
operated petrochemical and plastic production facility in Saudi Arabia‟s Eastern 
Province. The potential value of the deal has been estimated at over $ 20 billion, 
although biddings for engineering and construction contracts were delayed until 2010. 
In May 2008 General Electric announced the sale of its GE Plastic division to the 
Saud Basic industries Cooperation (SABIC) for $ 11.6 billion. The Saudi Arabia 
government owns 70% of SABIC, which experienced steep revenue and profit losses 
as global demand to its plastic and petrochemicals faltered in the fourth quarter of 
2008. 
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                 Saudi officials and business leaders have at times expressed concern that 
U.S. companies are failing to adequately pursue non-energy resource linked 
investment opportunities in he Kingdom. Saudi Arabia established a sovereign wealth 
fund in May 2008 with limited resources for overseas investments. Other sovereign 
wealth funds have attracted interest in the United States, where some observers and 
policy makers have been advocating for increased transparency of and roles of 
sovereign wealth fund investments.
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CHAPTER - VI 
CONCLUSION 
 American-Saudi relations were shaped significantly by the awarding in 1933 
of an oil concession covering a large area in the Eastern part of the country to the 
California Arabian Standard Oil Company (CASOC) by the late king Abdul Aziz Ibn 
Saud. Up until 1940 American-Saudi relations remained purely commercial with oil 
being the chief of sphere of attention.  
 The Second World War (1939-1945) however, changed this situation when 
the United States began to take more active role in world affairs especially after the 
war. During the war the United States decided that it needed to secure a strategic air 
base in the Middle East and after top-secret negotiations King Abdul Aziz granted an 
airbase lease to the United States. 
 The historic meeting on February 14, 1945 between King Abdul Aziz and 
American President Franklin Roosevelt aboard the U.S.S. Quincy was the starting 
point for more robust U.S.-Saudi political relationship that developed thereafter. 
 By 1948 diplomatic representation between the United States and the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was upgraded to the status of an embassy. Cooperation 
between the two countries increased at all levels and in various field though the first 
period of the relations. Despite obvious cultural differences there surprisingly was a 
large common ground between the United States of America and the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia. 
 In the fall and winter of 1973/1974, three events took place, which focused 
international attention on Saudi Arabia oil policies. The first incident revolved around 
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OPEC and the negotiations with the oil companies over prices. For the first time 
OPEC unilaterally raised oil prices ignoring the pleas of powerless companies. The 
second incident occurred during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The Saudi King Faisal 
had ominously stated that “Oil Weapon” might be use if the United States did not 
pressurize Israel to relinquish captured Arab lands. Washington paid little heed and 
when War subsequently broke out; the Saudis announced halting of oil shipments to 
the U.S. For the first time, the United States and Saudi Arabia found themselves on 
opposite sides of a major international crisis. Thirdly although the crisis subsided by 
the spring of 1974 oil prices had rocketed to over $11 a barrel while Saudi income 
rose to $222.6 billion that year. To the United States, it also meant that the Saudi 
Arabia could begin to spend untold amounts on domestic programs, a development 
having potentially far reaching consequences. 
 The embargo forced the United States for the first time to focus on the 
necessity for developing and integrated government-to-government energy relation. 
The policies adopted had to take into account domestic as well as foreign supply and 
demand factors. The realization that the United States was dependent on foreign oil to 
maintain its energy-intensive standard of living came slowly and painfully to 
Americans who had come to believe that personal mobility was their right. 
Domestically, the American government created the Federal Energy office/ 
Administration (FEA) and attempted to restrict private consumption more severely 
than industrial consumption. Development of alternative forms of energy under a 
government study called “project Independence” attempted to evaluate various energy 
strategies. The foreign energy policy was both multilateral in terms of focusing on 
major oil consumers, and bilateral in focusing on the major oil export. Saudi Arabia 
with its high production capacity emerged as the key country for the United States. 
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By the late 1970s, Saudi Arabia played an influential role in reducing the prices of oil 
by arriving at a “compromise price freeze” among the OPEC members. But the 
Iranian revolution led to dropping of Iranian oil production. The resultant climbing of 
oil prices led to “panic buying” in the market. In order to avoid another supply freeze, 
companies and countries alike began building up inventories, which increased the 
prices further 
 The breaking out of the Iraq-Iran War led to mayhem. As the Iranian and Iraqi 
production now shut down, Saudi Arabia increased its capacity. However, by August 
1981, it became obvious that, unlike the Iranian crisis, the war had occurred on the 
downside of a market cycle thereby merely postponing an oil glut. Saudi Arabia 
rapidly cut down production (4.5 mb/d in offered 1983) yet the demand kept 
declining. Oil producers and companies that had stocked offered “discounts” and de 
stocked their oil. In just a decade since the production countries had seized control of 
their oil resources, and OPEC, with Saudi Arabia at the helm had seized control of 
price and production, the world had witnessed two rapid price escalations and two oil 
gluts. Despite every one‟s vociferous support for market stability it appeared to be as 
far from realization in the 1980s as in the 1970s. For the United States, the world‟s 
greatest oil consuming country, and Saudi Arabia, the world‟s greatest oil exporting 
country, oil relations would remain a crucial interest in the future. 
 Longstanding military training programs remain an important pillar of US-
Saudi relations. The United States has played an integral role in the development, 
training, and arming of the Saudi Arabian military since the 1940s, when U.S. military 
advisors first carried out a comprehensive assessment of the kingdom‟s defense 
requirements. Since the 1940s, a number of subsequent U.S. defense assessments, 
joint planning activities, and training programs have established close and cooperative 
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relationships between U.S. military services and Saudi counter parts. The Saudi 
Arabian government has continually sought U.S. military technology and training as a 
guarantee of its national security, and Saudi authorities have pursued military 
procurement and modernization initiative based on the recommendations of U.S. 
defense surveys. 
 The United States meanwhile devised a “Two pillar policy” after the 
withdrawal of the British from the region. This policy looked at Iran and Saudi 
Arabia, as the two regional powers that could fill the so-called power vacuum left by 
the British. This was relatively successful, at least in the context of Gulf security and 
stability, until the fall of the shah of Iran in 1979. Inspite of criticisms of an arms race 
developing between the two regional powers the policy provided an impetus for active 
military relations during the period. Yet relations worsened immediately there after, in 
large part as a result of four crises that followed: The fall of the Shah of Iran in a 
revolution led by Islamic hard liners in Iran and the eruption of hostilities between 
Marxists in South and North Yemen, both of which took place in early 1979 was 
followed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 and the Iraq-Iran war, 
which broke out in 1980. During this period, military relations centered largely around 
two arms request that came to be regarded by the Saudis as “litmus tests” of their 
friendship with the United States: the request for F-15 fighter planes in 1978 and the 
air defense “enhancement package” of 1981 that centered around the Saudi request for 
air borne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft. Although both arms request 
were granted, it was not without stiff congressional opposition that itself had as 
negative an influence on the state of the military relations as the positive impact that 
the American government‟s willingness to make the sales had. 
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Saudi Arabia has lunched two large-scale operations: internal economic development 
and the building of a modern army and internal economic development. The United 
States has been called upon to assist in both areas. The United States-Saudi Arabia 
joint economic and security commission are the agents of choice to implement 
cooperation in both. Saudi Arabia showed some uneasiness about military ties with 
the United States doubting its benefits, the economic relationship between the two was 
clearly recognized as more beneficial to them. The development of economic and 
commercial relations between the two countries could be roughly characterized in to 
two periods. The first, from 1933 to 1973, was basically a period in with Saudi Arabia 
evolved from poverty to become a major oil producer. Then following the energy 
crisis of 1973-1974, Saudi Arabia seemed suddenly to emerge as a major power. 
 Americans oil companies had been responsible for the discovery, 
development and management of Saudi oil. Economic plans were designed in 
consultation with American experts. American technology flourished throughout the 
kingdom. The national airline, desalination projects, the hospitals, the National Guard 
and the vast petrochemical complexes at Jubayl and Yanbu all reflected American 
technology. 
 Saudi Arabia relies on its oil revenues to diversify its economy to build a 
broad industrial base and to educate and train its nationals. Through its economic 
diversification and manpower training programs the Kingdom hopes to transform 
itself from a semi-theocratic monarchy into a modern industrial state. 
 The Kingdom holds 25 percent of the world‟s oil reserves and the Kingdom, 
in its determination to develop its economy for the benefit of its citizen, needs the 
expertise of the West, there is an economic interdependence which binds the two 
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countries together. Saudi Arabia oil supplies are crucial to the economies of the 
Western world. Saudi Arabia is a major customer for the Western world‟s expertise, 
goods and services. It is in the interests of both the United States and Saudi Arabia to 
maintain and strengthen these economic ties.  
 The development of the Kingdom‟s oil resource, in particular, laid a firm 
foundation for co-operation between The United States and the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. The formation of the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) brought 
Saudi Arabians and Americans together in the exploitation of the vast oil reserves of 
the Kingdom. 
 U.S.-Saudi relations economic development had primarily involved the 
American private sector, not the government. For many years, ARAMCO probably 
played a more important role in this sphere than the American government. Economic 
relations also like military relations formally began with the extension of the 
American Land Lease aid to the kingdom in 1943.  There were two influencing cause 
responsible for the Land Lease agreement. The first one was the request for financial 
assistance by the Casco Company from the American government in 1941. The 
request materialized after the Saudi King Abdal Aziz, faced with the prospects of a 
financial collapse, had demanded an advance aid of $12 m to exploit the oil resources. 
The Second World War had brought the company‟s operation to a virtual stand still.  
The second motivating factor was the growing concern in Washington that the British 
intended to use their economic assistance to a kingdom as a wedge to increase their 
political and oil interests. 
 Following the war, mounting oil revenues ensured conclusively that the Saudi 
government would not collapse financially. Yet the rudimentary fashion in which the 
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Saudi ministry of finance operated seldom distinguishing between public and private 
finance led to the task of reforms led by the United States and Britain. The Unite 
States partly on its own initiative, begun offering technical assistance in 1948. The 
Eddy-Mikesell Mission was sent to look at currency reform, while John. E. Greany 
arrived to help design an income tax under the “point four agreement” signed in 1951. 
A Financial Mission under Arthur Young was sent to reform the budgetary and 
administrative system of the Ministry of finance and to improve the tariff system. All 
these missions were the creation of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) IN 
1952 to operate as the kingdom‟s Central Bank. 
 In the year immediately preceding the world energy crisis of 1973-1974, there 
a growing realization in the United States about Saudi Arabia‟s expanding importance 
in world trade and economic affairs. 
 The growing Saudi – American interdependence in trade and commerce led to 
the signing of an agreement which created the “US-Saudi Arabia Joint Commission on 
Economic Co-operation”. The Joint Commission was set up, as a government-to-
government arrangement, with the primary purpose facilitating the transfer of 
technology from the United States to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The work of the 
Joint Commission is under taken by the United States‟ Treasury Department and the 
Saudi Arabian Ministry of Finance and National Economy. 
 Having relied on the United States to produce the oil reserves, the Saudis have 
also turned to the same source for advice and assistance on how best to invest their 
assets, spend their money, and develop their country. 
 The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 constitutes a major landmark in US-
Saudi relations. The Saudis had helped finance Hussein‟s war against Iran, viewing 
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Iraq was a bulwark against the Iranian revolution. The sudden movement against 
Kuwait, a fellow Arab state and monarchy threatened the very existence of the House 
of Saud. With Hussein on the Kuwaiti border, virtually nothing stood in the way of 
Hussein‟s occupation of the Saudi oil fields adjoining the Gulf.  
 As Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait, President Bush immediately sent his 
secretary of defense, Richard Cheney, to Saudi Arabia. There, King Fahd, whether of 
his own volition or as a result of Cheney‟s arm-twisting, requested that U.S. troops be 
deployed to the kingdom in the context of Article 51 of the UN charter. For King 
Fahd, the decision was traumatic. It contravened longstanding Saudi policy to keep 
U.S. forces “over the horizon” on naval platforms in the Arabian Sea. It also 
constituted stark recognition by the Saudis that, if Iraqi forces spilled over from 
Kuwait into Saudi Arabia, as Cheney warned might be imminent, the battlefield would 
be the kingdom‟s Eastern Province where most of the Saudi oil fields are located. The 
Saudi royal request received Islamic validation through a Fatwa signed by the 
principle Saudi religious leader, Abd al-Aziz bin Baz. 
 Announcing the Saudi monarch‟s request, Bush publicly likened Saddam 
Hussein‟s invasion to the action of Adolf Hitler before World War II and explained 
that U.S. military forces were being sent to defend Saudi Arabia, which was important 
to the United States because of the kingdom‟s oil resources. U.S. ground and air force 
units were rapidly deployed to the potentially threatened areas of Saudi Arabia. By 
November they numbered more than 230,000 army personnel and marines and more 
than 1,500 combat aircraft of all types. A Central Command forward headquarters, 
under General Norman Schwarzkopf, was established in Saudi Arabia. On 8 
November, after consultation with King Fahd, President Bush announced plans to 
deploy up to 200,000 additional troops to insure what he termed “an adequate 
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offensive option”. To allay predictable local misgivings, Bush repeatedly indicated 
that U.S forces would leave whenever Saudi Arabia decided they were no longer 
necessary and asked for their withdrawal. 
 The between the Saudi kingdom and US high level and unprecedented 
coordination was severely tested by the bombings of the American military facilities 
in Saudi Arabia in the mid1990s. The first, which occurred on November 13, 1995,at 
the headquarters of a U.S. training program for the Saudi National Guard in the 
capital, Riyadh, killed 7 persons (including 5 U.S. citizens) and injured 60 others 
(including 37 U.S. citizens). Three little-known fundamental groups called the “Tigers 
of the Gulf”, the “Movements of Islamic Change”, and the “Combatant Partisans of 
God” claimed responsibility. Several months later, four Saudi nationals, who 
confessed to being influenced by Islamic fundamentalist exiles, were convicted and 
executed. 
 The second and more lethal explosion, which occurred at Khobar Towers (a 
housing facility for U.S. Air force personnel near Dhahran air base) in June 1996, 
killed 19 U.S. Air Force personnel, wounded many others and prompted the relocation 
of most American military personnel to more remote sites in Saudi Arabia to improve 
security. This bombing was reportedly carried out by exiled Saudi terrorist Osama bin 
Laden while the Saudi minister of interior prince Nayaf suggested that the bombing 
“were carried out by Saudis with the support of others”. Both the incidents led to 
renewed cooperation between the two countries in the wake of the threat that radical 
fundamentalist groups posed to both countries.  
 In many ways, as the Gulf war marked a watershed in U.S. trade relations 
with Saudi Arabia, it also left a significant mark on military cooperation. With an 
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active conflict enraging the region and with a rise in fundamentalist groups who 
resorted to violent methods for redress of their grievances, the U.S. defense of the 
House of Saud was no longer about preserving oil supplies to the United States but 
was more about protecting an emerging market for arms systems and big engineering 
projects. In the time span of three years, U.S. arms suppliers had sold Saudi Arabia 
almost $ 11 billion worth of equipments. Contracts for the biggest oil field projects 
during that time like the Shaybah structure also went mainly to American Companies. 
The looming threat of an Iraq, which was wounded badly, but not finished, pushed 
Saudi Arabia into increased military cooperation with the United States. The presence 
of over 5000 American military personnel in the kingdom confirmed a newfound 
understanding. Most of these personal were involved in enforcing no fly zones over 
various parts of Iraq. This agreement to a large deployment of U.S. personnel, during 
and after the Gulf war, represented a major shift in Saudi foreign policy. Saudi Arabia 
also emerged as one of the largest arms purchaser in the third world. During the period 
from 1988 through to 1995 the Saudis bought $ 67.1 billion worth of military 
equipment accounting for nearly 30% of all Third World arms agreements during the 
above eight-year period. It also gave away contacts worth $ 17.9 billion since the 
beginning of 1991 through to 1995. 19% of the value of U.S. – Saudi arms contracts 
was for lethal equipment; the largest portion (29%) went for support services (repairs, 
rehabilitation, supply operations and training). Another major component was for the 
construction of military bases and facilities, accounting for the largest share (31%) 
through 1990 and the second largest share (24%) for the entire period. The military 
cooperation between the two caused many concerns to the Jewish lobby in the United 
States, which was seriously threatened by the enhanced coordination between U.S. 
and the Saudis. 
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The Gulf War and the active threat of radical groups led to enhanced security 
cooperation between the United States and Saudi Arabia. These factors played a 
largely influential role in removing  the ambiguity that had existed in the earlier years 
of relations so much so that the decade after the gulf war witnessed military and trade 
cooperation emerge as an alternative to the oil weapon as the foundation on which the 
relationship moved ahead from the un certainties of earlier decades. 
 The threat that international terrorism posed to foreign and domestic security 
was highlighted by the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on selected targets in the 
United State. It dramatically re-energized the American focus and resolve on 
terrorism. The events of 11 September raised two immediate questions in the minds of 
President George W. Bush and the members of his national security team. First, who 
was responsible for the attacks? And second, how should the United States respond. 
Over the ensuing days, evidence emerged implicating al-Qaeda, a transnational 
terrorist organization based in Afghanistan under the leadership of Osama Bin Laden 
and harbored by the ultraorthodox Islamic regime of the Taliban. The evidence 
suggested that Bin Laden had planned and orchestrated the attacks from Afghanistan 
where he trained and dispatched the hijacker responsible for carrying out the operation 
on 9/11. 
 Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Lebanon, the four 
countries whose citizens were named as suspects for the September 11 attacks were 
particularly in a delicate situation because many of their citizens took the view that 
Washington itself was to blame for the terrorist assaults 
 The West Asian country with the most to lose by cooperating with Bush in his 
"crusade" against terrorism was Saudi Arabia. Washington`s prime suspect, Osama 
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bin Laden, was born in the Kingdom and was popular with ordinary Saudis because of 
his defiance of the United States. Bin Laden had been stripped of his Saudi passport in 
1994 and anyone overtly supporting him risked the confiscation of his assets. But the 
permanent presence of thousands of American troops on Saudi soil, since the 1991 
Gulf War and Washington`s unstinting support for Israel had angered and alienated 
many Saudis and created strong Anti-American feelings. Concerned with the prospect 
of a violent backlash, the Saudi authorities had insisted on handling investigations into 
the bomb attacks against American targets in the country and prosecuting those 
responsible in its territory rather than extraditing them to the United States. 
 Saudi Arabia was one of three states to have had diplomatic relations with the 
Taliban regime in Kabul, which was in the American hit list for granting sanctuary to 
Osama bin Laden. Riyadh had close ideological, political and economic ties with the 
Taliban that was inspired by the Saudi Wahhabi movement which had swept Abdel 
Aziz Ibn Saud, the founder of the ruling dynasty, to power in the 1920s. Many saw the 
Taliban as a stepson of Wahhabi Arabia. The movement enjoyed considerable support 
amongst ultra conservative clerics and wealthy citizens who financed its rise to power. 
 The solid five decade partnership was severely challenged by the 11 
September terrorist attacks. The relations came under considerable strain, for the first 
time, since the oil crisis of 1973. Even though various reports from the Arab Kingdom 
condemned the atrocious terror attacks and sympathized with the United States, Saudi 
Arabia, at first, refused to allow the United State to use its airfields for the strike on 
Afghanistan. It was only after considerable pressure from Washington that made it to 
announce immediately its wholehearted support to stand against the perpetrators of the 
attack. Such ambiguity was only met with scepticism in the United States. 
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  Where as other American allies like Germany, France and Singapore 
responded to the attacks on America with aggressive battle against hidden al – Qaeda 
cell in their territories, Saudi Arabia acted as if the 15 Saudi hijackers had come, 
literally, out of no where. The Taliban suffered an irreversible isolation only after 
Saudi Arabia decided to snap diplomatic links with it. Although American officials 
led by the President lobbied extensively around the world to build an international 
coalition under the United Nations umbrella, the absence of conclusive evidence to 
convict Osama bin Laden for the crime and his links to Afghanistan`s uncivilized 
Taliban regime genuinely mystified many countries about America`s plans. It was 
extremely difficult for the Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, to cooperate 
because of the vagueness of the proposed military response. The Saudi rulers met 
President Bush`s talk of a "crusade" with a firm disapproval while the idea of a "long 
war on terror" in turn, preferred dictatorial stability rather than the necessity of 
explaining to their people why it was necessary to host another American bombing 
campaign. 
 The September 11 attacks seriously compromised the close relationship 
between Saudi Arabia and the United States. Throughout the war on Afghanistan, the 
American administration disapproved of what they perceived as Saudi indifference. 
Saudi political vulnerability had been exposed by a relentless campaign in the western 
press, inspired by Riyadh`s alleged failure to cooperate fully by arresting possible 
accomplices, cracking down on dissident preachers and freezing book account of 
wealthy Saudi funding militant groups. 
  The Saudi government had a hard time articulating its stand and responding to 
critics both in the U.S. Congress and in the media. FBI agents repeatedly expressed 
their frustration at the lack of Saudi cooperation during the investigation of the truck-
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bomb attack in 1996 on the Khobar Towers housing complex in Dhahran in which 
nineteen American servicemen were killed. In the aftermath of 11 September, the 
cooperation between Riyadh and Washington has proved once again questionable. 
 Some members in the U.S. Congress and several American news 
organizations publicly criticized the lack of Saudi support in the war against terror. 
Their criticism focused on the involvement of Saudi citizens in the terrorist attacks 
and on allegations that Saudi private money had been funneled to terrorist 
organizations. 
 American investigators believe that several of the participants in the 11 
September attacks were recruited by al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, particularly from Abha 
the capital of Asir province in the southwestern part of the country. Individuals from 
the region have also been linked with the attack on the USS Cole in Aden Yemen in 
October 2000 in which seventeen American sailors were killed. 
 In the aftermath of the 11 September terrorist attacks, several U.S. officials 
have claimed that much of al-Qaeda‟s funding is funneled through Saudi 
organizations that provide humanitarian aid to Muslims around the world and that 
much of the money comes from wealthy Saudis and even some member of the Saudi 
royal family. But the Saudis strongly stress that they have no evidence that money 
from any Saudis-based charity went to Osama Bin Laden and his organization. 
 The Saudis had long frustrated American policy makers with their half hearted 
cooperation on security matters, regional diplomacy and intelligence sharing. The 
United States had long allowed itself to depend considerably on the secretive royal 
family for information. The Bush administration`s suspicions, after the September 11 
incidents, made it exclude the Saudi from among the allies who were informed in 
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advance of the U.S moves to freeze the assets of organizations linked to terrorism. The 
Saudis had also not allowed American airplanes to use facilities in the kingdom for 
raids against Afghanistan. Several top officials top within the U.S. administration as 
well as in the congress had endorsed the Rand Corporation`s analysis, which 
suggested, "Saudi Arabia should be treated as an enemy" .The study accused the 
kingdom of being a prime supporter of terrorism and instability in West Asia and said 
it should be issued an ultimatum to stop support for terrorism or face seizure of its oil 
fields. The concern in Washington was that Saudi Arabia could be "heading towards 
an Iran-style Islamic revolution". Although the Central Intelligence Agency concluded 
later that this was unlikely yet it remained uneasy about the lack of hard information 
about this closed society. 
 Political differences between the Kingdom and Washington had been 
widening ever since Crown prince Abdullah had become the de facto ruler of Saudi 
Arabia in the mid – 1990s. Prince Abdullah, considered a pragmatic ruler, was widely 
respected in the Islamic nations for his support to the Palestine cause. He was of the 
view that the present Bush administration did not maintain neutrality in the West 
Asian conflict. Differences also persisted on the policy towards Iraq and Iran. Bush 
had labelled both the nations part of an "axis of evil" demanding a change in their 
regimes. This conflicted with the Saudi policy that wanted to mend fences with its two 
neighbours. Saudi – American ties further worsened when Prince Abdullah initiated 
the move to bring back Iraq into the Arab fold on the condition that it would 
implement all the United Nations resolutions concerning the Gulf War. The United 
States believed that "The war on terrorism" would be won only when the despotic 
culture of the West Asian countries changed. Therefore it was not only demanding 
regime changes in Iraq and Iran but also putting pressure on the Saudis to root out the 
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terrorism in their midst and open up their system. It meant that the House of Saud had 
to introduce liberal Islamic values and find new political partners – something that 
was difficult for the conservative Wahhabi Saudi rulers. The Bush administration was 
increasingly of the view that Islamic militancy could not be contained unless and until 
some of its sources were identified and neutralized in Saudi Arabia. Differences also 
persisted on the presence in the Kingdom of about 5000 American troops who had 
come to expel Iraqis from Kuwait.  Although champions of the U.S. – Saudi alliance 
said the Saudis were transforming themselves from financers to fighters of terrorism, 
yet they acknowledge that they had to go a long way in addressing not just the 
symptoms but also the cause of Islamic extremism. 
 For the Saudi Arabian rulers it was a choice between the benefit of good 
standing with the world's only super power on the one hand and the increasing hatred 
of its people for American policies on the other. 
 The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 was perhaps the most difficult challenge 
facing the Saudi government since the Gulf War of 1990-1991. The invasion was 
unprecedented, unprovoked, and lacking in wide Arab and international support and in 
the name of threats, specially, weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and links to Al-
Qaeda that proved to have little credibility. Official Saudi Arabia wished to see 
Saddam Hussein and the Baath regime go, but feared the aftermath. It opted for an 
indecisive position, hiding behind a confused rhetoric of open objections to the war in 
regional Arab meetings and forums and implicit approval, even secret cooperation in 
allowing U.S. military command centers to conduct the war from its own territory. 
 The Iraq War was to oust Saddam Hussein himself. This made the Saudis 
uncomfortable as the charges trumped up against Saddam Hussein was the possession 
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of illegal weapons of mass destructions (WMDS) and he close relationship the Iraqi 
dictator allegedly enjoyed with the Al Qaeda terror network. 
 The Iraq War saw Saudi Arabia placed in a dilemma. After refusing to 
participate outright at first, it agreed to provide minimum cooperation by way of 
refuelling and a base later, to appease frayed American nerves. The Iraq War saw anti-
American feelings Saudi Arabia reach a crescendo, as the United States was perceived 
as imperialist and anti-Islamic. 
 The Iraq War was a unilateral move by the United States which was opposed 
by many countries, and the United Nations. To the Saudis, the American move 
smacked of imperial designs and as a show of might. Hence it did not convince the 
Saudis to participate in the war 
 Saudi-U.S. relations have grown increasingly complex as the number of 
policy challenges facing both countries has multiplied and as both countries security 
and economic interest have become more intertwined. The United States remains the 
principle external actor in the Middle East region, but by most accounts many regional 
policy makers including those is Saudi Arabia, perceive potential U.S. influence to be 
limited by current U.S. military commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 There has been a lot of anger and antagonism between the United States and 
Saudi Arabia. Both countries have felt the need to restructure their relationship in a far 
more positive way. They have realized that the events of 9/11 cannot be forgotten, and 
there is no way to go back to the past. Simultaneously, both countries are identifying a 
few reasons that should provide the basis for a more positive and vibrant relations 
between them. Significantly, Saudi Arabia, a monarchy, is in many ways an antithesis 
of the United States, the world‟s oldest democracy. Saudi Arabia also enjoys special 
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importance in the international community because of its unique association with the 
Islamic religion and the abundant presence of a scare and precious commodity like oil 
in the region. 
 Both the countries faced a common threat from terrorism, both in terms of 
internal and regional threats. Saudi Arabia was slow to recognize how serious this 
threat was, but after frequent terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia, it had become clear that 
it was as real for Saudi Arabia as it was for the United States. It became clear that 
dealing with terrorism required close cooperation between the two countries, that 
Saudi Arabia needed American assistance in modernizing many aspects of its internal 
security operations, and that the United States in turn needed Saudi cooperation in 
reducing the flow of money to terrorists and for their ability to manipulate Islamic 
cause. 
 Saudi Arabia is still the custodian of Islam‟s two most important holy places. 
It is still a symbol of Islam, as well as Arab rule, to many people outside as well as 
inside Saudi Arabia. If Saudi Arabia shifted its Islamic assistance overseas to support 
moderate and progressive Islam, it could have a major impact outside its territory. 
Meanwhile the United States was being pressurized domestically to look at more 
effective ways to tackle terrorism. There was an outcry for evolving a strategy of 
using hearts and minds, other than force to win over terror. 
 Cooperation to develop information campaigns to build understanding, rather 
than create anger and fear, between both the countries became a necessity. The cycle 
of US “Saudi bashing” by the Congress and US media, and its mirror image in the 
form of US bashing by Saudi opinion leaders and media, was becoming largely 
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destructive in character. Both countries realized that constructive criticism was vital to 
creating mutual understanding on both side. 
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APPENDIX - 1 
CRONOLOGY OF SAUDI ARABIA  
AND THE UNITED STATES RELATIONS 
1919  January 18 Prince Faisal attends the Paris Conference at 
Versailles, where President Woodrow Wilson affirms 
his Fourteen Point; the president‟s support of the 
principle of self-determination and de-colonization 
markets a lasting impression on subsequent relations 
between Saudi Arabia and the United States. 
1932  September 23 Unification of the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
under the        leadership of King Abdullaziz bin 
Abdulrahman Al-Saud. 
1933  July 14  First oil concession in Saudi Arabia granted to 
Standard Oil of California. 
           November Agreement signed establishing diplomatic relations 
between Saudi Arabia and the United States also 
covers commercial relations and navigation 
1938  March 3 Oil found in large quantities in the Eastern Province 
1940  February 4  U.S Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in 
Cairo, Bert Fish accredited as Envoy to Saudi Arabia. 
1942  April 13 James S. Moose, Jr., sent to Jeddah as charge 
d‟affaires of the first U.S. legation in the Kingdom 
1943  October Prince Faisal and Prince Khalid meet with President 
Roosevelt in Washington; it is first high-level Saudi 
Arabian delegation to visit the United States 
1944 Saudi Arabia legation open in Washington, later 
raised to the rank of embassy, U.S. consulate 
established in Dhahran; Saudi Arabia. 
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1945  February 14       King Abdul Aziz and President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
meet on board the USS Quincy in the Great Bitter 
Lake of the Suez Canal 
         June 26 Prince Faisal visit San Francisco to sign the United 
Nation Charter 
1953  March Foreign Minister Prince Faisal meets with President 
Eisenhower at the White House 
1957  January 30 King Saud meets with President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower at the Whit house; it is the first visit to 
the U.S. by a reigning Saudi King 
1962  February 13         King Saud bin Abdul Aziz Al-Saud meets with 
President Kennedy   in Washington 
          October 4 Crown Prince and Foreign Minister Prince Faisal met 
with President John F. Kennady during a visit to the 
U.S. for the opening session of the United Nations 
General Assembly 
1966  June 21  King Faisal meets with President Lyndon B. Johnson 
in Washington DC 
1969  October 13  Prince Fahd meets with President Nixon in 
Washington DC 
1971  March 27 King Faisal bin Abdullaziz Al-Saud meets with 
President Nixon in Washington DC 
1974  April 14 Prince Abdullah visits Washington DC for agreement 
on U.S. assistance in modernizing the Saudi Arabia 
National Guard, of which he is the Commander 
         June 6 Second Deputy Prime minister and minister of the 
interior Prince Fahd bin Abdulaziz meets with 
President Nixon at the white House 
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         June 8  Establishment of the Saudi Arabian- U.S. Joint 
Commission on economic cooperation 
         June 14 President Richard Nixon become the first U.S. 
President to visits Saudi Arabia 
1976  July 6 Second deputy Prime Minister and commander of the 
National Guard Prince Abdullah meets the President 
Gerald Ford at the white House. 
1977  may 23-5 Crow prince Fahd visits the United State meets with 
President Carter at the white house 
1978  January 3 King Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud and Crowe 
Prince Fahd meets with President Jimmy Carter in 
Riyadh 
1982  June 15 King Fahd and Crowe Prince Abdullah meet with 
vice President George H. W. Bush in Riyadh 
1983  October 24 Prince Bandar bin Sultan presents his credentials as 
Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. to president Reagan at 
the White House; serve the dean of the Washington 
diplomatic corps from September 4, 1993 to 
September 8, 2005 
1984 The U.S. Embassy move from Jeddah to Riyadh; the 
Jeddah mission become a consulate 
1985  February 11-15 King Fahd visits the United States for his first official 
visit to Washington since becoming king in 1982; 
meets with President Reagan at the White House 
         June 17 Prince Sultan bin Salman bin Abdulaziz serves as a 
payload specialist on the U.S. shuttle „Discovery‟ he 
is the First Arab and Muslim in space 
         October 4 Prince Sultan meets with President Reagan at the 
White House 
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1987  October 19 Crown Prince Abdullah meets with President Ronald 
Reagan and vice President Bush at the White House 
1989  July 28 Start of the United States tour of exhibition „Saudi 
Arabia‟: Yesterday and today‟ 
1990  November 21 King Fahd meets with President George H. W. Bush 
in Saudi Arabia 
1991  October 30 Saudi Arabia attends the Middle East Peace talks 
cosponsored by United States and Russia 
1994  April 27-8 First meeting of the U.S-Saudi Arabia Business 
Council 
         October 28 King Fahd meets with President Clinton in Half-Al-
Batin, Saudi Arabia 
1995  February 14 Fifth anniversary of the history meeting between 
King    Abdulaziz and President Roosevelt. 
        October 26-27 Prince Sultan visits the United States, meets with 
President Clinton and Vice President Gore at the 
White House 
1996  March 13 Prince Saud Al-Faisal attend the Peacemakers 
Conference in Sharm Al-Shakh, Egypt, cosponsored 
by President Clinton and Egyptian President Hosni 
Mubarak 
         September 25 Prince Saudi Al-Faisal meets with President Clinton 
in Washington DC 
1997  February 24-8 Prince Sultan visits the United States meets with 
President Clinton and Vice President Gore at the 
White House 
1998  May 1-2 King Fahd and Crown Prince Abdullah meet with 
Vice President Al Gore in Jeddah 
152 
 
   September 23-25 Crown Prince Abdullah visit the United States as part 
of a seven-nation worldwide tour, meets with 
President Clinton at The White House 
1999  November 1-4 Second Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Defense 
and Aviation and Inspector General Prince Sultan bin 
Abdulaziz meets President Clinton at the White 
House 
2000  September 6 Crown Abdullah and President Bill Clinton attend the 
Millennium Summit of the UN General Assembly in 
New York 
2001  September 11 Saudi Arabia condemnation of terrorist attacks on the 
United States 
2002  March 16 Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Fahd bin 
Abdullaziz meets in Jeddah with Vice President 
Richard Cheney 
         April 25 Crown Prince Abdullah meets with President Bush at 
the presidential ranch in Crawford, Texas 
         June 13 Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal and President 
Bush discussed the Middle East peace process at the 
White House 
2003  August/May Setting up the joint Saudi-U.S. task forces in the war 
on terrorist, for law enforcement and for financial 
oversight 
         December 23 Joint designation by Saudi Arabia and the United 
States of the Bosnia-based Vazir and the 
Liechtenstein-based Hochburg AG organizations as 
financiers of terrorism under the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1267 
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2004  June/January Joint Designation by Saudi Arabia and the United 
States of a total of nine branches of the Al-Haramain 
Islamic Foundation as the terrorist financiers under 
the 1999 United Nation Security Council Resolution 
1267 
2005  February 12 Sixth anniversary of the historic meeting between 
King Abdulaziz bin Abdulrahman Al-Saud and 
President Franklin De Roosevelt 
         April 23-26 Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdullaziz meets with 
President Bush at the presidential ranch in Crawford, 
Texas 
         September 12 Saudi Ambassador to the US Prince Turki Al-Faisal 
presents his credentials to Secretary of State Rice in 
New York 
         November 13 First Saudi-U.S. Strategic Dialogue held in Jeddah, 
co-chaired by Foreign Minister Prince Saud and 
Secretary of State Rice 
2006  September 4          King Abdul approve the Program of the Custodian of 
the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz 
for Foreign Scholarship, with provide 
15,000schilarship for Saudi students in the US; the 
program is the result of King Abdullah‟s 
2005meeting with President Bush 
         October 2 King Abdullah meets with Secretary of State Rice in 
Riyadh 
         November 25 King Abdullah meets with Vice President Cheney in 
Riyadh 
2007  January 15-17 King Abdullah meets with Secretary of State Rice and 
Defense Secretary Robert Gates at the Royal farm in 
Rawdhat Khuraim, near Riyadh 
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         February 21 Saudi Ambassador to the US Adel A. Al-Jubeir 
presents his credentials to Deputy Secretary of State 
John Negroponte in Washington 
         May 12 King Abdullah meets with Vice President Cheney in 
Tabuk 
         July 31 King Abdullah meets with Secretary of States Rice 
and Defense Secretary Robert Gates in Jeddah 
         October 19 President Bush certifies Saudi Arabia as an anti-
terrorism ally in a memorandum to Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice 
         October 23 King Abdullah meets with First Lady Laura Bush in 
Jeddah; Mrs. Bush was in the Kingdom to launch the 
US-Saudi Arabia Partnership for Breast Cancer 
Awareness and Research in Riyadh 
         November 27 Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal heads the 
Saudi delegation to the Middle East peace conference 
in Annapolis, Maryland 
2008  January 14-16 King Abdullah meets with President Bush at the royal 
ranch in Jenadriyah 
          February   16 Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal meets with 
President Bush at the White House 
          March   21-22 King Abdullah meets with Vice President Richard 
Cheney at the royal ranch in Jenadriyah 
          May   16-17 Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah 
bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud meets with President George 
W. Bush at the royal ranch in Jenadriyah, near Riyadh 
2009  June  US President Barack Obama visit Saudi Arabia as 
part of tour aimed at increasing US engagement with 
the Islamic world 
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2010  October US official confirm plan to sell $60 billion worth of 
arms to Saudi Arabia the most lucrative single deal in 
US history 
2011  December               US confirms major sale of fighter jets to Saudi Arabia 
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APPENDIX - 2 
Recent Proposed Arms Sales 
On October 4, 2007, Congress was notified of a possible sale of Light Armored Vehicles 
(LAV) and High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) and associated 
equipment. Specifically, 37 Light Armored Vehicles-Assault Gun (LAV-AG); 26 LAV-
25mm; 48 LAV Personal Carriers; 5 Reconnaissance LAVs; 5LAV Ambulance; 3 LAV 
Recovery Vehicles; 25 M1165A1 High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles 
(HMMWV); 25 M1165A1 HMMWV with winch; 124 M240 7.62mm Machine Guns; 525 
AN/PVS-7D Night Vision Goggles (NVGs); various M978A2 and M984A2 Heavy Expanded 
Mobility Tactical Trucks, family of Medium Tactical Vehicles, 120mm Mortar Towed, M242 
25mm guns, spare and repair parts; sets, kits, and outfits; and support services and equipment. 
The estimate value of the sale, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $631 million. 
Transmittal No. 08-03. 
On December 7, 2007, Congress was notified of a possible sale of five sets of Airborne 
Early Warning (AEW) and Command, Control and Communications (C3) mission 
equipment/Radar System Improvement Program (RSIP) Group B kits for subsequent 
installation and checkout in five E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System 
(AWACS).This proposed sale will also include spare and repair parts, support equipment, 
documentation, contractor engineering and technical support, and other program support. The 
estimated value of the sale, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $400 million. 
Transmittal No. 08-28. 
On December 7, 2007, Congress was notified of a possible sale of 40 AN/AAQ-33 SNIPER 
Advanced Targeting Pods, aircraft installation and checkout, digital data 
recorders/cartridges, pylons, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and 
technical documentation, contractor engineering and technical support and other program 
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support. The estimated value of the sale, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $220 
million. Transmittal No.08-29. 
On January 14, 2008, Congress was notified of a possible sale of 900 Joint Direct Attack 
Munition (JDAM) tail kits for (which include 550 Guided Bomb Unit (GBU)-38 kits for 
MK-82 bombs, 250 GBU-31kits for MK-84 Bombs, and 100 GBU-31 kits for BLU-109 
bombs). Also included are bomb components, mission planning, aircraft integration, 
publications and technical manuals, spare and repair parts, support equipment, contractor 
engineering and technical support, and other related support elements. The estimated value of 
the sale, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $123 million. Transmittal No. 08-18. 
On July 18, 2008, Congress was notified of a possible sale of continued assistance in the 
modernization of the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) as well as associated 
equipment and services. The estimated value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as 
$1.8 billion. The sale would support the continuation of the PM-SANG program through 
December 2013.Transmittal No.08-67. 
On September 9, 2008, Congress was notified of a possible sale of 12 AH-64D APACHE 
Longbow Helicopters, along with 30 T700-GE-701D Engines, 12 Modernized Targeting 
Acquisition and Designation Systems/Pilot Night Vision Sensors, 4 each AN/APG-78 Fire 
Control Radars and AN/APR-48 Radar Frequency Interferometers, 28M299 HELLFIRE 
Longbow Missiles Launchers, 12 AN/ALQ-144C(V)3 Infrared Jammers, 12 AN/APR-
39A(V)4 Radar Signal Detecting Sets, 12AN/ALQ-136(V)5 Radar Jammers, 12 AAR-
57(V)3/5 Common Missile Warning Systems, 36 Improved Countermeasures Dispensers, and 
12 AN/AVR-2B Laser Warning Sets. The sale would also include U.S. Government and 
contractor technical support and other related elements of program support. The estimated 
value of the sale, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $598 million. Transmittal 
No. 08-75. 
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On September 26, 2008, Congress was notified of a possible sale of 80 Link 16 
Multifunctional Information Distribution System/Low Volume Terminals (MIDS/LVT-
1) to be installed on United Kingdom Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft, as well as associated 
equipment and services. The estimated value of the sale, if all options are exercised, could be 
as high as $31 million. Transmittal No. 08-101. 
On September 26, 2008, Congress was notified of a possible sale of 250 All-Up-Round AIM-
9X SIDEWINDER Missiles,84 AIM-9X SIDEWINDER Captive Air Training Missiles 
(CATMs), 12AIM-9X SIDEWINDER Dummy Air Training Missiles (DATMs), as well as 
associated equipment and services, personal training and training equipment, contractor 
engineering and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics support. 
The estimated value of the sale, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $164 million. 
Transmittal No. 08-88. 
On September 26, 2008, Congress was notified of a possible sale of 17 AN/FPS-117 radars, 
including installation and checkout, engineering, calibration, reintegration, testing, support 
equipment, spare and repair parts, personal training, publications and technical data, U.S. 
Government and contractor technical assistance and other related elements of logistics 
support. The estimated value of the sale, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $145 
million. Transmittal No. 08-88. 
On August 5, 2009, Congress was notified of a possible sale of Tactical Airborne 
Surveillance System (TASS) aircraft upgrades, including spares and repair parts, support 
and test equipment, personal training and training equipment, modification/construction of 
facilities, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and support services and other related 
elements of logistics support. The estimated value of the sale, if all options are exercised, 
could be as high as $530 million. Transmittal No. 09-20. 
On August 6, 2009, Congress was notified of a possible sale of Communication Navigation 
and Surveillance/Air Traffic Management upgrades for Saudi Arabia‟s E-3 Airborne 
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Warning and Control System (AWACS) airplane fleet. The estimated value of the sale, if all 
options are exercised, could be as high as $1.5 billion. Transmittal No. 09-4.  
Sources: www.crs.gov congressional Research Service 
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APPENDIX – 3 
 
Saudi Arabia’s Arms Transfers 1994-2009 
(In Current Million $US; 0 = Less than $US 50 million) 
New Arms Deliveries by Supplier 
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APPENDIX – 4 
 
Buying an Edge Against Iran 
How Gulf Arms Sales Changed Between 2002-2005 and 2006-2009 
(From All Suppliers in current $US millions) 
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APPENDIX- 5 
 
 
U.S. Oil Consumption and Imports 
(in millions of barrels per day) 
 
 
 
Category 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 
2007 2008 2009 
 
Total 
U.S.Consumption 
 
20.034 20.731 20.802 20.687 20.698 19.419 18.768 
 
Total 
U.S.Imports 
 
12.264 13.145 13.714 13.612 13.439 12.872 12.083 
 
Imports from 
Saudi Arabia 
 
1.774 
 
1.558 1.537 1.463 1.489 1.532 1.095 
Imports from 
Canada 
 
2.072 
 
2.138 2.181 2.353 2.426 2.459 2.450 
Imports from 
Mexico 
 
1.623 1.665 1.662 1.705 1.533 1.299 1.280 
 
Imports from 
Venezuela 
 
1.376 1.554 1.529 1.419 1.362 1.191 1.147 
 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Annual Energy Review (AER) 2008, Report No. 
DOE/EIA-0384(2008), June26, 2009; Monthly Energy Review (MER), October 29, 2009; and, 
AER Table 5.4 - Petroleum Imports by Countryof Origin, 1960-2008, available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/aer/. 
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APPENDIX- 6 
 
SAUDI - U.S. MERCHANDISE TRADE (Millions of Dollars) 
YEAR SAUDI EXPORTS SAUDI IMPORTS SURPLUS/DEFICIT 
to U.S. from U.S. 
YEAR SAUDI EXPORTS 
TO U.S.  
SAUDI IMPORTS 
FROM U.S. 
SURPLUS/DEFICIT 
1986 4054.3 3448.8 + 605.5 
1987 4886.5 3373.4 +1,513.1 
1988 6236.9 3799.2 +2,437.7 
1989 7,181.3 3,576.0 +3,605.3 
1990 9,974.3 4,034.8 +5,939.5 
1991 12,153.6 6,572.0 +5,581.6 
1992 11,285.7 7,163.3 +4,122.8 
1993 8,431.5 6,665.6 +1,765.9 
1994 8,307.0 6,010.5 +2,296.0 
1995 8,898.0 6,085.0 +2.813.0 
 Compiled by the Commercial Office, Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington, D.C. Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Washington, D.C. 
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                                                APPENDIX - 7 
Leading Saudi Imports From the U.S. 
(f.a.s. - value in millions of dollars) 
(1990-1995) 
 
BY MAIN COMMODITIES 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Food and Live Animals 225.9 240.4 223.6 210.7 312.6 313.5 
Beverages and Tobacco 186.7 213.9 175.1 212.5 212.6 196.7 
Crude Materials (except fuel) 0.0 30.8 42.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Mineral Fuels, Lubricants, etc. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.1 
Oils & Fats (animal & vegetable) 38.5 30.4 25.2 0.0 0.0 97.4 
Chemicals & Related Products 36.2 93.4 24.5 0.0 51.9 93.8 
Manufactured Goods 210.8 508.7 1,517.5 2,548.9 1,145.9 1,006.6 
Machinery & Transport Equip. 1,255.21 1,656.7 2,552.4 2,530.4 1,274.3 1,729.7 
Miscellaneous Manufactured 41.7 47.4 273.0 152.9 356.3 375.6 
Other Articles 0.0 1,725.8 2,770.7 2,32.9 1,657.6 1,059.3 
Special Category 0.0 115.5 414.1 0.0 0.0 1,345.8 
Compiled by the Commercial Office, Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington, D.C., Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Washington, D.C. 
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                                             APPENDIX- 8 
U.S. trade in goods with Saudi Arabia 2010-2014 
NOTE: All figures are in millions of U.S. dollars on a nominal basis, not seasonally adjusted unless otherwise 
specified. Details may not equal totals due to rounding. 
Month Exports Imports Balance 
January 2014  1,219.1  5,094.2  -3,875.1  
February 2014  1,248.6  4,473.5  -3,224.9  
March 2014  1,631.8  4,881.9  -3,250.1  
April 2014  1,366.4  5,559.8  -4,193.3  
May 2014  1,749.3  4,403.2  -2,653.9  
June 2014  1,680.9  3,594.9  -1,914.0  
July 2014  1,483.7  4,284.8  -2,801.1  
August 2014  1,412.6  2,921.2  -1,508.7  
September 2014  1,536.7  3,531.3  -1,994.6  
TOTAL 2014  13,329.1  38,744.9  -25,415.8  
2013 
Month Exports Imports Balance 
January 2013  1,710.6  3,583.3  -1,872.7  
February 2013  1,275.6  3,041.8  -1,766.1  
March 2013  1,808.1  3,937.7  -2,129.5  
April 2013  1,481.2  4,045.2  -2,564.0  
May 2013  1,789.1  4,491.2  -2,702.1  
June 2013  1,650.4  4,704.3  -3,054.0  
July 2013  1,379.9  4,676.5  -3,296.6  
August 2013  1,228.3  4,790.6  -3,562.3  
September 2013  1,523.6  4,687.3  -3,163.8  
October 2013  1,625.4  4,720.5  -3,095.1  
November 2013  1,500.0  4,355.6  -2,855.6  
December 2013  1,984.2  4,772.7  -2,788.5  
TOTAL 2013  18,956.5  51,806.7  -32,850.2  
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2012 
Month Exports Imports Balance 
January 2012  1,510.6  5,090.3  -3,579.8  
February 2012  1,329.1  4,063.5  -2,734.4  
March 2012  1,696.2  4,949.5  -3,253.3  
April 2012  1,432.2  5,784.1  -4,351.9  
May 2012  1,231.7  5,713.3  -4,481.6  
June 2012  1,630.5  4,619.1  -2,988.6  
July 2012  1,499.3  5,437.9  -3,938.6  
August 2012  1,333.3  4,199.8  -2,866.5  
September 2012  1,330.9  4,043.1  -2,712.2  
October 2012  1,380.3  3,806.3  -2,426.0  
November 2012  1,675.9  4,300.2  -2,624.2  
December 2012  1,917.3  3,659.9  -1,742.6  
TOTAL 2012  17,967.3  55,667.0  -37,699.7  
 
2011 
Month Exports Imports Balance 
January 2011  928.9  2,526.3  -1,597.4  
February 2011  812.2  3,383.9  -2,571.7  
March 2011  1,271.9  3,757.8  -2,485.8  
April 2011  1,197.1  3,163.4  -1,966.3  
May 2011  1,211.6  3,887.1  -2,675.5  
June 2011  1,027.8  4,416.9  -3,389.1  
July 2011  1,076.5  4,194.7  -3,118.1  
August 2011  1,032.9  4,244.3  -3,211.4  
September 2011  1,185.2  5,148.4  -3,963.1  
October 2011  1,353.4  3,304.0  -1,950.6  
November 2011  1,314.2  4,335.6  -3,021.3  
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December 2011  1,511.9  5,114.0  -3,602.1  
TOTAL 2011  13,923.7  47,476.3  -33,552.7  
2010 
Month Exports Imports Balance 
January 2010  811.5  2,056.0  -1,244.5  
February 2010  1,054.0  2,040.7  -986.7  
March 2010  924.5  2,582.7  -1,658.2  
April 2010  999.8  2,995.1  -1,995.3  
May 2010  919.4  2,695.7  -1,776.3  
June 2010  984.7  2,906.4  -1,921.7  
July 2010  813.4  2,451.7  -1,638.3  
August 2010  1,001.7  2,631.0  -1,629.3  
September 2010  899.9  2,689.7  -1,789.9  
October 2010  1,025.7  2,424.2  -1,398.5  
November 2010  879.8  2,986.6  -2,106.8  
December 2010  1,191.8  2,953.1  -1,761.3  
TOTAL 2010  11,506.2  31,412.8  -19,906.6  
 
 
www.cencus.gov/foreign- trade balance/c5170.html 
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